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CHINA’S SOFT POWER AIMS IN SOUTH ASIA: EXPERIENCES OF NEPALESE 
STUDENTS IN CHINA’S INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
ROMI JAIN 
ABSTRACT 
Internationalization of higher education is a major characteristic of China’s higher 
education policy. Accordingly, the Chinese government is fervently encouraging the 
spread of Chinese language and culture through Confucius Institutes, student exchange 
programs, recruitment of international students, and international collaborations. South 
Asia is no exception to China’s higher education outreach. Against this background, this 
qualitative study examined experiences of South Asian students with regard to China’s 
higher education program(s) in relation to the explicit and implicit aims of China’s soft 
power policy. Soft power refers to the power of attraction and co-optation, which is based 
on a nation’s intangible resources such as “culture, ideology and institutions” (Nye, 
1990). 
A case study approach was employed by using Nepal as the site for an in-depth 
investigation into academic, socio-cultural and political experiences of Nepalese students 
in relation to China’s higher education policy and programs. Soft power constitutes the 
theoretical framework. Data sources included interviews with 20 Nepalese students 
(including alumni) and six experts, You Tube videos, images, news stories, books, 
journal articles, documents, and reports. Findings indicate that whereas the Chinese 
political system — specifically governance — and foreign policy as well as certain traits 
of the Chinese society drew admiration from the Nepalese students, the Chinese 
education program was found deficient in brand reputation and Chinese cultural 
vii 
 
penetration remains challenging, while such issues as racism and color discrimination 
stood out as social ills in the Chinese society. 
The study bridges a critical gap in the existing literature that is largely exclusive 
of the South Asian region where China is rapidly strengthening its strategic foothold, as 
well as making a significant contribution to the literature on linkages between soft power 
and education by employing the educational soft power model. The findings should be 
useful to education policy analysts, specifically those who are associated with 
international education, Nepalese and Chinese policy makers, China observers and 
specialists, prospective foreign students in China, and students and scholars of 
international relations.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The end of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union 
triggered two major developments in world politics. First, with the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, China steadily emerged as a great power — rather a competitor to the U.S. 
— with its expanding global footprint by dint of massive economic prowess and military 
might. China is now aggressively pursuing cultural soft power to dazzle and win the 
global audience with its charm. Second, with the collapse of the bipolar politics, inter-
state relations have transcended the barriers of ideological cleavages and covered 
multiple domains of cooperation and exchanges. Hence, apart from defense and security, 
the realms of culture, higher education, trade, and investment have elevated the portfolio 
of inter-state engagements. This is true of China’s foray into South Asia as Beijing has 
moved beyond military and defense cooperation in its growing engagement with the 
region. 
Against the above background, this chapter in its introductory passage explains 
how China’s role in South Asia has unfolded in the post-Cold War era. The remaining 
sections are as follows: purpose of the study; conceptualization of soft power; research 
questions and approach; and significance of the research. 
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China in South Asia 
South Asia, with a population of 1.67 billion, is constituted of seven countries — 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Maldives and Sri Lanka1— the last two of 
which are littoral states. India is the largest among them by size, population and 
economy. 
 
Figure 1. Map of South Asia (International Mission Board, 2016) 
South Asia is known not only as a site of ancient civilization but also for its 
linguistic, ethnic and religious diversity. In the world of international business, it is “the 
epicenter of future middle-class growth” (Wenqian, 2016, September 28, para. 1). In 
international politics, the region has garnered attention as a “nuclear flashpoint,” with 
India and Pakistan as the nuclear states, and for the geostrategic location of sitting astride 
                                                 
1 Though Afghanistan is the eighth member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC), it is not a part of South Asia. Some scholars erroneously include Afghanistan in South Asia, 
which has implications for their research involving the region. 
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“the strategic sea lanes of communication between the Orient and the Occident through 
the Indian Ocean” (Muni, 1991, p. 117). 
China is bordered by Bhutan, India, Nepal and Pakistan. China's linkages with the 
South Asian region were noticeable for long primarily in 1) its “all-weather” relationship 
with Pakistan,2 specifically in terms of the supply of military hardware and build-up of 
Pakistan’s nuclear and missile capabilities (Afridi & Bajoria, 2010; Curtis, 2016) as a 
hedge in Pakistan’s rivalry with India; and 2) in its unpredictable relationship with India 
owing to the contentious border dispute. In recent years, however, with its Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI), initially known as One Belt, One Road (OBOR), China’s strategic 
involvement in South Asia has become prominent. Comprised of two components — Silk 
Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road — the BRI is a grand project of the 
Chinese government, which covers Asian, European and African continents (“Full text: 
Action plan,” 2015) and is considered “a more audacious version of the Marshall Plan, 
America's postwar reconstruction effort” (Perlez & Huang, 2017, May 13). In addition, 
China has strengthened its ties with “smaller states” through “trade, diplomacy, aid, and 
investment” (Anderson & Ayres, 2015, para. 1). While hard power connotes China’s 
military and defense ties with South Asian states, the non-military dimension of China’s 
involvement and penetration in the South Asian region can be termed as an exercise of 
soft power. 
The term soft power, coined by the American scholar Joseph Nye (1990) in his 
book Bound to Lead, refers to a nation’s “intangible power resources such as culture, 
ideology, and institutions” (p. 32) that shape the “preferences” of others, in contrast to 
                                                 
2 Pakistan became China's close ally in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian War in 1962. 
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hard power such as military prowess. In China’s context, as underscored in Chapter II, 
soft power has a broader coverage. For example, presenting the economic aspect of soft 
power in the context of China’s BRI program, Churchman (2015) explains that China’s 
“geostrategic motivations” are to “win the goodwill of OBOR [BRI] nations by providing 
billions of dollars in financing for infrastructure projects that will likely benefit their 
economies” (para. 5). 
China's Interest in South Asia 
A host of factors attract China’s attention to South Asia. First, the geo-economic 
and geo-strategic significance of South Asia entices China to deepen its strategic 
presence in the region through military and economic partnerships, including 
development assistance, with individual countries in the region and to counter India's 
historically predominant influence through, what a section of scholars term, a policy of 
“strategic encirclement” (Prakash, 2017). The preeminence of India in South Asia is 
manifest from its size, population, gross domestic product (GDP), and scientific, military, 
nuclear and missile capabilities. Furthermore, its image as a regional hegemon is being 
projected by a vast majority of South Asian states while citing some of the evidences 
such as India’s military role in the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation in 
December 1971, its carrying out of the first nuclear explosion in May 1974, and the 
annexation of Sikkim with India in 1975. This apart, Nepal, a landlocked country, is 
entirely dependent on Indian ports to transport its goods for external trade. Also, 
India has been involved in infrastructure development projects in South Asian countries 
such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. As such, China’s motivation in South Asia includes, 
though not limited to, undercutting India’s influence (Curtis, 2016) through a 
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combination of hard power and soft power. 
In addition, Curtis (2016) identifies China’s major interests in the region as 
constitutive of the following: 1) promotion of stability in Pakistan with reduction of the 
influence of Islamist extremists, and securing trade and energy corridors; 2) increase in 
China’s influence with such South Asian states as Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka to 
secure energy and trade flows from the Middle East and Europe; and 3) enhancement of 
China’s diplomatic and economic clout. Yet another factor is China’s concerns about 
Tibet that constitutes China’s “core interest.” A brief note on the Tibet issue may be 
made here. Tibet, which lies at the edge of Nepal, was incorporated into China in 1951. 
The 1959 Tibetan uprising against the Chinese rule, led by the Tibetan spiritual leader 
Dalai Lama, met with a crackdown by China. As a result, thousands of Tibetans fled to 
India and Nepal. Thus, given that South Asia (specifically Nepal) borders Tibet, China 
needs Nepal’s support in reining in Tibetan separatists. As Lekhnath Paudel, a Nepalese 
strategic affairs analyst, observes, “In Tibet, unrest has significantly increased, so 
Chinese investment [infrastructure projects] in Nepal should be understood in the context 
of China’s integrity, which is very important for the giant nation” (“China invests in 
Nepal,” 2013, March 11, para. 8). 
China’s soft power diplomacy in South Asia. In order to protect and advance its 
national interests in South Asia, China is not relying on hard power that includes 
provision of military aid to countries such as Pakistan. It is rather deploying soft power to 
create goodwill and co-opt ruling elites and future leaders through such mechanisms as 
trade, infrastructure development, development aid, and educational cooperation. 
Explaining the overarching rationale of China’s soft power diplomacy in South Asia, 
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Jain, B. (2017) writes, “[It] is to convince South Asian states that it [China] does not 
constitute a threat to their national security or regional peace and stability… [and that] 
…it is seriously concerned about their well-being and economic prosperity” (p. 22). 
Jain, B. (2017) further writes that China’s soft power strategy in South Asia is 
constituted of three key planks: cultural diplomacy, economic assistance, and trade and 
investment (p. 17). China has signed free trade agreements (FTAs) with Pakistan and 
Maldives, and its foreign direct investment (FDI) in South Asia rose from $2.8 billion in 
2010 to $12.29 billion in 2015, while its trade with the region is worth over $111 billion 
(“China's investments,” 2016). Importantly, under the BRI, mentioned above, a 
prominent ongoing project in South Asia is the $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor (CPEC) 3, which is 3,000 kilometers long and runs from China’s Kashgar to 
Pakistan’s Gwadar. Besides, China has completed infrastructure projects in other South 
Asian countries while some projects are underway. For example, in Sri Lanka, which has 
long been in “India’s orbit” (Schultz, 2017, December 12), China has constructed the 
Hambantota port and is currently engaged in the Colombo Port City Project; in 
Bangladesh, China’s contribution lay in developing the Shahjalal Fertilizer Factory, in 
addition to its ongoing construction of the Padma Bridge. Further, China’s Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) to Sri Lanka is in terms of loans and grants worth $12 
billion for energy and infrastructure sectors (Bhatia, 2016). 
Matthews, Ping and Ling (2015) observe that unlike the Western countries’ use of 
conditional aid that is contingent on host countries’ record of human rights and 
acceptance of neoliberal ideology, the Chinese aid comes “without strings attached.” 
                                                 
3 Gwadar is a deep-sea port on the Arabian Sea. 
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They write that the Chinese model is “imbued with a less moralizing tone, and is 
characterized by a respect for self-determination and national sovereignty” (Matthews, 
Ping & Ling, 2015, p. 2). In turn, the modality of the Chinese aid projects China’s image 
as that of a non-interventionist country whose growing economic might translates into aid 
and assistance for countries in need. At the same time, Chinese projects in South Asia 
have encountered a “pushback” owing to China’s stringent lending conditions, resulting 
in massive debt for the recipient countries such as Sri Lanka (Schultz, 2017, December 
12). 
Cultural investment is yet another manifestation of China’s soft power diplomacy 
in South Asia. China’s Confucius Institutes in the region not only promote the Chinese 
language but also undertake cultural programs such as the “Chinese Cultural Festival, 
performances, Chinese textbooks exhibitions, cultural lectures, seminars, and various 
Chinese games” (“Welcome to Confucius Institute,” 2007). From time to time, China 
organizes cultural events such as the Chinese Culture Fair that was held in Colombo, Sri 
Lanka, in February 2017, and the Chinese New Year Temple Fair that was organized in 
Kathmandu, Nepal, in January 2017. From the perspective of soft power, the cultural 
initiatives are among the measures intended to build attractiveness for China, which is a 
long-term investment to attract the youth in the region, to curtail India’s cultural 
influence in the region, and to possibly promote its cultural products in the region, as 
discussed in Chapter IV. While it may be argued that soft power is too soft to achieve 
strategic objectives, China has latched onto the notion of “smart power” (Nye, 2009) 
which combines hard power based on coercion and soft power based on appeal, essential 
for protecting the national interest. 
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Involvement in the higher education sector. Yet another domain of China’s 
engagement with South Asia in non-military fields, as described above, is higher 
education. Though Nye includes education in culture (specifically “high culture”), this 
thesis treats education as a separate soft power source in view of the growing literature on 
the role of higher education in soft power. 
Choudaha (2015) observes that China has emerged as “a primary engine of 
growth for international higher education” (para. 2). In fact, from the perspective of 
internationalization of higher education, China is feverishly expanding its global 
educational footprint, though with the varying degree and nature of involvement. It is 
rapidly promoting the Chinese language and culture through Confucius Institutes and is 
swiftly intensifying student exchange programs, recruitment of international students, and 
international collaborations in science and technology. 
Against the above backdrop, it is crucial not only to explore China’s higher 
education engagement with South Asia, the region that accounts for 22 percent of the 
global population, but also to investigate how well it has been received by students in the 
region. Importantly, South Asia is witnessing an increase in the demand for higher 
education. As reported by Badat (2016), “While an estimated 30 million or more are 
enrolled in tertiary education systems across the region, the unmet demand is estimated at 
three to four times this number” (para. 3). It merits a mention that the Chinese 
government states that an objective of its Plan for Study in China (2012) is “to develop 
China into the country with the largest number of international students in Asia” 
(Objectives section). 
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Purpose of the Study 
This study explored the experiences of South Asian students with regard to 
China’s higher education program(s) through the conceptual framework of soft power, 
which is defined as the power of attraction and co-optation and is based on a nation’s 
intangible resources such as “culture, ideology and institutions” (Nye, 1990). The 
experiences were examined in relation to the explicit and implicit aims of China’s soft 
power policy in South Asia. As a South Asian country, Nepal served as the case study. 
Nepal, a federal democratic republic, has a population of 29.62 million and lies in the lap 
of the Himalayas which is known for the world’s highest peak, Mount Everest. Nepal 
stands out as the state in the region where China is striving to sharpen its geopolitical 
outreach by forging stronger bilateral ties. China not only shares its border with Nepal 
but is also believed to be exerting diplomatic pressure on it as well as providing logistic 
support to rein in Tibetan refugees, numbering about 20,000 in Nepal, from carrying out 
anti-China protests and separatist activities. 
Using the soft power framework, I investigated academic, social and cultural 
experiences of Nepalese students in China and at the Confucius Institute in Kathmandu, 
Nepal, as well as bringing out their impressions of China in terms of Chinese culture, 
values, foreign policy, and politics. Interestingly, this study has an interdisciplinary 
appeal in bringing together the concepts of internationalization of education and soft 
power to inform the literature on China’s higher education approach toward South Asia. 
Thus, disciplines of education, international relations, and area studies coalesce in this 
research. In the next section, the concept of soft power is introduced and discussed as an 
official policy embraced by China. 
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Conceptualization of Soft Power 
As mentioned, Joseph S. Nye invented the term soft power to denote the power of 
attraction in contrast to coercion in order to get “others to want the outcomes that you 
want” (Nye, 2004, p. 5). Nye (2004) further writes: 
The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in 
places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them 
at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate 
and having moral authority). (p. 11) 
Nye’s policy prescription for embracement of soft power came in the wake of the 
end of the Cold War era when, according to his reasoning, the United States emerged as a 
sole superpower faced with the possible coalition of international actors. Hence, Nye 
argued for building and using soft power as a “means to success in world politics.” 
Interestingly, the concept of soft power is popular in academic circles globally and has 
caught the fancy of policy makers and practitioners. Currently, the discourse of soft 
power centers around three major directions: prevailing hardness; advocacy for soft 
power; and the parallel approaches of hard power and soft power. 
Prevailing Hardness 
On this spectrum are scholars, policy makers and policy practitioners who have 
advocated the use of hard power, given the complexity of challenges — emerging from 
the reign of hard power — to the US foreign policy. This stance has developed from the 
perceived belligerence of North Korea on its nuclear program issue and the rise of the 
ISIS in the Middle East. In his work on the limits of soft power, Cohen (2016) presented 
a case for the indispensable role of hard power in American foreign policy based on the 
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critical role of the US in international affairs. Cohen argues that given the burgeoning 
military strength of China, Russia’s conquest of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, nuclear 
threats from North Korea and Iran and the spread of the ISIS, global peace is threatened 
which calls for an active role of the US. 
In this context, the Trump administration’s priority to “defense spending over 
diplomacy and foreign aid” was reflected in its budget proposal that was described as the 
“hard power budget” (Merica, 2017). Nossel (2017) notes that the president has tended to 
“view the U.S. role in international affairs almost entirely through a military lens” (para. 
3). For instance, military generals were appointed to head the Department of Defense, the 
National Security Council and the Department of Homeland Security. 
Persisting Advocacy for Soft Power 
Nossel (2017) cautions about the dangers of the major focus on military power. 
Claiming to be the proponent4 of the smart power concept, which combines hard power 
and soft power, she writes, “Trump’s tunnel-vision foreign policy, centered on the 
military, will leave other elements of the U.S. foreign policy toolbox idle while incurring 
significant expense and risk for troops pressured to become the solution to all of 
America’s foreign policy challenges” (Nossel, 2017, para. 5). Echoing Nossel’s 
viewpoint, Herpen (2016) notes that then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had 
expressed concern over America’s lack of proactive communication of its values through 
“government-backed media” (p. 6). He quotes Clinton, “We are engaged in an 
information war and we are losing that war” (p. 6). Interestingly, the recent discourse in 
soft power includes propaganda and information warfare as well as hegemony, as the 
                                                 
4 Nye (2009) writes that he developed the term “smart power” in 2003. 
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following discussion reveals. 
Parallel Approaches of Hardness and Softness 
Despite their overt demonstration of hard power in their foreign policies, such as 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and China’s “muscleflexing” in the South China Sea, 
countries like China and Russia are simultaneously pushing for soft power. For the 
Russian leadership, soft power is apparently tied to information war, which is distinct 
from the original meaning intended by Joseph Nye who contended that civil society 
rather than government plays a crucial role in building a nation’s soft power. In contrast, 
Herpen (2016) talks about the “propaganda machine” of the Putin administration in 
projecting Russia’s soft power and outlines its following elements: allocation of 
“unprecedented generous budgets” for propaganda efforts; “profound modernization of 
the propaganda machinery”; psychological knowhow in conducting information warfare; 
and use of the “relative openness of the Western media world for the Russian propaganda 
offensive” (p. 3). 
In China, Peking University established a research center in 2014 to strengthen 
the country’s soft power. Cai Wu, China’s culture minister, stated at the inaugural 
ceremony, “Cultural soft power is beginning to offer strong support for the rise of China. 
The country must enhance its cultural strength in order to dominate the global contest for 
soft power” (“New center,” 2014). It is apparent that for China, soft power (apart from 
military and economic spheres) is another domain of “contest” for global stature. 
China and Soft Power 
The foregoing discussion raises the question as to what soft power means to 
China and how and why China embraced it, which is discussed in this section. 
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Rationale and Motivation 
The notion of soft power resonated with Chinese scholars and political leadership 
with Nye’s coinage of the term (Nye, 1990). In hindsight, Chinese leaders acutely 
realized its significance for foreign policy with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
which partly demonstrated the power of political ideals and values over the power of the 
gun. In fact, Wang Huning, a Chinese scholar, published China’s “first article on soft 
power” in 1993, arguing that “if a country has an admirable culture and ideological 
system, other countries will tend to follow it” (Glaser & Murphy, 2009, p. 12). Huning 
also noted that a country “does not have to use its hard power which is expensive and less 
efficient” (Huning, 1993, cited in Glaser & Murphy, 2009, p. 12; Wang, 1993, p. 91). 
China’s cultural system reform (CSR) was launched at the 16th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2002 to promote the “socialist 
culture with Chinese characteristics [as] a powerful attraction and inspiration not only to 
the Chinese people, but to the people throughout the world” (Yunshan, 2002, cited in 
Glaser and Murphy, 2009, p. 15). At the Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group 
meeting on January 4, 2006, President Hu Jintao stated that China’s “international status 
and influence” needed to be “demonstrated in hard power such as the economy, science 
and technology, and defense, as well as in soft power such as culture” (Hayden, 2012, p. 
177). On another occasion, Jintao said, “The one who takes [a] commanding point on 
the battlefield of cultural development will gain the upper hand in fierce international 
competition” (Meng, 2012, p. 20). As Glaser and Murphy (2015) note, for China, soft 
power represents “achievement of comprehensive national power” (p. 16). 
Finally, in October 2007 President Jintao submitted his work report to the 17th 
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CPC Congress, mentioning “culture as part of the soft power [of China]” in promoting 
the “vigorous development and prosperity of socialist culture” (“Full text of Hu Jintao’s 
report,” 2012). The report categorically affirmed that in the current era, “culture 
has become a more and more important source of national cohesion and creativity and a 
factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strength…” (“Full 
text of Hu Jintao’s report,” 2012). Further, in the context of the current regime under 
President Xi Jinping, Xinhua (2014) reported: 
President Xi Jinping has vowed to promote China’s cultural soft power by 
disseminating modern Chinese values and showing the charm of Chinese culture 
to the world...China should be portrayed as a civilized country featuring rich 
history, ethnic unity and cultural diversity, and as an oriental power with good 
government, developed economy, cultural prosperity, national unity and beautiful 
mountains and rivers. (para. 3) 
Kurlantzick (2007) traces China’s global strategy of “charm offensive” globally, 
launched in the early 2000s, to Chinese leaders’ projection of China’s rise as “peaceful 
rise” (heping jueqi) in response to foreign policymakers’ perception of China as a 
“threat” to world peace, fueled by China’s “military actions in the 1990s, and its 
powerhouse economy” (p. 40). Similarly, Wang (2011), director of the University of 
Southern California Center on Public Diplomacy (CPD), writes in his introduction to 
China’s search for soft power: 
Countries, large and small, are now keenly aware that their image and reputation 
can be vital strategic resources in world affairs. China is no exception. In fact, 
perhaps nowhere else has the idea of “soft power” been as widely discussed, 
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embraced, and appropriated as in China. (p. 1) 
China’s Approach to Soft Power 
Even though the original meaning of soft power as the power of attraction 
permeates China’s pursuit of soft power, China’s approach to soft power, including its 
characteristics and objectives, has been varyingly discussed and examined. Kurlantzick 
(2007) notes that for Chinese leaders, soft power encompasses all those resources that fall 
outside the “military and security realm,” and as such, it includes “not only popular 
culture and public diplomacy but also more coercive economic and diplomatic levers like 
aid and investment and participation in multilateral organizations” (p. 6), in contrast to 
Nye’s sole emphasis on the “attractiveness of a nation’s brands, of its values, ideals and 
norms” (p. 6). This study focuses on higher education, and while it incorporates Nye’s 
connotation of the softness of soft power (in terms of culture as a source), it also includes 
higher education “aid,” including scholarships, in China’s soft power approach. 
 Glaser and Murphy (2009) point to China’s focus on soft power in both domestic 
policy and foreign policy. The former involves China’s publicization of “harmonious 
society discourse” while the latter incorporates setting up Confucius Institutes globally as 
well as expansion of “Chinese media and other cultural enterprises overseas” (p. 24). 
However, they add a caveat that “China’s soft-power policy remains largely ad hoc and 
primarily reactive, aiming to counter the China threat theory and improve China’s image 
abroad” (Glaser & Murphy, 2009, p. 10). In contrast, Chen (2016) points to the Report to 
the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Chapter VI) as an 
indication of the Chinese government’s “coordinated, consistent, coherent and 
comprehensive soft-power strategies of promoting modern Chinese culture” (p. 10). 
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Mingjiang (2009) critically examines Nye’s conceptualization of hard-soft power 
dualism, pointing out that even conventional sources of hard power can be sources of soft 
power such as humanitarian tasks like disaster relief. Hence, the “resource-based” 
approach of soft power is questionable. He also points to the “social context” that 
facilitates or hinders the growth of soft power. Hence, while the American liberal 
democracy model may be appealing in certain pockets of the globe, the Chinese model of 
development, that is, “political authoritarianism plus economic liberalism” is appealing to 
many third-world countries. 
The above discussion underscores that in China’s context, soft power is an all-
encompassing term of national power resources sans military power. Higher education is 
another resource as well as a tool of soft power in China’s international relations. 
Research Questions 
This study sought to address the following research question through the case 
study approach that focused on Nepal as a South Asian country: What is the relationship 
between the experience of Nepalese students in China’s higher education programs and 
the explicit and implicit aims of China’s soft power policy in South Asia? The sub-
questions are: 
a. What is the experience of Nepalese students with regard to China’s higher 
education program(s)?5 
b. How are China’s social and political values as well as its culture reflected 
in the experience of Nepalese students in regard to China's higher 
education programs? 
                                                 
 
5  This sub-question deals with students’ academic experiences. 
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c. What are the perceptions of soft power/ Nepal-China relations experts in 
terms of the explicit and implicit aims of China’s soft power policy in 
South Asia? 
Significance of the Research 
First, this study is the first to extensively document academic, social and cultural 
experiences of Nepalese students in a foreign country, covering both scholarship 
recipients and self-funded students. Second, with the focus on South Asia, this study 
bridges a critical gap in the literature on China’s internationalization of higher education. 
This research reveals how the experiences of Nepalese students in China and at the 
Confucius Institute (CI) are different (while also being similar in some ways) from those 
of foreign students in other regions of the world. Also evident in the research findings are 
the typical ways in which China is reaching out to the region by strategically employing 
higher education to engage the Nepalese youth, including professionals. Third, by 
analyzing students’ experiences against the backdrop of China’s marketing of its 
education programs, this study offers a useful reference for reform in China and possibly 
elsewhere and also becomes relevant to the discipline of international education. 
Fourth, the conceptual framework enriches the literature on soft power as part of 
statecraft or public diplomacy in inter-state relations, especially in view of soft power’s 
enduring relevance in China’s foreign policy. This is especially so when hard power is 
much apparent in the current international politics, as evident from the defense and 
foreign policies of the Trump administration, North Korea, and Russia. Fifth, this 
research straddles several disciplines – education policy studies, international relations 
(through the intersection of education and soft power and with the role of education in 
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China-Nepal ties), and China studies. As such, it enriches the inter-disciplinary literature 
while also serving as a useful source for comparative studies in higher education — for 
example, comparison with China’s policy approach toward Africa and Europe or 
comparison with experiences of students from other South Asian countries. Similarly, it 
provides insights for US policy makers in handling the challenge posed by China’s rise, 
since the findings provide a close-up view of what young adults from a China-bordering 
country think about China’s political system and foreign policy. 
Importantly, this study captured the voices of Nepalese students by revealing their 
social, cultural, and academic experiences in China. Thus, it should benefit Nepalese 
foreign and education Ministries through greater awareness of those experiences as they 
review their respective policies with implications for Nepalese students in foreign 
countries, as well as to use that information for coordination with the Chinese 
government to improve learning experiences and outcomes for Nepalese students. 
Findings might also be useful in influencing the development of an enabling environment 
for Nepalese students at home. Finally, this study may spark interest among Nepal’s 
policy makers and scholars to conduct research into concrete benefits of China’s higher 
education program for Nepal. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Between 1100 and 1800, China sat astride the globe as an economic and 
technological giant, with the Tang dynasty (618-907 C.E.) constituting a golden age in 
Chinese history (Petras, 2012; Wang, 2011). In its modern history beginning with the 
foundation of the Communist China in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has 
come a long way in becoming a major power, or a global power (as some scholars claim), 
in world politics. Notably, China is the world’s second largest economy and has made 
huge strides in building military strength as well as establishing a global presence in 
myriad ways, including trade and investment. In fact, the trajectory of Chinese politics 
has been marked by distinct visions of its leaders in different time periods. Mao Zedong’s 
extreme emphasis on class struggle reflected in his Cultural Revolution and Great Leap 
Forward which rather insulated China from the rest of the world, though industrialization 
received a firm footing under his leadership. Deng Xiaoping launched the modernization 
program and economic reforms for the country’s economic advancement in 1978. Since 
then, China has been on the path to economic liberalization, while the political authority 
of the Chinese Communist Party has remained intact. The current leadership, led by 
President Xi Jinping, is known for the slogan of the China Dream that calls for national 
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revitalization. Toward this end, one of the stated tasks of the leadership is to build China 
into a “cultural superpower.” It is partly a reflection of the pursuit of soft power or the 
power of attraction. 
However, as noted in the previous chapter, aspirations for cultural eminence are 
not the only rationale behind embracing the soft power policy. China combines the 
objectives of projection of a “benign image” for generation of goodwill in foreign 
countries and preservation of the Communist regime by upholding its legitimacy through 
Chinese values and culture. Furthermore, the Chinese government utilizes a number of 
tools to build and project the national soft power. Higher education is one of them and 
constitutes the cornerstone of the focus for this research. 
This chapter conducts a review of the literature on China’s projection of soft 
power through higher education. The first part describes the soft power – higher 
education linkages in general. The second part explains China’s higher education system, 
followed by the third part that illuminates the connections between soft power and higher 
education in China’s context. The fourth part carries a critique of China’s soft power, 
while the fifth part highlights the research gaps that this study bridged. 
Soft Power and Higher Education 
Nye (2004) puts education in the high culture domain of soft power, whereas 
popular entertainment is in the low culture realm. In this way, education is a soft power 
resource. What makes it so is a higher education institution’s ranking, research output, 
quality of faculty, level of internationalization, attractiveness to international students and 
scholars, and collaboration with prestigious foreign institutions. Importantly, higher 
education is also an instrument of soft power in terms of creation of national goodwill, 
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image, appeal, and attraction among foreign students (Peterson, 2014; Richmond, 2003; 
Selltiz, Christ, Havel & Cook, 1963; Wang, 1991; Watson & Lippitt,1958; Wilson & 
Bonilla, 1955). Wojciuk, Michalek and Stormowska (2015) offer the model of 
educational soft power that has three constituents: values, resources, and tools. 
Accordingly, soft power through higher education is strengthened through 
communication of the values of the host country to international students, provision of 
quality education to foreign students, and through the role of higher education in 
achieving a country’s policy goals. 
Interestingly, the trend of internationalization lies at the intersection of the notion 
of higher education as a resource and tool of soft power. Specifically, this trend has aided 
building and projecting soft power — let us understand internationalization of higher 
education in light of four perspectives: activity, competency, ethos and process (Knight, 
1994). The activity perspective incorporates activities bearing an intercultural dimension, 
including “the presence of international students, curriculum and student/faculty 
exchange” (Delgado-Marquez, Hurtado-Torres and Bondar 2011, p. 270). The 
competency perspective covers the “development of skills, knowledge, attitudes and 
values” (p. 270) to compete in the global marketplace. The ethos perspective includes the 
culture or climate that supports intercultural or international initiatives, and the process 
perspective emphasizes the “integration of an international or intercultural dimension into 
teaching, research, and service” (Delgado-Marquez, Hurtado-Torres & Bondar, 2011, p. 
270). 
Helms, Rumbley, Brajkovic and Mihut (2015) cite Hans de Wit (2002) in 
outlining the categories of motivations driving internationalization, which include the 
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following: academic, economic, political, and social/cultural (p. 7). Soft power, along 
with public diplomacy and national security, figures in the political motivation category. 
The academic category includes expansion of higher education capacity; improvement in 
higher education quality; prestige and rankings of national higher education institutions; 
and creation and advancement of knowledge. Economic rationales include short-term 
economic gain, workforce development, and long-term national economic development; 
and social/cultural motivations incorporate resolution of global problems and promotion 
of global citizenship and mutual understanding. 
What does internationalization cover? Given the above perspectives, it covers 
student mobility (inbound, outbound, and bilateral) through grants, scholarships and 
financial aid policies; scholar mobility and research collaboration through such policies 
as funding for visiting scholars; cross-border education through overseas campuses and 
formation of institutional hubs; internationalization at home through curriculum 
internationalization; and comprehensive internationalization strategies through global 
strategies or strategies with a regional focus (Helms, Rumbley, Brajkovic, & Mihut, 
2015, p. 50). 
The following points highlight the role of higher education in serving as an 
instrument of soft power. It may be noted that by serving as a host to foreign students, a 
country may be able to benefit from the favorable opinion formed by the latter and by 
positively impacting them in its favor. 
Positive Perceptions of the Host Country 
 Atkinson (2010) conducted a comparative analysis of student exchange programs 
to investigate whether soft power really “matters.” She notes that statesmen have 
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supported educational exchange programs as a mechanism of gaining influence and 
shaping “international political behavior” (p. 3) Atkinson is often cited for her following 
observation: “Research has consistently shown that exchange students return home with 
a more positive view of the country in which they studied and the people with whom they 
interacted” (p. 3). Similarly, Wit, Hunter, Howard and Egron-Polak (2015) write in the 
context of the United Kingdom, “The UK Government claims to support universities in 
attracting high quality students and the soft power…they wield on behalf of the UK when 
they return home” (p. 180). 
Influence Over Future Leaders 
Yang (2007) observes, “Training future generations of intellectuals, technicians, 
and political elites from other nations is a subtle yet important form of soft power” (p. 
25). Similarly, Nye (2004) cites former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in 
underlining the significance of soft power, “I can think of no more valuable asset to our 
country [U.S.] than the friendship of future world leaders who have been educated here” 
(p. 44). Nye explains that foreign alumni who hold important positions in their home 
countries can impact “policy outcomes” that are significant to the US. For instance, he 
points out that “most of China’s leaders have a son or daughter educated in the States 
who can portray a realistic view of the US that is often at odds with the caricatures in 
official Chinese propaganda” (Nye, 2004, p. 13). In this regard, Mai (2015) gives 
examples of foreign leaders who were educated in the US and exhibited a pro-US 
attitude, such as Namibian Prime Minister Nahas Angula’s defense of the decision to 
clinch the multibillion-dollar Millennium Challenge Account Development agreement 
with the US or Panamanian President Ricardo Martinelli’s catalyst role in achieving a 
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free trade deal with the US. Mai (2015) concludes: 
 A welcoming attitude toward international students facilitates U.S. soft power. 
The influence that the United States is exerting on other nations around the world 
attests to the underlying and important value of the education of international 
students in the United States. (para. 10)6 
Public Diplomacy 
  Patti McGill Peterson, presidential advisor for internationalization and global 
engagement at the American Council on Education, writes that higher education is “an 
ideal vehicle for soft power” (Peterson, 2014, p. 2). In the context of Malaysia, Wit et al. 
(2015) write: 
The ultimate objective is to develop confidence and trust with partner countries 
through educational internationalization. This policy clearly illustrates Malaysia’s 
desire to use its educational strategy as soft power to enhance its influence in 
contributing to South-South socio-political and economic development. Part of 
this soft power strategy is best reflected in the implementation of various 
initiatives between Malaysia and the CLMV Countries (Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar and Vietnam). (p. 245) 
Transmission of Culture 
  Nye (2004) observes that international students facilitate transmission of the 
                                                 
6 In contrast, according to a survey (“Do years studying,” 2015) conducted by the Foreign Policy magazine 
in 2015, the years spent by Chinese students in the United States did not always constitute a gain for the US 
soft power. The magazine reported that 55 percent of respondents said that their view of China improved 
after time in the US. Explaining the reason, Haifeng Huang, a professor of political science at University of 
California, Merced, said that some Chinese students saw that “not everything in foreign lands is as shiny as 
they had imagined” (para. 9). Further, there are examples of individuals who despite studying in the US 
turned against it. For instance, Anwar al-Awlaki, a “top propagandist for Al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula...was educated at Colorado State and George Washington University” (Rosen, 2014, para. 9). 
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culture, including values and ideals, of the host country. He writes: 
The ideas and values that America exports in the minds of more than half 
a million foreign students who study every year in American universities and 
then return to their home countries, or in the minds of the Asian entrepreneurs 
who return home after succeeding in Silicon Valley, tend to reach elites with 
power. (Nye, 2004, p. 13) 
China’s Higher Education System 
As noted earlier, higher education is considered as both a soft power resource and 
a soft power instrument. Mok and Ong (2013) write, “the expansion of transnational 
higher education in China is…[a] part of its strategy to transform the country from a 
strong economic power to a country with strong cultural and soft power influences” (p. 
134). Similarly, Wang (2013) writes, “education is used as an important tool to expand 
China’s influence, as it provides suitable channels to introduce the Chinese value and 
culture to the world” (p. 306). Interestingly, China has the world’s largest higher 
education system in terms of student enrollment that reached 36.9 million in 2016 from 
approximately 29 million in 2010. Further, it has over 2,900 colleges and universities, 
producing eight million graduates annually. 
Before reviewing the literature dealing with China’s soft power and higher 
education, let us briefly describe China’s higher education system as well as its 
internationalization. 
Education Governance 
 Education governance in China takes place at three levels: national, provincial, 
and local (Michael and Gu, 2016). As the central government agency, the Ministry of 
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Education formulates macro education policies at the national level. Guided by state 
regulations, provincial education departments are responsible for the local policy 
development and implementation. Over 100 universities of repute fall under the direct 
jurisdiction of the education ministry and central government authorities, while a few 
universities are managed jointly by the central and provincial governments. While a 
majority of higher education institutions have affiliation with provincial or lower local 
governments, local authorities are primarily responsible for supervision over elementary 
education (Michael and Gu, 2016). 
Higher education is governed by the Higher Education Law of the People’s 
Republic of China that was adopted at the fourth session of the Standing Committee of 
the Ninth National People’s Congress on August 29, 1998, and became effective on 
January 1, 1999. Per the Law (Article 2), higher education means “education conducted 
on the basis of completion of senior middle-school education” (known as high school in 
the US). Article 3 states that in “developing socialist higher education, the State adheres 
to Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory as its guide and 
follows the basic principles as laid down in the Constitution.” 
China’s higher education sector is divided into two categories: regular and adult. 
Ninety percent of them fall in the regular sector (2,553 as of 2015) that includes “447 
private institutions, 275 independent colleges (quasi-private) and seven Chinese-foreign 
cooperative initiatives” (Michael & Gu, 2016). The adult program follows the regular 
program curriculum but it includes distance education and part-time study. 
Over time, higher education institutions have received autonomy in such financial 
and academic matters such as appointment of staff and administrators, and curriculum. 
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However, as noted by Li and Yang (2014) in their UNESCO report, the government’s 
control can be seen in “ideo-political education and the appointment of university 
presidents and party secretaries” (p. 4). Similarly, Kapur and Perry (2015) note: 
[A]pparent autonomy [among universities] is, however, tempered by the role of 
the Chinese Communist Party...campus governance structure is embedded within 
a larger framework of party supervision and direction. The Communist Party’s 
central and provincial propaganda departments set the agenda, conduct the 
selection and evaluation process, and regulate the funding for major research 
projects in the humanities and social sciences. (p. 8) 
Major Developments in Higher Education 
From 1949 through mid-1970s, higher education in China was largely confined to 
ideological indoctrination and technical training for serving the planned economy 
(Vaughan & Chunzhou, 1996). In fact, China has had a tradition of preserving social 
order through “regimentation of knowledge” (Hayhoe, 1993, p. 291) with the focus on 
“classical studies and narrow specialization” (Vaughan & Chunzhou, 1996, p. 214). 
Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) adversely 
affected higher education as 106 higher educational institutions were shut down and 
replaced with universities for workers, party cadres, and peasants to spread proletarian 
consciousness (Agelasto & Adamson, 1998). It also resulted in a huge drop in 
enrollments from 674,000 students in 1965 to 48,000 in 1970. Hence, in the post-Mao 
period, Deng Xiaoping launched educational reforms with his acclaimed speech in 1978, 
terming education as the “crucial basis for a drive towards economic and technological 
modernization” (Yin & White, 1994, p. 218) which paved the way for massification of 
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higher education and autonomy for universities, as well as sponsoring of overseas 
Chinese students for building a human capital base. It may be mentioned that Deng 
introduced economic reforms and open-door policy in 1978 as a crucial step toward the 
country’s economic development. Hence, educational reforms came to complement the 
economic liberalization. 
Between late 1990s and 2000s, the Chinese leadership found it essential to boost 
competitiveness of the national economy in the increasingly globalized world, which 
demanded educational reforms along with best practices, wherever amenable to 
incorporation. As such, Project 211 (Hawkins, 2007) was launched, which brought about 
decentralization of higher education, involving provincial governments in education, 
depoliticization, and private-sector led commercialization, though the supervisory role of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continued (Gow, 2012). Similarly, Project 985 was 
launched to establish world-class universities. Overall, economic modernization, 
technological advancement, creation of skilled labor force, and building of national 
influence in the domain of education constituted major goals of Chinese higher education 
reform, with the CCP as the major driving force. 
Internationalization of Higher Education 
As noted above, during the Deng Xiaoping era, China opened up to the world as 
part of economic liberalization with impact on its higher education system as well. In 
fact, currently the importance of internationalization can be gauged from China’s 
National Outline for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development (2010-
2020) that outlines the following elements: expansion of international exchange and 
cooperation at all levels of education (both inbound and outbound); introduction of high 
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quality education resources; emphasis on substantial and quality-orientated educational 
exchange and cooperation models; and strengthening of international partnerships based 
on the principle of mutual benefit (“Outline of China’s National Plan,” 2010). 
Further, a section of the website of the Chinese Ministry of Education is dedicated 
to foreign students, institutions and governments, reflecting a prime importance to 
international cooperation and exchanges and to the “Study in China” program which is 
supported through multiple channels of scholarships. As informed by the Chinese 
Ministry of Education, 442,773 international students were studying in China in 2016; 
they are enrolled in over 829 higher educational institutions in China (“Study in China,” 
2017). Moreover, 279 designated Chinese universities offer academic programs in 
science, engineering, agriculture, medicine, law, economics, management, education, 
liberal arts, philosophy, history, and fine arts to scholarship recipients. The scholarships 
offered include: Chinese government scholarships (such as bilateral program, Chinese 
university program, and Great Wall program), Confucius Institute scholarships, local 
government scholarships, foreign government scholarships, enterprise scholarships, and 
university scholarships. 
Coelen and Bo (2016) spell out characteristics of internationalization in China’s 
context. First, the Double World Class Project was launched in 2015 to create 
“international hubs” for cooperation with overseas universities. Second, international 
student mobility, both inward and outward, has been enhanced which has contributed to 
“acceleration of credit transfer, degree recognition and joint programs as well as short-
term student exchange programs” (Coelen & Bo, 2016, para. 5). Third, there is an 
increase in bi-directional staff mobility and international research collaboration. Fourth, 
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there is an uptick in staff and student exchange, facilitated through the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI). Fifth, more than 2,000 Sino-foreign cooperative education programs or 
institutions have come into existence, comprised of 200 non-independent institutions, 
1,800 non-independent programs, and eight independent universities. Sixth, as part of 
overseas expansion, as many as 500 Confucius Institutes and 1,000 Confucius classrooms 
operated in 134 countries at the end of 2015. It may be added that the Confucius 
Institutes offer the following services: Chinese language teaching; training for Chinese 
language instructors; delivering of Chinese language teaching resources; administration 
of the Hànyǔ Shuǐpíng Kǎoshì (HSK)examination (Chinese Proficiency Test); provision 
of information and consultative services concerning China’s education, culture and other 
areas; and conducting language and cultural exchange activities between China and other 
countries (Hanban, 2014). 
 It merits a mention that the Chinese government is packaging its scholarships 
under its foreign policy program — BRI — by launching the BRI Scholarship Program in 
2017 for countries “along the routes” of its BRI project. Clearly, the field of education 
has been employed in the brand marketing of the foreign policy program. Writing in 
China Plus, Yijing (2017) informs that the scholarships will be awarded at the following 
three levels: 
Ministry- and commission-level cooperation, to reserve talents in important fields, 
such as energy, transportation, communication, finance and maritime research; 
provincial-level cooperation, to strength[en] regional scholarship support along 
the routes; and employment-side cooperation, to encourage Chinese colleges and 
universities to cooperate with the state-owned enterprises, government sectors of 
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“Belt and Road” nations and foreign universities to cultivate talents with specific 
orientations. (“China to launch new government scholarship,” 2017, para. 3) 
In sum, by internationalizing its higher education program in several ways, China 
has reached out to foreign countries to deepen bilateral ties, to attract international 
students to its educational institutions, and to spread its culture far and wide. As Yang 
(2007) points out, “Beijing’s innovative and most systematically planned soft power 
policy involves a two-way strategy: hosting international students and building up the 
Confucius Institutes worldwide” (p. 25). Also, the Pew Research Center notes that 
“China’s greatest global asset in the future may be its appeal among young adults around 
the world” (“Attitudes towards China,” 2013). 
China’s Soft Power and Higher Education 
 This section deals specifically with the literature on China’s soft power in higher 
education, divided broadly into two categories: Confucius Institutes and international 
students in China. 
Confucius Institutes (CIs) 
 Most of the literature on the subject is constituted of journal articles that focus on 
Confucius Institutes (Hartig, 2010; Kragelund, 2010; Kwan, 2014; Wheeler, 2014; Yang, 
2010) in individual universities, rather than conducting an in-depth study of several 
components of soft power diplomacy through higher education. In the context of the 
African region, for instance, Wheeler (2014) provides an empirical case study of the 
University of Nairobi Confucius Institute, which reveals a difference in perspectives of 
African policy makers and Chinese diplomats. While the former expect practical benefits 
of Mandarin for Kenyan students, the Chinese side is more interested in advancing 
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China’s political and economic interests than promoting “cultural exchange and language 
instruction.” In the case of the University of Zambia (UNZA), Kragelund (2010) 
concluded that the CI is the “hotbed for training of future Zambian political and 
economic leaders,” serving as a “breeding ground for the development of opinion formers 
that may be able to communicate Chinese values to the Zambian public” (p. 17). He 
further finds that rather than being an example of “equal partnership,” the CI is simply 
“donor driven” (p. 18) like other international partnerships that UNZA has forged 
historically. 
Kwan (2014) studied three CIs in Canada through interviews with their 
administrative staff to understand the host perceptions of CIs. The theoretical framework 
was formed by constructivism, and the findings revealed that CIs were considered a part 
of the internationalization of Canadian campuses. The author further states: “it can be 
observed that the local administrators believe there are benefits to being a host and such 
bilateral partnership proves to be a kind of symbiotic relationship” (p. 125). However, 
Kwan adds a caveat that interviewees’ responses might have been impacted by their 
motive to project “a certain image of the Institute” (p. 25). 
A case study by Yang (2010) employed semi-structured interviews in 
investigating China’s soft power projection through CIs as a “new distinctive model of 
international exchange and cooperation” in the context of an Australian university. 
Hartig’s case study (Hartig, 2010) involving Confucius Institutes in Australia employed a 
“strategic stakeholder engagement” to understand CIs as a cultural diplomacy tool, 
arguing that it is a collaborative tool relying on the commitment of “local stakeholders.” 
Hartig (2010) sums up: 
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The Chinese approach to engage local stakeholders and expertise is strategically 
very smart: by utilizing the current global demand for and fascination with 
Chinese language and culture, the Chinese government has found interested and 
willing international partners to co-finance the teaching of Chinese language and 
the introduction of Chinese culture (p. 269). 
In addition, Confucius Institutes have been the dominant subject of “public 
diplomacy” as exercised by China in higher education (Flew & Hartig, 2014; Hartig, 
2012; Lien, Ghosh & Yamarik, 2014; Paradise, 2009; Zaharna, Hubbert & Hartig, 2014). 
China a Host to International Students 
 Literature in this section mainly covers experiences and perceptions of foreign 
students in China. Gillespie (2001) studied motivational factors and experiences of 
African students in China as part of her work on Sino-African educational exchanges. 
She found that “obtaining a scholarship” was the strongest motivation for her participants 
and their experiences were largely negative reflecting in racial discrimination. Dong and 
Chapman (2010) investigated Chinese Government Scholarship Program (CGSP) 
recipients’ “perceptions of their higher education experience in China and their attitudes 
toward China as a country” (p. 145). However, their use of surveys limited capturing the 
depth of experiences, though they used opened-ended questions for respondents’ 
additional comments. 
Gao (2015) examined the effectiveness of China’s higher educational programs 
for Arab students in enhancing its soft power in that part of the world. The researcher 
reported that the majority of the survey respondents developed “more positive feelings 
about China despite the difficulties encountered by many of them academically and 
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socially” (p. 60), such as communication problems and lack of academic and personal 
attention to international students. Metzgar (2016) focuses on public diplomacy strategy 
“implemented at home” through China-based university programs —Schwarzman and 
Yenching programs — to attract international students. Prior to this study, Cheng (2009) 
examined China’s efforts at being transformed into a major educational powerhouse on 
two fronts: elevating Chinese universities to global higher rankings, and promoting soft 
power overseas through CIs. Cheng pointed out that China was faced with such 
challenges as the counter-challenge from Western universities, lack of quality, and 
skepticism over motives of the CIs. 
King (2013) undertook a comprehensive study of China’s education aid and 
training to African countries such as Ethiopia, South Africa and Kenya. He applied three 
lenses: China’s view of historic connections with the region; China’s approach to South-
South cooperation; and China’s soft power perspective. While King interviewed African 
students to explore their experiences in China, his analysis of the nature of Confucius 
Institutes in Africa was not informed by student interviews. Yet another investigation into 
African students’ experiences was conducted by Haugen (2013) in the context of Sino-
African relations. Using the soft power concept, she mentioned that her study focused on 
two conditions of soft power: students’ enjoyment of their experience and attractiveness 
of China’s political system. However, Haugen’s actual focus was on the academic 
experience, or the first condition, while the second condition seems to have been 
overlooked or sparsely addressed. 
‘How Soft is the Soft Power’? 
Scholars have brought out different dimensions of soft power. Bell (2016) 
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couches soft power in imperialistic terms, not pejoratively though. Using the original 
connotation of soft power as attractiveness of culture, she places it in the category of 
cultural imperialism in the context of Britain, while observing that soft power enables 
“British imperialism to spread in a new form” (p. 77) through British-based companies. 
In the case of China, Callahan (2015) argues that its soft power is “negative rather than 
positive, and is employed as a tool in domestic policy more than in foreign affairs” (p. 
216). He gives the example of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s China Dream notion which 
depicts mainly “negative portrayals of foreign countries in order to mobilize China’s 
domestic audience” (Callahan, 2015, p. 226). As such, this notion has gained “little 
traction abroad” (p. 226). 
Regimented approach. In the case of China, the dualism of internationalization 
and state control is found operational. On the one hand, through internationalization of 
higher education China is building and projecting soft power, integral to which is the 
positive image of and attraction for China and its culture. On the other hand, state control 
over higher education suggests coercion, which is antithetical to “seduction.” This section 
explains China’s regimented approach to higher education, which is considered essential 
for the preservation of the communist regime against the spread of liberal ideas. 
The turning point in the Chinese higher education scenario came about with the 
student-led pro-democracy protests in June 1989 in the precincts of the Tiananmen 
Square in Beijing, marked by such slogans as “Long Live Democracy.” The Chinese 
government severely crushed the protests, declaring martial law. Moreover, the incident 
prompted the government to reform education along politico-ideological lines. Hence, 
party secretaries to universities came to be entrusted with “expunging all tendencies 
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towards bourgeois liberalism” (Hayhoe, 1993, p. 297) by controlling and reforming the 
curricula. It primarily affected the previously popular disciplines of humanities and social 
sciences that witnessed huge cuts in funding, leading to a decline in enrolments (Gow, 
2012; Hayhoe, 1993). Moreover, it led to “the stratification of Chinese academia” (Gow, 
2012, p. 204) with the transformation of the intellectuals of the 1980s into experts and 
scholars for supporting “the emerging technocracy of the 1990s” (Gow, 2012, p. 204). 
In addition, a number of state control methods exist. Writing about the control 
exerted by the Chinese government over Chinese students in foreign universities, 
Onsman and Cameron (2014) explain that the spread of democratic values is prevented 
through Student Affairs Offices in universities. Such offices maintain detailed files on 
every student, including his or her ideological views. This practice acts as a deterrent on 
students in voicing anti-Party opinions for fear of not getting employment if the file 
reports a misdemeanor. Similarly, youth leagues of students are entitled to act as 
informers to university administration if they find their professors speaking up against the 
CPC or the Chinese political system. Similarly, Elizabeth Perry explains that Chinese 
college campuses have mental health facilities just like in the US. However, in China, 
“the definition of ‘mental illness’ is broadly construed to include ideas and inclinations 
that the state deems politically dangerous, and the results of mandatory mental health 
screening for freshmen are forwarded to political cadres for analysis and possible 
preventative or punitive action” (Perry, 2015, pp. 17-18). 
During the current Communist regime led by President Xi Jinping, who assumed 
office in 2013, ideological controls have been further tightened with a vociferous 
advocacy of Marxism. Jinping has instructed China’s higher learning institutions to 
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“shoulder the important tasks of studying, researching and publicizing Marxism, as well 
as training builders and successors of the socialist cause with Chinese characteristics” 
(Ramzy, 2014). For example, in January 2015, then Chinese Education Minister Yuan 
Guiren summoned administrators from China’s universities, including Tsinghua 
University and Peking University, to announce the government mandate that colleges 
must prevent infiltration of textbooks that spread Western values in classrooms or 
disparage socialism and CPC leaders. The minister also asked for a greater scrutiny of 
Western textbooks, stating: “Never let textbooks promoting Western values appear in our 
classrooms” (Yue & Xinying, 2015). 
Control over faculty can also be seen. In November 2014, the Liaoning Daily 
published an article titled “Teacher, Please Don’t Talk about China Like That: An Open 
Letter to Teachers of Philosophy and Social Science.” The Liaoning Daily informed that 
it had found three major issues with Chinese university classrooms, based on 
approximately 130,000 words of class notes compiled by its reporters who had visited 
nearly 100 classes in 20 schools in Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang and Wuhan 
in 2014. First, there was a lack of theoretical recognition of CCP ideology on the part of 
faculty. Second, there was a lack of political recognition, with some teachers praising 
Western “separation of powers” and questioning policy decisions of the CCP’s Central 
Committee. Third, identification on an emotional level was lacking, with some teachers 
making such remarks as “I won’t enter the Party” (Bandurski, 2014). The article 
apparently had official support since it was published by the newspaper of the 
Communist Party provincial committee of Liaoning province and was republished on the 
website of People’s Daily, a prominent party newspaper (Ramzy, 2014). 
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In light of the above discussion, it appears that China’s soft power approach in 
education is selective, geared to promoting its culture, projecting a “benign image” in 
dealing with the outside world, creating goodwill in foreign countries, and upgrading the 
quality of its higher educational institutions as a source of national power. However, 
there remains a question as to whether and how the regimented approach on the domestic 
front is applicable to foreign students enrolled in Chinese universities. As noted, 
regimentation is more applicable in social sciences. In this study, there were five students 
in this discipline; interviews with them shed light on some nuances of academic freedom. 
Research Gaps 
The literature review reveals that the South Asian region is missing in the studies 
on China’s higher education policy in relation to soft power, barring the sporadic 
references to China’s educational presence through Confucius Institutes and scholarships. 
Similarly, the existing literature on the China-South Asia relationship does not deal 
exclusively with China’s higher education outreach in South Asia. For instance, Jain, B. 
(2017) conducted a critical examination of China’s use of a multitude of soft power tools 
such as trade, aid, infrastructure development, cultural exchanges, and education in the 
South Asian region. His contribution lies in exploring the implications of China’s soft 
power diplomacy for India and South Asia in general. Palit (2010)’s working paper 
examined various aspects of Chinese soft power in South Asia in dealing with individual 
countries, while her another work (2017) on soft power, though inclusive of South Asia, 
extends to regions beyond it. Hence, my research focuses exclusively on South Asian 
students’ experiences with regard to China’s higher education programs through a case 
study approach. 
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Importantly, the existing literature (Barrie, 2014; Nelson, 2008; Valentin, 2015) 
on Nepalese students’ overseas experiences is sparse. Valentin’s (2015) study was in the 
context of Nepalese students’ migration to Denmark from the perspective of class-based 
mobility practices in Nepal. In her undergraduate thesis, Barrie (2014) undertook to 
understand the challenges faced by Nepalese students at American universities in light of 
their lived experiences and diverse perspectives on their “exodus and commitment to 
return to Nepal” (p. 10). On her part, Nelson (2008) employed the lens of critical 
hermenuetics to explore the issues of “identity, solicitude, and imagination” as they 
related to Nepalese university students in the United States and to those who returned to 
Nepal upon completion of their studies. These studies are related more to identity and 
migration issues than Nepalese students’ academic experiences in foreign countries. In 
fact, even the Nepalese government’s records are glaringly blank on important aspects of 
information pertaining to Nepalese foreign students. As Aryal (2017) writes: 
The [Nepalese] government has no records on how many students return to the 
country after studies abroad or what they do in foreign countries. Neither MoE 
[the Ministry of Education] nor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) has done 
anything yet to compile details of the Nepalese students abroad and their status in 
the foreign countries. The Non-Resident Nepalese (NRN) Association also has no 
such records. (para. 4) 
Thus, this study makes a major contribution in revealing Nepalese students’ 
experiences in a foreign country in academic, socio-cultural, and political terms. Also, 
experiences of students who studied Chinese at the Confucius Institute are documented. 
The soft power theoretical framework was employed, as explained below. 
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Theoretical Framework 
 As noted earlier, education is a sub-component of culture as a soft power source. 
In this study, education is treated as a resource, as a conduit or vehicle of values and 
culture promotion, and as a tool for policy goals attainment. The model of “educational 
soft power” (Wojciuk, Michalek & Stormowska, 2015, p. 16) was employed which 
features the following three “mechanisms”: values, resources, and tools. I modified the 
model for my research by adding “culture”7 to “values” (Wang, 2013) and by leaving out 
the “quality of life” and “future-oriented” aspects of higher education (which are the 
outcome of the study by the authors of the model). To elaborate, the original model 
presents “quality of life” and future-oriented expectations (as shown in the ellipse in 
Figure 2) as the major “values” found attractive to international students in Finland and 
China. In other words, the ellipse in the original model represents the findings of the 
study by Wojciuk and others (2015). Hence, I kept out the findings portion by retaining 
the three constituents of the model, which includes the following: values (and culture), 
the resource, and the tool. With this, the model became broader which is not confined to 
“quality of life” and “future-orientation” as the values cherished by international students. 
Importantly, the modified model is comprehensive, incorporative as it is of Nye’s soft 
power triad: culture, political ideals, and foreign policy. While the first two of them 
figure in the “values and culture” part, foreign policy occurs in the context of the “tool” 
of education. 
                                                 
7 In the Chinese official discourse, the reference to cultural power has figured frequently. Also, Glaser and 
Murphy (2015) write that China's top leadership has “recognized the importance of soft power in achieving 
comprehensive national power, and has accepted the mainstream academic view that the core of soft power 
is culture” (p. 16). 
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           Figure 2. Original Model (left) and the Modified Model (right) of Educational Soft 
Power 
Let us now understand the model. First, the soft power of a country results from 
education as a resource based on the quality of education or the level of 
internationalization of a higher education institution or through any other element of 
academic attraction for students. Enhancing attractiveness of China’s education for 
international students is part of China’s official document — Plan for Study in China 
(2012). Second, education boosts the soft power by “purveying” the values and culture 
that appeal to foreign audiences. Wojciuk, Michalek and Stormowska (2015) include 
“modernization, equality, good life, and competitiveness” as the cherished values which 
are reflected in varying degrees in Finnish and Chinese educational systems, which 
constitute case studies in their work. In my research, values and culture have a Chinese 
context. The website of the Chinese Ministry of Education markets its educational 
program to international students through the attraction of Chinese culture by underlining 
the following elements: traditional Chinese cultural values (such as harmony, 
benevolence, righteousness, courtesy, wisdom, honesty, and loyalty); food culture; and 
arts and literature (such as dance, music, paintings and poetry). Moreover, the website’s 
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special feature on the cultural experiences of international students states that it aims to 
“encourage foreign students to experience the profound yet interesting Chinese culture 
and understand the huge achievements China has made” (“My Chinese new year stories,” 
2016). 
Third, education serves as a tool of achieving “certain policy goals” (Wojciuk, 
Michalek, & Stormowska, 2015, p. 17). In the context of China, from the soft power 
perspective, the goals include the following: strengthening “mutual understanding and 
friendship between the Chinese people and people from all over the world” (“Notice to 
international students,” 2011, para. 1); “to generate a large number of graduates 
[international students] who both understand China and contribute to connecting China to 
the rest of the world” (“Plan for study in China,” 2012, Objectives section); expansion of 
international influence, and promotion of “its model of governance” (Yang, 2010, p. 
235). It may be added that the phrase “mutual understanding and friendship,” as referred 
to above, occurs commonly in the parlance of public diplomacy in international relations. 
Several factors such as convergence of national interests contribute to building such 
understanding; so, higher education engagement is one of its building blocks.  
The subsequent chapters in this dissertation pertain to the methodology, findings, 
discussion, and conclusion. Findings on China’s soft power aims are presented in Chapter 
IV while findings on students’ experiences and observations are presented in chapters V, 
VI and VII. Chapter VIII is the discussion on the research question based on research 
findings, and Chapter IX presents the implications, recommendations and conclusions. 
43 
 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
This study was undertaken to explore the socio-cultural and academic experiences 
of Nepalese students in relation to China’s higher education programs and to examine 
them from the perspective of China’s soft power policy toward South Asia. The first part 
of this chapter lists the research questions and explains why qualitative research was 
employed. The second part describes the research approach, constitutive of the theoretical 
framework, interpretive paradigm, research context, participants, and interview questions. 
The third part deals with data collection methods in alignment with the case study 
approach. The fourth part describes the role of the researcher in this study, while the fifth 
part deals with data analysis. The final part concludes. 
Research Questions 
This study aimed to answer the following research question and its sub-questions: 
What is the relationship between the experience of Nepalese students in China’s higher 
education programs and the explicit and implicit aims of China’s soft power policy in 
South Asia? 
a. What is the experience of Nepalese students with regard to China’s higher 
education program(s)?  
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b. How are China’s social and political values and culture reflected in the experience 
of Nepalese students in regard to China’s higher education programs? 
c. What are the perceptions of Nepal-China relations experts or soft power experts in 
terms of the explicit and implicit aims of China’s soft power policy in South 
Asia? 
The nature of research questions required qualitative research. As Munhall (2008) 
writes, “Qualitative researchers are most interested in individual perception to gain access 
to understanding the meaning of experience for an individual, a culture and or social 
groups” (p. 606). Her views on the use of qualitative research for exploring perceptions 
have been echoed in several other texts that connect research questions that seek to 
answer “hows” and “whats” of a phenomenon or a case with qualitative research methods 
for in-depth investigation through open-ended questions (Berg, 2014; Farber, 2006, p. 
366). Janesick (1994) explains: 
[Qualitative researchers] study a social setting to understand the meaning of 
participants’ lives in the participants’ own terms. I mention this in contrast to the 
quantitative paradigm, which is perfectly comfortable with aggregating large 
numbers of people without communicating with them face to face. (p. 210) 
Clearly, my research involved a deeper interaction with the participants, which is 
not possible in quantitative research, in order to unearth their experiences in a foreign 
country or in a foreign institution (the Confucius Institute) in their home country. Also, 
Denzin and Lincoln (2005), while differentiating between qualitative research and 
quantitative research, point out that the former seeks “answers to questions that stress 
how social experience is created and given meaning” (p. 10). As such, experiences of 
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Nepalese students are captured in this study by seeking answers to the above-mentioned 
questions rather than relying solely on the Chinese or Nepalese media for the reporting on 
the growing number of Nepalese students in China. 
The study of experiences was informed by an inquiry into students’ motivation to 
study in China or at the Confucius Institute at Kathmandu University (CIKU) in Nepal, 
their academic experiences associated with CIKU and with universities in China, and 
their understanding of China’s socio-political values and culture. Such investigation 
involves semi-structured interview questions and follow-up questions. For instance, Gao 
(2015) undertook a study to examine the effectiveness of China’s soft power in the Arab 
world by supplementing the use of a survey with interviews. The interviews allowed for 
the exploration of Arab students’ overall impressions of China, their experiences in 
Chinese universities and the “future development” of Arab students in China. Gao (2015) 
explained why the survey was not sufficient: first, almost half her respondents skipped 
the open-ended questions that were optional, and “a vast majority” of those who 
responded simply “jotted down a few words” (p. 44) without elaboration; second, 
questions that prompted for ratings of China did not capture details of Arab students’ 
impressions of China, which underscores a limitation of a quantitative approach. Also, 
King (2013), a former professor of international and comparative education at the 
University of Edinburgh, U.K., conducted qualitative research on African students’ 
experiences in China as well as China’s training for African professionals. 
Hence, through qualitative data sources, I was able to explore and reveal how 
Chinese socio-political values, culture, and its higher educational institutions/programs 
are viewed by South Asian students or Nepalese students specifically. Investigation into 
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recipients’ experience was important to determine the strength of China’s soft power, 
defined as the power of attraction. Also, this study required a deeper involvement of the 
researcher in terms of asking probing questions and interpreting the data through her 
informed awareness and conceptual knowledge of the subject, in particular the concept of 
soft power and strategic involvement of China in South Asia. 
Specifically, with Nepal as a site with which China shares the border and has a 
geopolitical interest in spreading its political influence in the South Asian region, the case 
study approach was employed that involves “the study of an issue explored through one 
or more cases within a bounded system” (Creswell, 2007, p. 73). As Creswell (2007) 
notes, education and political science are common subjects for case study research. Be 
that as it may, this study bears disciplinary affinity with political science, international 
education and international relations. 
Research Approach 
Case Study 
Stake (1994) puts case studies into three categories: intrinsic, instrumental, and 
collective. While the purpose of an intrinsic study is to understand “a particular case,” an 
instrumental study provides “insight into an issue or problem” or “refines” a theory. A 
collective case study employs multiple cases to understand a phenomenon. This study is a 
“single instrumental case study” in which “the researcher focuses on an issue or concern, 
and then selects one bounded case to illustrate this issue” (Creswell, 2007, p. 74). The 
issue in the given context was illumination of China’s soft power strategy in the South 
Asian region, specifically Nepal, through the mechanism of higher education. 
Creswell (2007) further writes that a case study approach works well when the 
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researcher has “clearly identifiable cases with boundaries and seeks to provide an in-
depth understanding of the cases” (p. 74). In this study, I identified Nepal as a case for 
investigation: being a South Asian country with a border with China, Nepal comes across 
as a suitable case. The section on sampling explains my choice of Nepal in detail. 
Interpretive Paradigm 
Social constructivism paradigm informed my research. As Creswell (2013) 
explains, the meaning of the situation, phenomenon or event is constructed in relation to 
subjective experiences. The study involved interpretation of the experience of Nepalese 
students in China’s higher education programs. It considered the relationship between 
their experiences and the aims of China’s soft power policy in South Asia. For example, 
the website of the Chinese Ministry of Education prominently markets its education 
system to foreign students, institutions and governments, reflecting the Chinese 
government’s prime focus on international cooperation and exchanges. Creswell (2013) 
writes: 
[constructivist researchers] recognize that their own background shapes their 
interpretation, and they “position” themselves in the research to acknowledge how 
their interpretation flows from their own personal, cultural, and historical 
experiences. Thus the researchers make an interpretation of what they find, an 
interpretation shaped by their own experiences and background. (p. 25) 
The constructivist paradigm reflects in my interpretation of data through my 
analytical lens constituted of my academic background in international relations and my 
South Asian background. The paradigm engaged student experiences and document study 
as well as data from interviews with experts. Further, the meaning making or 
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understanding of the subject was shaped by the theoretical concept of soft power, 
reflecting multiple realities. 
Research Context 
At the outset, it is important to explain why Nepal served as a case study. Nepal 
holds geostrategic significance for a global power like China that is seeking to enhance 
its influence in the South Asia region through both hard power and soft power. Nepal is 
“sandwiched” between India and China. For centuries, Nepal has had cultural affinity 
with India and the post-independent India has wielded political and strategic clout in 
Nepal, especially with the signing of the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship. However, 
on account of political developments in Nepal and China’s expanding portfolio of 
military and economic power, China has lately intensified its penetration in Nepal in 
order to curb India’s influence and deepen its own influence politically, economically and 
culturally. Further, Nepal shares a border with Tibet, spanning over 1,400 kilometers, 
which China considers as its autonomous region. Thus, Nepal’s cooperation is considered 
essential for China to rein in Tibetans from conducting separatist activities. The 
subsequent chapters will turn spotlight on Nepal’s importance for China. 
In addition, the remaining South Asian countries are not ideal cases for the 
following reasons. First, China already carries a predominantly positive image in 
Pakistan which is considered as its “all-weather friend.” So, China is reaching out to new 
frontiers. Also, China has been a supplier of military hardware to Pakistan; as such, its 
influence in Pakistan is tied up to the strength of China’s hard power. Second, in the case 
of India, engagement with China on the front of education is not substantive, other than 
the existence of two Confucius Institutes. In fact, due to the trust deficit between the two 
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countries owing to border skirmishes, China’s defense assistance to Pakistan, and other 
bilateral issues, China’s soft power appeal has not made inroads into the Indian psyche 
(Gopal & Mancheri, 2013). Third, the South Asian countries of Maldives and Bhutan do 
not have any Confucius Institute. In fact, China does not have diplomatic relations with 
Bhutan. Fourth, China does not share a border with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, whereas 
Nepal serves as a conduit for shelter of Tibetan refugees. Given the political salience of 
the Tibetan issue, Nepal ranks high in China’s strategic calculus (Adhikari, 2011). 
Participants and the Sampling Plan 
Participants in my study fall into the following categories: five Nepalese alumni 
who had learned the Chinese language at the Confucius Institute at Kathmandu 
University (CIKU) in Nepal; 15 Nepalese students who were studying in or had studied 
in China; and six Nepalese experts. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and an 
hour. Two of the experts were interviewed for between 45 minutes to an hour for 
ascertaining China’s soft power aims; short telephone conversations with three experts 
involved China-Nepal relations, while email exchanges took place with a Nepalese 
academician on the role of China in Nepal’s education. Pseudonyms – Leejo and Jaba – 
have been used for the experts interviewed on soft power keeping in view the IRB 
requirement for protecting the identity of the participants. Leejo is a China expert and a 
US director of the Confucius Institute in a major East Coast city. The real names of the 
remaining experts have been mentioned in this research as information was them was 
meant to supplement or clarify certain aspects of the findings. They are: Lok Raj Baral, 
Executive Chairman of the Nepal Center for Contemporary Studies; Madhukar S.J.B. 
Rana, an economics professor at the South Asian Institute of Management in Kathmandu 
50 
 
and former finance minister; Sujeev Shakya, a Nepal-based trade and investment 
consultant and the author of Unleashing Nepal; and Hira B. Thapa, a former Joint 
Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nepal. 
Students currently studying in China were in the 20-30 age group (most of them 
in their 20s), while the alumni were in their 20s. Two current Ph.D. students of political 
science and international relations are recipients of scholarships from Nepalese and 
Chinese governments respectively. Three other participants from social science 
disciplines were recipients of Chinese government scholarships for short duration 
master’s courses, ranging from a semester to a year. One former MBBS student in China 
was a recipient of the Nepalese government scholarship.  Thus, out of 15 students – both 
current students and alumni – nine were self-funded. 
A total of 13 universities from diverse regions of China found representation in 
this study, including northern, eastern, northeastern, southwestern, southeastern, and 
central parts of China. I approached members of the Facebook groups of Nepalese 
medical students in China by using the following criteria: their frequency of participation 
on Facebook, based on their profile pages, suggested how likely they were to read my 
message; representation of different universities; and recruitment of both males and 
females. Given the overwhelming number of males in the groups, most of the participants 
in my study were males; four out of the 20 student participants (including alumni from 
the Confucius Institute) were females. It may be added that their recruitment could not 
take place through the Facebook group page administrators. As such, I reached out to 
individual members, which rather ensured their confidentiality. LinkedIn, a networking 
site of professionals, was used for a couple of recruitments. For instance, a combination 
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of a Nepalese last name and a reference to “China” in the search option delivered names 
of possible participants. In addition, a small proportion of participants came through 
snowball sampling as several participants in this study and Nepalese experts 
recommended current students or alumni, contributing to the pool of prospective 
respondents. 
For recruitment of experts, I employed snowball sampling by requesting the 
scholars known to me to recommend those who would be willing to participate in helping 
me create a list of prospective participants. I reached out to select scholars, based on their 
expertise on China-Nepal relations or soft power through email to request their 
participation. The pool of scholars was widened as I conducted author-based searches of 
articles/books in the Cleveland State University Michael Schwartz online database and 
other online libraries, in addition to Internet searches. 
Recruitment challenges. I intended to recruit alumni through the Nepal-
based Arniko Society, which consists of Nepalese alumni who had studied in China. 
Initially, I approached the Society via email with an attached flyer but there was no 
response. When I made a phone call, I received the message that the subscriber did not 
accept incoming calls. Then, I attempted to reach out to the Society’s Executive 
Committee (EC) members through personal contacts but to no avail. One of the EC’s 
members did ask one of my contacts that I email him the questions and he would send me 
his answers, but he never got back to me despite reminders. 
Under the IRB process, I was required to seek institutional approval for 
contacting the students and teachers at the Confucius Institute for recruitment in my 
study. Unlike Confucius Institute (CI) websites in other countries, the Institute’s website 
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in Nepal does not provide any contact information of any of the staff members, including 
the director(s). So, I hunted up two email addresses of the director representing the 
Nepalese side director through online search. I sent him emails to both addresses with an 
attached flyer detailing the purpose of the research. I did not get any response. 
Then, I contacted a couple of Nepalese scholars for help with connecting me to 
the director. One of them informed me about the director who represents the Chinese side 
at CIKU and shared the director’s contact information. Thereupon, I sent the email to the 
Chinese director, but there was no response from him either. Sending a reminder also did 
not work. Other than that, I had some questions for him as well as I sought to provide 
contextual information in my chapter on CIKU. My contact who was in touch with him 
apprised him of my research and sought his cooperation. So, when I eventually called the 
director in October 2017, he told me to email him the questions because he could not hear 
me. I did that immediately. The questions were general such as the curriculum and course 
material, the number of students and their levels, the number of teachers and volunteers, 
and challenges and opportunities before the Institute, while one question specifically 
pertained to the role of CIKU in contributing to China’s soft power. A couple of minutes 
later, I called him just to inform that the questions had been emailed, but my phone call 
was ended from his side. I thought that if he did not wish to share his views on soft 
power, he would at least answer the basic questions that were important to provide the 
contextual information in my introduction to the Confucius Institute in Nepal, which as a 
director he was ideally able and capable to furnish. Had I received institutional 
cooperation, I would have taken a field trip to Nepal to interview the students at the 
Institute. 
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As such, I was left to find out prospective participants on social media. I ended up 
interviewing the alumni whose experiences and stories provided significant information 
that was not to be found in the existing literature or on the Web. But no teacher at the 
Confucius Institute could be interviewed as the contact information was nowhere to be 
found. There was one former teacher whom I approached via social media but I am not 
sure if my message reached him. Had the Confucius Institute website provided email 
addresses of the teachers, I could have at least reached out to them. 
I felt like I was investigating a serious criminal issue because an air of fear, 
caution and secrecy seemed to surround both the Institute and certain sections of the 
Nepalese society. A remarkable behavior pattern on the part of an eminent Nepalese 
journalist and professionals, such as doctors who had studied in China, was that instead 
of expressing their inability to participate, they rather showed their willingness to “help” 
and asked me to email them the questions. But they never responded to my questions 
afterwards. Despite several reminders, they did not even reply to my email. I felt like they 
were more interested in knowing the questions rather than answering them.  As my study 
reveals in subsequent chapters, close linkages have formed between the Confucius 
Institute, the Chinese Embassy, and the Arniko Society. Does that provide a clue to the 
silence? It is an open question. Is it the influence of China? Is it the fear of antagonizing 
China? Or is it the liking for China? Interestingly, a former student at the Confucius 
Institute, whom I reached through Facebook, told me that there was no use interviewing 
the students at the Confucius Institute because they were going to talk about “positive 
aspects only.” He added that if I was aiming to get their views on whether China or donor 
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agencies were spying on Nepal, I might not get answers to such questions, especially 
from the engineering students who, he humorously added, “lacked critical thinking.” 
However, inasmuch as the focus of this study is on students’ experiences, this 
study is rich with relevant data from students.  Further, the extensive online search traced 
information pertaining to the Confucius Institute and the Arniko Society in relation to 
China’s soft power aims and actions in practice. My analysis of the online data brings out 
the dynamics and nuances of China’s higher education engagement in Nepal. 
Interview Questions 
The interview questions centered on the academic, social, cultural and political 
experiences of Nepalese students while studying in China and at the Confucius Institute. 
The questions were designed for different categories of participants: current Nepalese 
students in China; alumni; members of the Arniko Society; students at the Confucius 
Institute in Kathmandu, Nepal; teachers at the Confucius Institute; the Nepalese Ministry 
of Education; and experts (see Appendix B). Questions for the students in China and at 
the Confucius Institute, including the Arniko Society and alumni, were mostly the same 
with necessary modifications to reflect the difference in their academic status. Questions 
for the teachers and the Ministry were formed to understand Nepalese students’ 
experiences from their perspective, though interviews with them could not take place. 
Questions for experts centered around their views on the factors behind China’s 
involvement in Nepal’s higher education sector as well as China’s soft power objectives 
in South Asia and Nepal in particular. 
The process of forming interview questions began with consulting existing 
sources such as Gao (2015), but at a later stage they were discarded because more 
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relevant questions, aligning with the research question and the soft power model, needed 
to be framed. Also, the number of questions was reduced for the sake of managing the 
interview process; the initial count of questions for students was 27, which scaled down 
to 10. 
The questions were developed keeping in view the education soft power model 
with its three constituents: education as a mechanism to expose students to Chinese 
values/culture, education as a resource for China’s effort to attract Nepalese students, and 
education as a tool for China in attaining specific goals such as broadening its influence 
globally and, for this study, in Nepal in particular. 
The values/culture part reflected in questions on students’ cultural and social 
experiences. When students could not understand what I meant by “social values,” I gave 
them examples of Indian values and American values, and thereby probed what they 
thought of Chinese social values or how the people in China behaved with them. Given 
that the Confucius Institute deals with language and culture, it was included in the 
values/culture category. Because the students who had learned Chinese at the Confucius 
Institute in Nepal and had not been to China, follow-up questions mostly centered around 
their language learning and cultural experiences. 
The resource part of the soft power model covered the academic experiences of 
Nepalese students, both current and alumni, in China. Under this model, education is 
considered a resource in nation-branding or attractiveness of a country based on its 
educational offerings. The tool part of the model refers to the use of higher education to 
achieve “certain policy goals.” This study deals with the foreign policy goals vis-à-vis 
Nepal. In this regard, experts on soft power and Nepal-China relations were interviewed, 
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in addition to analyzing documents such as news articles. In addition, Nepalese students 
were asked about their understanding of China-Nepal relations. 
Data Collection Methods 
Methodological rigor followed from adherence to the requirements of the case 
study approach. Accordingly, data collection involved “multiple sources of information” 
(interviews, audiovisual material, books and articles, documents, and reports) to answer 
the research question about experiences of Nepalese students at the Confucius Institute in 
Nepal as well those who were studying in or had studied in China as well as to explore 
the aims of China’s soft power policy. 
Interviews took place over WhatsApp (a Voice over IP service), regular phone, 
Skype, and via emails. Four respondents, including current students and alumni, 
answered by email. Student experiences were studied in terms of participants’ views 
about the educational program, their motivation in joining the program, and their 
academic, social, cultural, and political experiences. The social aspect of experience was 
explored in the case of Nepalese students in China in order to understand their 
experiences with Chinese society. In addition, an interview with the Nepalese Minister of 
Education (or the education ministry staff) was planned in order to explore the benefits of 
China’s higher education program for Nepal and to triangulate the investigation of 
experiences of Nepalese students. But I could not reach out to the Ministry. As such, 
content from the Web such as the education minister’s statements was incorporated and 
analyzed in this thesis. The table below illustrates how various data sources help to 
answer the research question and sub-questions in this study: 
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Table 1 
Data Sources for Addressing the Research Questions 
Data Sources Information Research 
Question 
Website of the Chinese 
Embassy in Nepal: 
Education section 
 
Activities of Chinese ambassador in 
terms of speeches, participation in 
exhibitions, seminars pertaining to 
China’s educational cooperation with 
Nepal. 
 
Aims of China’s 
soft power 
policy   
The Chinese Ministry of 
Education website 
 
Policy framework on international 
cooperation & exchanges. 
Policy focus on internationalization of 
higher education. For example, the 
National Outline for Medium and 
Long-term Education Reform and 
Development (2010-2020). 
 
Policy 
framework for 
understanding 
the soft power 
approach in the 
higher education 
domain 
Online articles/stories China-Nepal educational 
cooperation/views of students 
studying in China 
 
Aims of China’s 
soft power 
policy/ 
experiences of 
Nepalese 
students 
 
You Tube videos Interviews with Chinese language 
learners at the Confucius Institute at 
Kathmandu University 
 
Experiences of 
Nepalese 
students 
Interviews with members of 
the Arniko Society/alumni 
and current Nepalese 
students in China 
 
Academic, social, cultural and 
political experiences 
Experiences of 
Nepalese 
students 
Interviews with students at 
the Confucius Institute in 
Kathmandu, Nepal 
Academic, social, cultural and 
political experiences 
Experiences of 
Nepalese 
students  
Expert interviews China’s soft power pursuit through 
higher education, with a special 
reference to Nepal. 
Aims of China’s 
soft power 
policy 
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Role of the Researcher 
My role was to collect the data through various sources to answer the research 
questions and analyze it through the soft power framework. In this regard, my academic 
background in international relations enabled me to connect the data with the concept of 
power. Since I am from India, a South Asian country, my interest in the region further 
drove my investigation into the subject. Also, India has a population of 3 to 4 million 
Nepalese people. Further, the name of Tenzing Norgay, one of the first mountaineers to 
climb the Mount Everest which is in Nepal, has been associated with my memory of 
Nepal. As such, it was interesting for me to know as to what motivated Nepalese students 
to study in China, while traditionally India has been their destination. Hence, I became 
interested in exploring Nepalese students’ mobility outside South Asia in choosing China 
as a destination for higher education. 
Thus, my subjectivity crept in interpreting findings in terms of adding a note for 
Indian policy makers to retain India’s attractiveness for Nepalese youth. Besides, my 
understanding of China, through the lens of the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the 
persisting border skirmishes between the two countries, is informed by China’s pursuit of 
hard power. Hence, this background enabled me to discern contradiction with its soft 
power strategy as I analyzed the data. Nevertheless, I was aware that my role lay in 
presenting the views of the participants in terms of what they perceived and experienced. 
As such, my findings clearly indicate what the participants reported (Chapters V-VII), 
separate from my interpretations in Chapter VIII. 
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Data Analysis 
With guidance from Saldana’s coding manual (2009), the data underwent multiple 
cycles of coding to investigate into the experience of the recipients of Chinese education 
as well as to identify the aims of the Chinese government in its soft power policy through 
higher education in South Asia. Toward this end, the educational soft power model 
(Wojciuk, Michaleka & Stormowska, 2015), as described earlier, was employed. As 
such, the model constituents of “values”/culture, “resources” and “tools” served as 
umbrella themes representing the three chapters — V, VI and VII. In respect of selection 
of the type of coding, Saldana (2009) writes, “Affective coding methods investigate 
subjective qualities of human experience (e.g., emotions, values, conflicts, judgments) by 
directly acknowledging and naming those experiences” (p. 86). 
Descriptive codes were used which summarize the statements of the interviewees. 
Affective coding supplemented the codes where applicable. For example, the descriptive 
code of “racial discrimination” was accompanied by the emotion code of “disapproval,” 
and “mental discomfort,” which resulted from the participant’s experience of 
discriminatory treatment that he “didn’t like” and that made him feel “uncomfortable.” 
Coding was preceded by extraction of statements based on research questions. Once 
codes were assigned to the selected responses, they were condensed into categories such 
as “unpleasant social behavior.” 
The archived data was codified to inform analysis pertaining to China’s soft 
power aims and students’ perceptions of China’s foreign policy. Other than that, 
this source was employed for substantiation, context support, and evidence where 
relevant. 
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Coding acquired added importance in this qualitative study owing to the 
methodological challenges and complexities associated with measuring soft power. Tao 
(2015) mentions the most important of them: 
First [as acknowledged by Nye himself] how do we know how much soft power a 
country has and how do we compare soft power across countries? Public opinion 
polls are the most frequently used instruments these days, but they tell us little 
about the degree of attraction, the essence of soft power. Second, how do we 
know that one country’s foreign policy behavior is a result of another country’s 
soft power? In other words, how can we isolate the independent effects of soft 
power from those of hard power (such as economic inducements or military 
coercion)? (para. 7) 
Hence, the use of coding enabled me to capture the perceptions and experiences 
of Nepalese students in relation to China’s higher education offering, social values, 
culture, politics, and foreign policy. 
Trustworthiness 
This study meets the four criteria of trustworthiness, as spelt out by Guba (1981): 
credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability. 
Credibility. Credibility was achieved by using properly designed research 
methods as well as through triangulation, peer scrutiny, the researcher’s personal 
credibility, and thick descriptions. Triangulation occurred in terms of diversity of data 
sources. In this regard, Shenton (2004) writes, “Here individual viewpoints and 
experiences can be verified against others and, ultimately, a rich picture of the attitudes, 
needs or behavior of those under scrutiny may be constructed based on the contributions 
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of a range of people” (p. 66). Shenton further cites Van Manen’s view that he “urges the 
exploitation of opportunities ‘to check out bits of information across informants.’” While 
there were constraints on diversifying the source of informants, as mentioned in the data 
challenges section, the extensive search of information through the Internet — as 
exemplified by incorporation of online sources — as well as diversity, reflecting in the 
composition of Chinese universities and regions, recruitment of both current students and 
alumni, and involvement of both males and female students, facilitated triangulation. 
During the course of this study, feedback on some drafts was obtained from China 
experts — Joseph Lee, a China expert and professor of history at Pace University, and 
Zhiqun Zhu, a professor of political science at Bucknell University. It was in relation to 
determining the strength of my analysis of China’s cultural penetration as well as its 
interest in higher education engagement with Nepal in light of soft power. Shenton 
(2004) explains, “The fresh perspective that such individuals may be able to bring may 
allow them to challenge assumptions made by the investigator, whose closeness to the 
project frequently inhibits his or her ability to view it with real detachment” (p. 67). In 
addition, the researcher’s “background, qualifications and experience” (Shenton, 2004) is 
considered important in qualitative research because of his or her vital role in data 
collection (Patton, 1990). Further, thick description in presentation of the findings 
conveys the context of the experiences, imparting credibility to findings. 
Transferability. Detailed information about specifics of research context is 
provided, such as categories of participants, methods and challenges of data collection, 
and modality of interviews (such as phone calls) in order to enable the reader to 
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determine the extent of transferability. Overall, transferability was achieved through the 
rich description of the writing up of the study, which I offer in chapters V-VII. 
Dependability. Dependability demands that “the way in which a study is 
conducted should be consistent across time, researchers, and analysis techniques” 
(Gasson, 2004, p. 94). It was achieved through an audit trail that detailed the 
“chronology” of emergence of research design, emerging codes and analytic memos. 
Confirmability. In order to protect the findings from being shaped by the 
researcher’s biases, source triangulation and reflexivity were employed. The steps of the 
research process are outlined below: 
Identification of the research topic. The research topic was identified when I was 
enrolled in EDU 895 doctoral research courses, beginning in fall 2015, in the Ph.D. 
program. I grabbed the opportunity to explore the topic further for PSC 512, an elective 
political science course, when I chose to write my final paper on Nepal as a case study in 
China’s soft power projection through higher education in South Asia. The peer reviews 
of my draft as well as class discussion on paper proposals bolstered my interest in 
pursuing research on that topic as well as impressing on me the necessity to conduct 
interviews with Nepalese students and to get into the depth of the subject. In October 
2015, I chaired a panel on Projecting Chinese Culture through Education at the 57th 
annual conference of the American Association for Chinese Studies in Texas. I presented 
a paper on dualism in China’s higher education system, marked by internationalization 
and regimentation. During the question-answer session, I had the opportunity to interact 
with attendees such as June Teufel Dreyer, a professor of political science at the 
University of Miami, Florida, who shared her thoughts on China’s soft power. Hence, the 
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background to conducting research for my Ph.D. degree was informed by my active 
engagement with the subject in conjunction with interaction with scholars and peers. 
Importantly, the topic of this thesis complements my academic background with a 
master’s in political science and international relations as well as previous publications 
on China. Additionally, the growing importance of internationalization in universities’ 
strategic planning as well as my own experience as an international student in the United 
States sensitized me to work on this timely project. My interest in it was further piqued 
by my father’s book on China’s soft power in South Asia (Jain, B., 2017) as I considered 
exploring the higher education aspect of China-South Asia relations. 
Preparation and approval of the research proposal. Once I became sure of my 
research interest in the area of soft power through higher education, I prepared an 82-
page research proposal for approval by a four-member dissertation committee drawn 
from education and political science departments. Its key highlights were: the 
introduction to the subject, a thorough review of the literature, the theoretical framework, 
and the methodology. The gap in the coverage of South Asia in the existing literature on 
China’s internationalization of higher education was underlined as one of the aspects of 
the significance of the proposed research. Once approved, the committee and I 
approached the Institutional Review Board (IRB) for its approval for data collection. The 
application form outlined the measures to seek informed consent of interviewees as well 
as providing the participant consent forms and informational flyers. After receiving the 
IRB approval, I began interviewing the participants. 
Preparation of the interview protocol.  Interview questions were carefully 
selected, refined and finalized, marked by relevance for the research question, through a 
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process of several exchanges with the committee. The demographic questionnaire was 
prepared to provide background information about the student participants. 
Maintenance of analytic memos and notes. During data collection through both 
interviews and archived documents, I maintained notes on emerging codes, queries, 
questions for further investigation, and follow-up questions for interviewees. Also, I 
created MS Word files titled “to be added” or “important matter,” containing content on 
analysis, for inclusion in the draft. Besides, I maintained notes on my interpretation of the 
emerging data. With this, I could keep the interviewees’ responses and data from online 
sources separate from my reflections which I used in the discussion chapter.  
Data reduction. In data analysis, the memos proved helpful in creating categories 
and themes, while in the occasional meetings with the committee I got feedback on the 
coding. The data analysis was facilitated by coding matrices columned into "descriptive 
codes," "categories" and "exemplars." Also, my experience in coding in the Ph.D. courses 
on qualitative research was useful. 
Peer reviews. During data analysis, feedback on some portions of the draft from 
experts on China was incorporated where relevant. 
Review of the checklist. I reviewed my notes to ensure that research findings and 
my interpretations had been integrated into the final document. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CHINA’S SOFT POWER AIMS THROUGH HIGHER EDUCATION IN SOUTH 
ASIA: NEPAL AS A CASE STUDY 
China-Nepal diplomatic ties were established on August 1, 1955. A turning point 
in their relationship came with the treaty in 1956 which replaced the Treaty of Thapathali 
and under which Nepal accepted Tibet as an integral part of China. Both countries share 
the 1,414-kilometer-long border. In most of the South Asian history, however, Nepal has 
been politically and strategically closest to India through their 1950 Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship, establishing a “special relationship” (the 1,700 kilometers open border 
without a visa requirement, and unrestricted movement of people on both sides), as well 
as owing to socio-cultural affinity and recruitment of Nepalese Gorkha soldiers in the 
Indian Army. At times, Nepal-India ties were strained over the issue of China during the 
regime of then Nepalese King Birendra in 1970s. 
With the installation of the Maoist-led government by Pushpa Kamal Dahal in the 
August of 2008, China-Nepal relations experienced a positive change. The Nepalese 
government, bearing ideological proximity to China, emphasized keeping equidistant 
relations between Beijing and New Delhi, which meant that Kathmandu did not subscribe
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to its past policy of a unilateral tilt toward India. Further, in 2009, a “comprehensive 
partnership” of cooperation was established between China and Nepal. 
This chapter underlines the key aspects of China-Nepal relations, including the 
educational ties, and identifies the aims of China’s soft power drive in relation to Nepal. 
China-Nepal Relations 
Lately, China-Nepal bilateral relationship witnessed such developments as 
China’s opening of the Jilung border crossing point for transport of petroleum and other 
essential items in the face of Madhesi protests8 in Nepal, and an uptick in China’s official 
aid to Nepal from $24 million in 2014 to $128 million between 2015 and 2016 (Shah, 
2016). From the Nepalese perspective, it is through China that the landlocked Nepal can 
scuttle “India’s monopoly over Nepal’s transit trade” (Ramachandran, 2016) as well as 
the prominence of India in trade with Nepal. Interestingly, India’s share in Nepal’s 
imports and exports is 60 per cent and 63 per cent respectively, while “the rest of the 
trade, valued at over $3 billion, is also routed through India” (Bose, 2017, July 16). Also, 
following the massive earthquake in Nepal in April 2015, China sent a total of 1,088 
personnel as part of disaster relief assistance. 
Development Aid and Infrastructural Support to Nepal 
China’s financial aid and infrastructural support to Nepal have stepped up 
recently. As noted in Chapter II, China is using a number of tools to build its soft power 
in South Asia. In Nepal, China’s economic role is no less prominent. In the Nepal 
                                                 
8Due to the Madhesi movement's blocking of trucks, carrying food items from India, it is considered as an 
unofficial economic blockade by India. 
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Investment Summit 2017 in Kathmandu, Chinese firms committed to investing $8.3 
billion in Nepal, “far higher than the Indian commitment of $ 317 million” (Giri, 2017, 
para. 1). 
As noted on the Nepalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: 
The Chinese assistance to Nepal falls into three categories: Grants (aid gratis), 
interest free loans and concessional loans…Some of the major on-going projects 
under Chinese assistance include: Upper Trishuli Hydropower Project- Power 
station and Transmission Line Projects (Concessional loan); food/ material 
assistance (Grant) in 15 bordering districts of northern Nepal; Kathmandu Ring 
Road Improvement Project with Flyover Bridges -(Grant); Tatopani Frontier 
Inspection Station Project (Construction of ICDs at Zhangmu-Kodari)- (Grant); 
and Pokhara International Regional Airport (Loan). (“Nepal-China Relations,” 
n.d., Economic Cooperation section) 
During Nepalese Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli’s visit to China in March 2016, 
China agreed to upgrade road links between Nepal and Tibet, extend the Chinese railway 
from Kathmandu through Lumbini and made a commitment of financial support for 
building international airport in Pokhara, as well as agreeing to “a long-term commercial 
oil deal” (Baral, 2016). Also, China has emerged as the largest source of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in Nepal. 
The India Factor 
Whereas India considers Nepal its natural sphere of influence, China is keen to 
scuttle India’s entrenched influence (Dabhade & Pant, 2004). As appeared in the DNA, 
based on an Indian intelligence report, 22 China Study Centers (CSC) have come up in 
68 
Nepal, with 11 of them on the Indo-Nepal border, “propagating subjects of Chinese 
culture, traditions, teachings and economy to the population in Nepal” (“Four dozen 
China study centers,” 2014, December 28). Writing about China’s “soft power offensive 
in Nepal,” Zheng comments that many sections in Nepal “seem unconcerned” about the 
implications for Nepal’s sovereignty even as China’s influence in Nepal deepens because 
they are focused “instead on China’s massive economic development and the spillover 
benefits it could have for their country” (Zheng, 2018, January 8, para. 17). 
The Tibet Issue 
 As mentioned earlier, Nepal’s proximity to Tibet has catapulted Nepal to prime 
significance for China. In this regard, Nepal and China have committed themselves to 
boosting security cooperation. According to Hira B. Thapa, interviewed for this study, 
“China wants its close neighbors like Nepal not to allow the use of Nepalese territory by 
any anti-China element.”9 As reported in Xinhua: 
Hailing the traditional friendship between the two countries and the smooth 
cooperation between the ministries, Guo Shengkun [Chinese State Councilor and 
Minister of Public Security] said he hopes the two sides will increase personnel 
interactions, improve mechanisms of cooperation, and boost practical cooperation 
on Tibet-related affairs, fight against illegal border crossing and drug trafficking 
to safeguard security and stability of the two countries as well as the region at 
large to provide a favorable environment for common development. (“Police chief 
holds,” 2014, October 17, para. 2). 
Clearly, China wants to ensure that Nepal curbs protests and activities of Tibetan 
                                                 
9 The participant's name appears with his consent. 
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activists, and the Nepalese government has responded accordingly. For instance, the 
Nepalese police detain Tibetans who try to cross the Nepalese border into India (Wong, 
2016). 
Writing about China’s interest in Nepal owing to the Tibet issue, Campbell (2012) 
writes: 
China’s engagement with Nepal is strongly shaped by the ‘One China’ policy. 
This refers to China’s own sovereignty and territorial claims, which are primarily 
concerned with denying official recognition to Taiwan and to claiming Tibet – 
officially the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) – as an integral part of China. 
Beijing considers Tibet part of its territory, and the region is also a key source of 
mineral and water resources for China’s development. Tibet is one of China’s so-
called ‘core interests’, which essentially means that it is not open to negotiation 
and China will use all means necessary to protect it. (p. 10) 
This section provided the context of China-Nepal relations in light of both 
countries’ mutual interest in coming close to each other. It did not go deeper into other 
areas such as China’s interest in Mustang and Lumbini. 
China-Nepal Educational Ties 
China’s approach to higher education in dealing with Nepal fits in its education 
policy framework for developing countries in general, its plan for internationalization for 
higher education, as well as for fostering bilateral ties with Nepal to achieve some 
specific aims, as described subsequently in this chapter. 
Section titled “exchanges and cooperation” of China’s Medium and Long-term 
National Plan, 2011-2020 for higher education states: 
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International aid to education shall be boosted, so as to cultivate and train 
professionals for other developing countries. A framework shall be established to 
make Chinese college graduates’ overseas volunteer service available in more 
fields and through more channels…Chinese government scholarships shall be 
increased, with financial assistance offered mainly to students from other 
developing countries. (“Outline of China’s National Plan,” 2010, p. 35). 
Accordingly, in a joint statement released in March 2016 during Nepalese Prime 
Minister K.P. Sharma Oli’s visit to China, China offered approximately 400 training 
opportunities in human resource development and an increase in government scholarships 
for Nepalese as well as inviting the latter to pursue higher education in China through 
other channels as well. Hence, the provision of scholarships and training is the key to 
educational relationship with developing countries. In case with the American and 
Oceania region, in contrast, what underlies China’s strategy is “partnership” that includes 
institutional exchanges, involvement of multinational companies (such as for donation of 
funds and equipment for Chinese universities) and government cooperative projects. 
Scholarships. In August 2017, the Chinese government granted “university-level 
scholarships to over 100 Nepali students” for the 2017-2018 academic year (“China 
awards,” 2017, para. 1) in such disciplines as civil engineering, medicine, business, 
telecommunications, and international relations. XinhuaNet further states that as of 2016, 
5,160 Nepali students had studied in Chinese universities through scholarships 
“supported” by the Chinese government. As stated on the website of Sichuan University, 
the purpose of the BRI Scholarship is “to allow more international students to learn while 
living in China and experiencing its culture, bridging the gap between China and other 
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countries” (“Sichuan University,” 2016). The full scholarship covers tuition, 
accommodation and insurance, apart from providing a monthly stipend of RMB 3,000 
and RMB 3,500 respectively, for graduate and Ph.D. students, while undergrad students 
are entitled to RMB 20,000 per annum. 
Establishment of the Confucius Institute. The Confucius Institute was 
established at Kathmandu University (CIKU) in 2007 through a partnership between the 
Hebei University of Economics and Business and Kathmandu University. The Confucius 
Institute offers the following services: Chinese language teaching; training for Chinese 
language instructors; delivering of Chinese language teaching resources; administration 
of the HSK Examination (Chinese Proficiency Test); provision of information and 
consultative services concerning China’s education, culture and other areas; and 
conducting language and cultural exchange activities between China and other countries 
(Hanban, 2014). 
With four Confucius classrooms and 2129 registered participants, it offers 
different levels of curriculum in Chinese such as undergraduate compulsory and elective 
courses, postgraduate elective courses, local teacher Chinese language training, 
elementary school courses, and Chinese language classes serving business persons, 
tourists, and media reporters. In addition, the Confucius Institute undertakes cultural 
programs such as the “Chinese Cultural Festival, performances, Chinese textbooks 
exhibitions, cultural lectures, seminars, and various Chinese games” (“Welcome to 
Confucius Institute,” 2007). 
Upon the completion of ten years since its establishment in Kathmandu, Yang 
Shichao, Political Counselor of the Chinese Embassy in Nepal, said that the contribution 
72 
of the Institute was to enable the Nepalese people to learn Chinese and get to know about 
Chinese culture closely, by responding to the lack of professional organizations and by 
providing teachers and textbooks. Hanban News, operated by the Confucius Institute 
Headquarters, made further observations on the achievements of the Confucius Institute: 
The Confucius Institute at Kathmandu University has established 4 Confucius 
Classrooms and 14 teaching sites, cultivating more than 20 thousand students in 
all…it has made remarkable progress in establishing favorable cooperative 
relations with other universities, enlarging teaching venues, regulating the 
management systems, enhancing the teaching levels and influence, and other 
aspects. (“Confucius Institute at Kathmandu university,” 2017, para. 6) 
Nepalese actors and collaborators. China has received cooperation from 
multiple actors in Nepal in China’s drive to enroll Nepalese students in Chinese 
institutions, though in varying degrees and forms. The following section identifies those 
six actors. 
Nepalese Ministry of Education. A ministry of the government of Nepal, it is 
responsible for formulating the country’s education policy and is an important actor in 
government-to-government ties in the educational field. The Ministry grants No 
Objection Certificates (NOCs) to Nepalese citizens before they can study abroad. The 
Ministry’s official stance in China’s context is that educational ties with China will boost 
people-to-people contacts. 
 Nepal Medical Council. The Nepal Medical Council (NMC) is Nepal’s 
legislative institution whose approval is mandatory for Nepalese students to study 
medicine abroad. Otherwise, the students graduating from abroad are not allowed to 
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appear for the NMC licensing examination. The NMC’s role in the enrollment of 
Nepalese students in China appears to be forming lately.10 Registrar Dilip Sharma 
welcomed the delegation of the University of South China (USC) in May 2017. Covering 
this news, Ning (2017) writes that Sharma said that the NMC would recommend “more 
and more excellent Nepal[ese] students to study in China” (para. 3) and apprised them of 
the requirements of higher medical education as acknowledged by the NMC. 
Nepalese universities. Apart from Kathmandu University that hosts the Confucius 
Institute, Nepal’s Tribhuvan University has witnessed a spurt in interaction with Chinese 
universities and the Chinese Embassy. Extension of China’s research arm to Tribhuvan 
University reflects in the creation of the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS)’s 
Kathmandu Center of Research and Education (KCRE). As mentioned on the KCRE’s 
website: 
As South Asian countries are important stakeholders in China’s implementation 
of the [Belt and Road Initiative], the establishment of Chinese Academy of 
Science’s Kathmandu Center of Research and Education (KCRE) in Nepal is 
within the framework of the CAS ‘Go-Out-to-Develop’ strategy, and an important 
step forward to strengthen the scientific and education cooperation between China 
and South Asian countries. (“About KCRE,” 2016, para. 3) 
Nepal-China Cultural and Educational Council. The Nepal-China Cultural and 
Educational Council (NCCEC) is involved in organizing education exhibitions for 
Chinese universities. Upon its recommendation, Liu Shengxue, vice-president of the 
University of South China, paid official visits to both the Nepalese Ministry of Education 
                                                 
10Though just a few instances do not confirm continuation of its support in the future. 
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and the Nepal Medical Council in May 2017. The delegation briefed the Nepalese 
ministry on USC’s [proposed] initiatives to “build collaborative programs with Nepal 
educational institutions, establish Confucius Academy in Nepal and broaden students[‘] 
recruitment channels” (Ning, 2017). On behalf of the Nepalese Ministry of Education, the 
Joint Secretary of Education expressed his “willingness to support USC’s international 
education exchange and cooperation moves in Nepal” (Ning, 2017). 
Educational consultancies. In March 2017, Free Educational Consultancies 
Organization of Nepal (FECON) organized the China Education Fair in Kathmandu to 
familiarize Nepalese students with China's progress in the education sector and to assist 
them with applying to Chinese universities. Yubaraj Katuwal, FECON’s president, told 
Xinhua, China's official press agency, “Our major objective is to bring Chinese 
universities which are highly ranked and are offering scholarships and different types of 
schemes for international students.” Noting the significance of the event, Xinhua notes: 
Through the exhibition, the organizers have brought together Chinese education 
institutions and Nepali students from the diverse academic backgrounds. The 
exhibition is being held at a time when Chinese government has set a target of 
having half million foreign students by 2020. (“China education fair,” 2017, para. 
8) 
Arniko Society. This is an alumni association of professionals who had studied in 
China. It is one of the organizers of the China Education Exhibition in Nepal, and its 
presidents have promoted Chinese universities during such events. For instance, 
Sarbottam Shrestha, president of the Arniko Society, stated on one such occasion, 
“Chinese universities have professional teachers, well facilities and high quality 
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education. Nepali students can learn a lot in China and utilize the knowledge in their own 
nation” (“China awards,” 2017, last para.). 
China's Soft Power Aims in Nepal 
Chapter II highlighted that China is interested in building soft power in South 
Asia by going beyond military and economic forms of engagement. As stated earlier, the 
sources of soft power – the power of appeal and attraction in contrast to coercion – are 
culture and values, ideology and institutions, and foreign policy (Nye, 1990). A question 
arises: what does China aim to achieve through its soft power in Nepal which serves as 
the case study? It is important because the research question entails exploring the 
relationship between China's soft power aims and experiences of Nepalese students with 
regard to China's education programs. Against this backdrop, this chapter aims to identify 
China's soft power aims by drawing on the following sources: my interviews with two 
experts, and online sources: the website of the Chinese Embassy in Nepal; news stories; 
articles; and speeches of Chinese President Xi Jinping. One of the experts is a China 
expert and US director of a Confucius Institute in the United States, and the other is a 
South Asia expert based in India. 
Expert Opinion 
Although I interviewed six experts in all, the views of two experts specifically on 
China’s soft power aims are being presented in this section. The background information 
on experts has been provided in the methodology chapter. At the outset, Leejo, an expert 
on soft power, briefed me on China's embracement of the soft power concept: 
Those in charge of Chinese international education and cultural affairs 
appropriated the Western construct of soft power....in teaching Chinese language 
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as a foreign language for foreigners. In a way….so I think there was a deliberate 
effort to use this Western idea of soft power to repackage what China has been 
doing to promote its cultural resources. 
Leejo pointed out the cultural, economic and political considerations behind 
China’s establishment of Confucius Institutes worldwide. He said that Confucius 
Institutes in general were set up as a “cultural passport to promote the idea of Chinese 
soft power and also maybe to cultivate a new generation of Chinese language learners.” 
Additionally, Leejo indicated China's intention to compete with the “First World” and to 
dominate the “Second World” and “Third World.” When asked to elaborate on this 
aspect, he said that China had observed “the spread of America's cultural influence since 
the second World War” and that even in its modernization project launched in 1970s, 
China has “always looked up to the West especially the United States [in the] world 
order,” while the success of the Japanese cultural industry also appealed to the Chinese 
leadership.  Against this background, Leejo said: 
So what China is trying to do is by promoting the study of Chinese language and 
culture, China is actually trying to invest in the language, [in] education of the 
younger people in many parts of the world. I guess the idea is by cultivating the 
interest in Chinese language and culture....[so they may] subscribe to cultural 
products or maybe the Chinese popular cultural industry in the next ten to twenty 
years. 
When asked specifically about Nepal, Leejo said: 
It could be part of its regional diplomacy to coopt Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan and Nepal where the Confucius Institute is active and also to support 
77 
Chinese competition with India. That's my reading of China's approach — how 
they run Confucius Institute and also how they offer scholarships, and how they 
support local universities, local colleges and even the local high school system in 
competition with much powerful regional state — India. 
Leejo further cited an example of Africa where political and economic elites who 
studied in China had developed a positive image and had likely become a major bridge 
between the Chinese and African governments. Building on this point, he said, “So I 
guess the Confucius Institute and the China Scholarship Council would be working to 
bring the support of the future elite in the developing world. And I see the similar 
patterns in some of the South Asian countries.” 
Hence, according to Leejo, China's soft power aims in South Asian countries like 
Nepal are to garner support of future leaders, to disseminate its culture, and prepare a 
generation of Chinese language learners.  Additionally, the use of soft power is intended 
to curtail India's cultural and political influence. The aspect of competing with India is 
corroborated in a case study by Campbell (2012) who writes, “Beijing is well-aware of 
the deep-rooted Indian cultural influence in Nepal and it is widely perceived to be 
deploying soft power in an attempt to counter-balance and dilute India’s influence” 
(Campbell, 2012, p. 9). 
According to Jaab, another expert interviewed for this study, China’s soft power 
aims consist in creating a network of supporters including the youth and thereby wean the 
current generation away from the influence of India. Jaab contended: 
 it is easy to brainwash professionals from a non-political background. As such, it 
is seeking to influence future doctors and engineers by providing scholarships and 
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by inviting professionals to China. It is possible that by creating incentives for 
them [youth] and through hospitality, China is cultivating them. 
Jaab observed that in China's strategic calculations, its economic aid to Nepal 
would lessen the latter's dependence on India. 
Online Sources 
On the front of several soft power aims, highlighted above, expert views find 
resonance in several online sources including the speeches of President Xi Jinping, the 
website of the Chinese Embassy in Nepal, the website of the Chinese Ministry of 
Education, and news articles. Those aspects are explained subsequently in this chapter. 
Online searches have unearthed another aim: making China a “major player” in global 
higher education, an aim that is a part of strengthening the global appeal of higher 
education as a source of nation branding or a constituent of national power. As 
Schulmann and Ye (2017) write in World Education News and Reviews, “More recently, 
China has embarked on an effort that could have an equally radical effect on global 
higher education: transforming itself from a non-entity as an international higher 
education destination into a major player.” In fact, China is seeking to recruit 500,000 
international students by 2020. Similarly, China is striving to enhance the attractiveness 
of its educational institutions in Nepal and enhance recruitment of Nepalese students and 
thereby build and strengthen its soft power resource through higher education. This 
aspect is described below. 
Increasing the influence of China’s higher education program. China is 
seeking to become a hub of international education. In order to enhance the influence of 
the Chinese higher education system by making it attractive to foreign students or 
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Nepalese students, China encourages enrollment of Nepalese students in its higher 
educational institutions by organizing events such as exhibitions, seminars and lectures. 
According to China’s Plan for Study in China (2012), the country is aiming to 
enhance the attractiveness of Chinese education for international students with the 
guiding principle of developing “the brand name of education in China internationally.” 
Nepal is part of this overall project. In building a brand name, the plan talks of a 
“comprehensive, cohesive and sustainable development of Study in China” program that 
takes into consideration the “scale, structure, quality and effectiveness” of education in 
China. The objectives of the plan are the following: 
to develop China into the country with the largest number of international 
students in Asia; to establish a comprehensive system, compatible with the overall 
scale and development of education in China; to produce a number of highly-
qualified teachers; to build up a group of higher education institutions with 
distinguishing features and a number of high-standard disciplines for Study in 
China; and to generate a large number of graduates who both understand China 
and contribute to connecting China to the rest of the world. (Objectives section, 
2012) 
Toward this end, course construction and teacher development have been 
highlighted as reform and development areas. The Plan (2012) states, “We will try to 
build brand names of our courses, optimize course structure and develop a course system 
more attractive to international students” (Course Construction section). In regard to 
teacher development, the Plan (2012) seeks to make “a number of outstanding teachers 
with academic excellence, rich experiences and caring for students the main force for 
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Study in China” (Teachers Development section). In achieving the aim, the following 
major tasks have been identified: increasing enrollment to 500,000 international students 
by 2020; a gradual increase in Chinese government scholarships; and a more balanced 
composition of foreign students in terms of origin and academic levels and types. In sum, 
China seeks to make its education attractive to international students by building a brand 
name through education reform and development. 
Promotional activities. In Nepal, China’s plan to recruit international students is 
more visible in provision of scholarships and in organizing education exhibitions. In 
2003, the China Scholarship Council (CSC) which functions under the Chinese Ministry 
of Education held the China Education Exhibition in Nepal for the first time. It took place 
in the Birendra International Convention Center in Kathmandu, drawing approximately 
2500 attendees, most of whom were high school and university students (“China Edu. 
Exhibition,” 2003). The event was aimed at “introducing Chinese higher education 
system” with the involvement of China’s 30 higher education institutions, comprised of 
“comprehensive ones, scientific and technological ones, normal ones and medical ones, 
such as the famous Tsinghua University and Beijing University” (“China Edu. 
Exhibition,” 2003, para. 1). The official website of the CSC interprets the success of the 
event in the following words: “[the event] broadened the influence of Chinese higher 
education in Nepal, and the universities achieved proactive results in enrollment and 
cooperation” (“China Edu. Exhibition,” 2003, last para.). This description provides a clue 
that building and increasing China's influence in Nepal in the field of higher education is 
one of the aims of China's soft power pursuit. 
Table 2 gives an account of the remaining exhibitions (though not all) in 
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Kathmandu for promoting Chinese universities in Nepal. They were sourced from Web 
searches, including the CSC website, and as such, the list is confined to the information 
available. 
Table 2 
China Education Exhibitions in Nepal, 2007-2014 
China Education Exhibition Participating Universities Organizers 
 
Year: 2007 (5th exhibition) 
 
21 institutions 
Included Beijing University, 
Fudan University, Zhongshan 
University, East China 
Normal University, National 
Central University, Nanjing 
University of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics 
 
The China Scholarship 
Council, the Chinese 
Embassy in Nepal and 
the Nepal Arniko Society 
Year: 2009 (6th exhibition) 
 
No information Same as above 
Year: 2010 (7th exhibition) 36 Chinese institutions, 
including engineering, 
medicine, language, culture 
and commerce, science and 
technology, and normal 
universities. 
 
Same as above 
Year: 2013 (8th exhibition) 
 
No information  The China Scholarship 
Council, the Chinese 
Embassy in Nepal, and 
the Nepal-China Cultural 
and Educational Council 
 
Year: 2014 (exhibition 
number not known) 
 
13 universities including 
Zhejiang University of 
Technology, International 
School of Capital Medical 
University, Guangxi 
University, Nanchang 
University of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics, Ocean 
University of China, 
Changzhou Textile Garment 
Same as above 
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China Education Exhibition Participating Universities Organizers 
 
Institute, China 
Pharmaceutical University  
Interestingly, the CSC has secured the support of Nepalese alumni from the 
Arniko Society in holding these events. Speaking at the sixth such exhibition, H.C. Shah, 
then president of the Society, said, “the focus of this exhibition is to inform Nepalese 
youths that China is one of the best option[s] of higher education which is of international 
standard” (“China education exhibition, 2009, para. 4). 
Given that Nepal has joined China's foreign policy program, the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI), Nepal might witness an increase in the number of scholarships for its 
students under the BRI Scholarship Program. In 2017 also, China raised the number of 
Nepalese recipients of Chinese government scholarships. 
Dissemination of Chinese culture. According to the Council of Confucius 
Institute Headquarters, the aim of the Confucius Institute is to “promote Chinese 
language and culture in foreign countries” (“Confucius Institute Headquarters,” n.d., 
para.1). Furthermore, in 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping gave a clarion call for 
making China a cultural soft power, which entails spreading Chinese language and 
culture. 
Given the presence of the Confucius Institute in Nepal, Nepal is a part of the 
cultural project. Evaluating the progress made by the Confucius Institute at Kathmandu 
University (CIKU) since its establishment, the website of the Hanban (CI headquarters) 
reported that CIKU has established four Confucius Classrooms and “14 teaching sites, 
cultivating more than 20 thousand students in all,” making “remarkable progress in 
establishing favorable cooperative relations with other universities, enlarging teaching 
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venues, regulating the management systems, enhancing the teaching levels and influence, 
and other aspects” (“Confucius institute at Kathmandu University,” 2017, para. 6). 
Chinese teachers as “culture evangelists.” The website of the Chinese Embassy 
in Nepal carries news and speeches about activities of the Chinese ambassador in Nepal, 
which highlights the significance of culture in China's educational linkages with Nepal. 
For instance, then Chinese ambassador to Nepal, Yang Houlan, at its fifth anniversary 
ceremony in 2012 made frequent references to the role of the Confucius Institute in 
transmission of Chinese culture and values. Houlan stated that the Institute was “the most 
important base on Chinese language teaching and Chinese culture transmission” (“H.E. 
ambassador Mr. Yang,” 2012, para. 2). Alluding to teachers' role in China's cultural 
diplomacy, he said, “Besides [being] Chinese language tutors, I hope, the teachers can 
also be the Chinese culture evangelists” (“H.E. ambassador Mr. Yang,” 2012, para. 5). 
Culture exhibitions. Yang Shichao, Political Counselor of the Chinese Embassy 
in Nepal, underlined the importance of the Confucius Institute by saying that earlier it 
was difficult for Nepalese students to learn Chinese because of the lack of professional 
institutes, teachers and textbooks, but since the establishment of the Confucius Institute, 
the locals were not only able to learn Chinese but also “come in close contact with 
Chinese culture” (Hanban News, 2017, para. 4). Further, in August 2017, the first 
Chinese Publication and Chinese Culture Exhibition was “sponsored by the CRI [China 
Radio International] Confucius Classroom Nepal and co-organized by Xinzhi Books 
Chinese Bookstore in Kat[h]mandu” (“The First Chinese Publication,” 2017, para. 2). 
The exhibition comprised the publication exhibition section, the culture experience 
section, and the video section that featured 100 short videos about Chinese culture. As 
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reported, “nearly 500 people, including...employees from Chinese-funded enterprises in 
Nepal and teachers and students from over 20 colleges and universities such as Tribhuvan 
University” (Chenyi, 2017, para. 4). attended the exhibition. According to Xiang 
Pingyong, director of Xinzhi Books Chinese Bookstore in Kathmandu, the bookstore was 
opened with a view to spreading Chinese culture globally. He said that Nepalese students 
visited the bookstore to “experience Chinese culture on their own,” adding “We will hold 
more such kind of activities in various schools” (Chenyi, 2017, para. 7). 
Clearly, promotion of Chinese language and culture is an important component of 
the Chinese leadership’s ambition to make China a “cultural soft power.” Interestingly, 
the Confucius Institute comes under the Chinese Ministry of Education, not the Ministry 
of Culture, which points to association between education and culture in this specific 
case. 
Fostering bilateral ties and gaining support of the Nepalese youth and 
alumni. Existing literature points to China's policy of providing scholarships as part of 
soft power diplomacy to generate goodwill and strengthen friendly ties with foreign 
countries (Dong & Chapman, 2010). Nepal is no exception. The Chinese government's 
stance in giving these scholarships is that it will enable the recipients to contribute to 
their nation's welfare. In the words of the Chinese ambassador in her speech at the award 
ceremony in August 2017, “This year, the Chinese government has increased the number 
of scholarships to Nepali students. After completing their studies, the Nepali students can 
be experts on their respective fields and can contribute to the development of their 
nation” (“China awards university-level,” 2017, August 27, para. 5). A respondent in this 
study, a Ph.D. candidate in international relations, considered provision of scholarships to 
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Nepal as an instrument of China’s soft power, aimed at building influence in the region. 
He further said that it was part of China's policy of taking responsibility for assisting 
developing countries. His view mirrored China's official policy of stepping up 
international aid under the Medium and Long-term National Plan (2011-2020) for higher 
education. 
Apart from building goodwill, one of the objectives of China’s official Plan for 
Study in China (2012) is “to generate a large number of graduates who both understand 
China and contribute to connecting China to the rest of the world” (Objectives section). 
As such, China considers it important to expose Nepalese students, including self-funded 
ones, to China and its culture and economic development. China expert David 
Shambaugh's observation fits in Nepal's context as Shambaugh (2004) opines that China 
is aiming to “train future generations of intellectuals, technicians, and political elites in its 
universities and technical colleges” (p. 77). 
Interestingly, at the fourth gathering of Nepalese alumni in Kathmandu in 
November 2017, Chinese Ambassador Yu Hong noted that after finishing their studies in 
China, the Nepalese students were promoting the China-Nepal relations (“Nepal grateful 
to China,” 2017, November 22). Gaining support of the Nepalese youth in advancing its 
national interest pertains to what China perceives as related to its national security (for 
example, by reining in Tibetan separatists), stronger China-Nepal ties, cultural 
promotion, creation of a market of cultural products such as traditional Chinese medicine, 
and penetration of political influence as an edge over India. The following findings shed 
light on this analysis. 
Cultivating the alumni. The importance given by China to the Arniko Society, an 
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alumni association, reflects in several ways. First, then Chinese ambassador to Nepal 
Yang Houlan did not neglect to meet with Sarbottam Shrestha when Shrestha was elected 
as president of the Society. As reported on the website of the Chinese Embassy in Nepal: 
They [Houlan and Shrestha] exchanged views on enhancing people-to-people 
exchanges between China and Nepal and on the future plans of the Society. Dr. 
Sarbottam Shrestha introduced the Society's future plan of carrying out free clinic 
in Nepal, organizing Nepalese Culture Festival in China, translating and 
introducing Chinese books, films and TV programs to Nepal people. He and the 
Society would strive to contribute to the friendly cooperative relations 
between Nepal and China. (“H.E. ambassador Mr. Yang,” 2012, paras. 1-2) 
The extent of importance given by the Chinese ambassador to a president of an 
alumni association can be shown from the photograph below at an awarding ceremony of 
the Chinese government scholarship where the president is seated in the front row, next to 
the ambassador. Such gestures are apparently intended to build up goodwill for China. 
 
Figure 3. Awards to Chinese scholarship recipients (2017, August 28) 
Interestingly, Sarbottam Shrestha said in his interview to China Global Television 
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Network (CGTN) in November 2017: “...we want [to] push TCM [traditional Chinese 
medicine) to Nepali society as a whole” (“Studying in China,” 2017, para. 7). In fact, one 
month before his interview, the Chinese Ministry of Culture had organized an event in 
Nepal to promote Chinese traditional medicine, introducing it to Nepalese health 
professionals and students (“Chinese culture talk,” 2017). 
Frequent interaction with Nepalese youth. The Chinese Embassy’s website 
chronicles the events of the Chinese ambassador’s interaction with the Nepalese youth. 
Then Ambassador Yang Houlan interacted with Nepalese students on several occasions 
by paying personal visits to schools and by alluding to the ancient ties between the two 
countries in his speeches on different occasions such as the closing ceremony of the 
China Winter Camp in January 2013, signaling a strategy of influencing the future 
leaders in Nepal. Interestingly, the Chinese leadership is seeking to engage even high 
school Nepalese students who might want to pursue higher education in China or develop 
a pro-Chinese bent of mind. In the words of a senior Nepali journalist, “Traditionally the 
Nepalese elite used to go to India for higher education. But soon a day will come when 
the future leadership of Nepal will be educated in Beijing and Shanghai rather than in 
Indian universities in Allahabad, Varanasi and Patna” (Joshi, 2013, para. 10). 
Table 3 lists instances of events organized by the Confucius Institute in Nepal, 
such as the Spring Festival, attended by then Chinese Ambassador Yang Houlan. The 
excerpts from Houlan's speeches affirm the Chinese government's policy of strengthening 
bilateral ties with Nepal through an appeal to the young generation as well as by 
conveying the message of the “peaceful rise” of China. 
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Table 3 
Excerpts from Speeches of Yang Houlan, then Chinese Ambassador to Nepal 
Event Excerpts Notes 
Spring Festival 
Celebration 
Organized by CI, 
January 27, 2013 
 “…we always stick to target 
of peaceful development, and 
launch all-round diplomacy 
to strengthen exchange and 
cooperation all over the 
world, to make a new 
contribution for building 
harmonious world.” 
Reference to “peaceful 
development” and “harmonious 
world” is a clear-cut instance of 
China’s vigorous efforts to 
spread the message of its 
peaceful rise- important for its 
positive image- which is a well-
known motivation of its soft 
power diplomacy. 
 
Ceremony of the 
First Nepal China 
Winter Camp, 
January 22, 2013 
“I sincerely wish China-
Nepal younger generation 
would further enhance 
mutual understanding by 
communication and jointly 
create a better future for our 
two countries’ mutually 
beneficial cooperation.” 
 
There is a reference to the 
young generation as a link 
between China and Nepal. 
Interaction Program 
of “Experiencing 
China” at 
Siddhartha 
Vanasthali Institute, 
July 16, 2012 
“Young students are not only 
the future of the nation, but 
also carry the heavy 
responsibility of continuing 
China-Nepal friendship. ” 
The emphasis is on students as a 
link between China and Nepal. 
Both countries have signed an agreement for China-Nepal Youth Exchange and 
Cooperation. Further, at the interaction program with young Nepalese political leaders, 
upon invitation by the Nepal-China Friendship Youth Association, Houlan stated: 
I believe the youth associations such as Nepal-China Friendship Youth 
Association and our young political leaders here today will bear in mind the 
history of our friendship, and keep exploring new ways to enrich, vitalize and 
refresh the friendly cooperation between China and Nepal, and in this way 
promote the development of our friendship in new times. (“Ambassador Yang 
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Houlan's address,” 2011, para. 7). 
The ambassador shared his observation on involving Nepalese youth in the Chinese 
Embassy’s activities: 
More and more young people in Nepal are interested in involving themselves in 
activities organized by Chinese Embassy, including China Festival, Happy Spring 
Festival, Chinese Film Festival, Chinese Book Exhibition, Chinese Photo 
Exhibition, China Education Exhibition, and Chinese Language and Culture 
Competition, which create very positive social atmosphere featuring China-Nepal 
friendship.  (“Ambassador Yang Houlan's address,” 2011, para. 6) 
In another instance evident in the data, the frequent interaction between China and 
Nepalese youth is quite clear. In a diplomatic move in March 2017 the Confucius 
Institute organized a tour of over 50 Nepalese students to “China-aided development 
facilities” in Kathmandu in order to make them aware of China's assistance to Nepal and, 
thereby, create goodwill for China. The places included: Civil Service Hospital, the 
Birendra International Convention Center (BICC), the national stadium, the National 
Ayurvedic Research and Training Institute, and the Sports Complex. In this regard, the 
role of the teachers at the Institute comes across as diplomatic in serving as channels of 
building goodwill for China. Xinhua, China's official press agency, quotes a Chinese 
teacher at the Confucius Institute, Zhang Shubin, “So many students do not know 
anything about how China is supporting Nepal in many sectors so we organized the 
program...China has been helping Nepal for its development projects for the economic 
development in the country” (“Nepali students enjoy,” 2017, para. 6). The press agency 
further states that students liked visiting those places and becoming aware of China's 
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assistance. This is evident in a Nepalese student’s statement, “I am feeling good to visit 
places of Chinese development cooperation to get familiar with it and to know about the 
Chinese assistance” (“Nepali students enjoy,” 2017, line 11). 
Yang Houlan stated at the fifth anniversary of the Confucius Institute at 
Kathmandu University (CIKU) that CIKU was making a “remarkable contribution to the 
cross-culture communication” between China and Nepal by acting as a “bridge of 
language, culture and friendship.” He further said that Nepalese students learning 
Chinese language were like the “seeds of the friendship” between the two countries, 
“rooting and spreading” (“H.E. Ambassador Mr. Yang Houlan's address,” 2012). 
Houlan’s speech clearly reflects the foreign policy objective of not only promoting 
Chinese culture but also forging closer cultural ties with Nepal by familiarizing Nepalese 
students with Chinese language and culture. It also echoes the opinion of Leejo, an expert 
participant in this study, that China is seeking to nurture a generation of Chinese 
language learners. In this scenario, China's soft power consists in building appeal and 
attraction for the Chinese language. 
Also, the Confucius Institute in Nepal is apparently acting as an arm of China’s 
foreign affairs office even though it is affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Education. 
Promotion of business interests. It may be noted that existing sources do not 
suggest talent acquisition as China’s aim involving Nepal as of now, while China is 
seeking foreign talent to propel innovation as part of structural changes in the economy 
(“China seeks foreign talent,”2016). However, building networks with professionals to 
advance its business and legal interests in developing countries as well as building and 
strengthen friendly ties is apparently driving some of the courses in Chinese universities. 
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For instance, the Youth of Excellence Scheme of China (Yes China) is a Chinese 
government scholarship for master’s programs targeting applicants from developing 
countries, including Nepal (which in the World Bank parlance is a least developed 
country). In fact, one of the participants in this study, with a legal firm in Nepal, was a 
recipient of the Yes China scholarship. As for the qualifications spelled out in the 
requirements, they are: “working in a government agency, company or research 
institute...or excellent in scientific researches[sic]; possessing a strong development 
potential in his/her career, and willing to promote the mutual cooperation and exchanges 
between China and his/her home country” (“Youth of Excellence Scheme of China,” 
2017, Qualifications section). As for China’s business interest in Nepal, Campbell writes 
(2012), “Nepal is a market for Chinese goods in its own right, but more importantly it 
could also be a gateway to the markets of South Asia. A senior Chinese official spoke of 
‘developing Nepal as a transit hub between China and the larger sub-continent’” (p. 13). 
Conclusion 
Thus, in building soft power — the power of attraction — through education, 
China aims to penetrate Nepal by generating goodwill by offering scholarships while also 
acting as a counterweight to India by challenging its clout in cultural, educational11, and 
political arenas12 by cultivating the Nepalese youth who would be future elites or could 
be of help in advancing China’s national interests in Nepal. While these are specific aims, 
the general aims, which extend to China’s aims globally, are to attract Nepalese students 
to study in China with a view to accelerate China’s emergence as a hub of international 
education and also to expose the students to Chinese culture, economic development, as 
                                                 
11 India is currently ahead in hosting Nepalese students. 
12If Nepalese alumni from China would be the future political leaders. 
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well as impacting them positively in forming a pro-China opinion (for instance, through 
courses, as discussed subsequently in this thesis). 
The aims described above fit in the constituents of the educational soft power 
model: education as a resource for China in attracting Nepalese students; education as a 
purveyor of Chinese culture and values; and education as a foreign policy tool. The 
subsequent chapters deal with student experiences in each of these categories. 
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CHAPTER V 
EDUCATION AS A RESOURCE OF ACADEMIC ATTRACTIVENESS FOR CHINA 
This chapter analyzes how China has positioned itself as an attractive education 
destination for Nepalese students. In this regard, their choice of China as a destination for 
study and their academic experiences will be taken into consideration. The composition 
of the sample of interviewees is as follows: nine were medical students in Bachelor of 
Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery (MBBS) programs; one was a master's student in 
aeronautical engineering; and the remaining five were in social science programs in 
international relations, political science, and international law. Three of them were 
females — two medical students and one student of international relations. Among the 
social science students, three were master's students and two Ph.D. candidates.  
 Interviews with those 15 Nepalese students, including both those currently 
studying in China and alumni, reveal their experiences in terms of learning, pedagogy, 
and other aspects of academic life in China. Where relevant, findings through interviews 
have been supplemented by news articles and other existing sources. Broadly, the results 
have been presented through the following categories based on coding: compulsion and 
convenience; unfavorable perception of Chinese education; limitations of academic 
experiences, and positive academic experiences. 
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Compulsion and Convenience: Decision to Study in China 
The study reveals that Nepalese medical students chose to study in China largely 
out of considerations based on convenience and compulsion, rather than because of the 
quality of its education or reputation of its educational institutions. The category of 
“convenience and compulsion” was formed out of the following descriptive codes from 
the final cycle analysis: affordability, scholarships, and easy admission. These in turn 
were extracted from the initial coding based on the following common explanations to 
study in China: low cost; ease of paying tuition in installments; Chinese scholarships; 
non-acceptance of students by Nepalese medical colleges owing to the students' failure in 
qualifying examination; and lack of enough seats in medical colleges in Nepal. For 
instance, in the words of Bimal, an MBBS student in central China, said, “The basic 
problem is the money problem. In Nepal we can’t afford. We have to pay forty lakhs [4 
million in Nepalese rupees] in one time but in China we can pay installments like 5 lakhs 
[0.5 million] per year….6 lakhs [0.6 million] per year…. it’s a big difference for 
medium-level families.” It looks like China is to middle-class students in Nepal (or 
elsewhere) what Walmart is to middle-class Americans. As Mishra (2012) writes, 
“Compared to the US, UK and other European countries, the cost of medical education in 
countries like China and Russia is much lower and varies from US$3,400 to US$6,000 
per year” (para. 9). 
The chance to visit China and learn the language was found to be an additional 
advantage. Some students pointed out that their decision to study in China was also 
informed by the fact that their relatives or siblings had studied in China. Also, the frailties 
of the education system in Nepal were underlined, viz., expensiveness of medical 
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education and corruption in the admission process, which caused frustration among some 
of the interviewees. As Aryal (2017) writes in My Republica, “A private medical college 
charges from Rs [Rupees] 4 million to 7.2 million per student for MBBS and BDS 
courses, as against the Rs 3.5 million to 3.8 million fee structure set by NMC [Nepal 
Medical Council]” (para. 11). In addition, Sapkota (2015) provides excerpts of secretly 
recorded audios of an official who was involved in taking bribes for facilitating 
admission. He writes: 
The registration of medical colleges is a convoluted process in Nepal, but it can 
be made much simpler by bribing a thoroughly corrupt system. Our investigation 
has revealed a chilling truth: almost everything is for sale in Nepal’s medical 
education. Nearly everyone is on the take: government ministries, the Nepal 
Medical Council (NMC), even the anti-corruption watchdog, the CIAA, and 
Supreme Court. Anyone can be a doctor if you pay someone enough. Bribery is 
standard operating procedure in acquiring college licenses, student seats, 
manipulating monitoring teams, influencing the judiciary. The medical mafia will 
even guarantee that students with cash will pass not just their entrance exams but 
their final exams too. (Sapkota, 2015, paras.1-2) 
Students in the social science programs went to China as recipients of 
scholarships (two doctorate students on Nepalese government and Chinese government 
scholarships respectively) as well as under student exchange programs (less than a year 
for master's students), which explains why they studied in China, in addition to the fact 
that their subject matter pertained to China such as China's foreign policy. In 
international relations as a discipline, China has occupied a prominent place by virtue of 
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its emergence as a major global player, which also impacted social science students’ 
decision to study in China. For instance, the Ph.D. candidates’ dissertations focused on 
China. Similarly, in the words of Nisha, a master’s student, “I was selected under the 
scholarship program of [an institute at a university in Southwest China.] I chose to study 
in China because [sic] being a student of international relations and China being one of 
the emerging powers plus our neighboring country, I opted to study there.” Samir, 
another student who had studied at the same institute, under a student exchange program 
for a semester, said: 
Knowing about China’s foreign policy was very important for me because China 
is a powerhouse and the second largest economy of the world.  I really wanted to 
see what the country is. The perception of China is mostly developed through the 
Western constructs. So, I wanted to know how it really is. 
Unfavorable Perception of China’s Education Program 
It was revealed during interview that studying in China was not considered 
prestigious in Nepal. The final cycle of coding yielded such phrases as “unattractive” and 
“non-prestigious” to describe Nepalese perception of China’s education program, 
preceded by the following initial descriptive codes from students’ responses: “just okay,” 
“not much value of people who studied in China,” and that Nepalese students studying in 
China are not considered “serious [about studies].” In addition, a student shared that 
Nepalese families think that those opting to go to China rather indulge in fun. As such, 
she called upon a prospective student to prove that “Chinese doctors are not bad” by 
which she meant that Nepalese students receiving education in China needed to study 
hard and prove their caliber and competence. It looks like the perception is framed by the 
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relatively poor performance of China-returned students in Nepal Medical Council (NMC) 
exams (Kharel, 2013).13 Further, most interviewees converged on the need for self-effort 
in achieving academic and professional success. 
Another student added that people in general are not aware of what it means to 
study in China and are not that aware of China’s current state of development. Being 
aware of this social perception, Karuna from a university in Southwest China expressed 
disgruntlement over indifference of people in Nepal who did not appreciate how 
Nepalese students struggled in a foreign land. 
In sum, interviews with Nepalese students underscore that studying in China is 
not fascinating to Nepalese people at large. Interestingly, several Nepalese students asked 
me to find for them the best programs, offering scholarships in medicine and political 
science, in the US. In fact, based on the No Objection Certificates (NOCs) issued by the 
Ministry of Education, China ranks sixth in the list of destinations for Nepalese students. 
It is preceded by Australia, Japan, the United States, India, and Poland (Nepal Education 
in Figure, 2016) (see Appendix C). The reasons why other countries rank higher are the 
following (Most preferred destinations, 2016, June 10): Australia topped the list on 
account of climate, lifestyle, and top-ranking universities; Japan has a reputation for 
technical skills with advancements in science and technology; the United States enjoys 
popularity globally; and India has traditionally been Nepalese students’ destination. 
                                                 
13 In an interview to Xinhua in 2013, Damodar Gajurel, then chairperson of the Nepal Medical Council, 
stated, “It is an eye-opener that more than 60 percent of medical graduates from China have been 
unsuccessful in obtaining license of medical practitioner, the records of six licensing examinations of past 
two years show” (Kharel,2013). Among the 954 examinees with MBBS from China who appeared for the 
NMC examination in 2011-2012, 381 passed. Gajurel attributed it to the lack of enforcement of “pre-
qualifying system for students seeking medical degree abroad” which enabled the “incompetent students” 
to pursue education abroad. 
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Limitations 
The next section reveals the learning challenges and university-related issues 
faced by Nepalese students in China. 
Learning Challenges 
According to the Chinese education ministry’s Circular on Education for Foreign 
Medical Students: 
The overall goal of the undergraduate medical education program in English for 
international students in China is to train the undergraduate students to develop 
solid medical knowledge, standardized clinical skills, and an appropriate 
professional attitude, and to lay the foundation for their further study in medical 
research, health administration, etc. (“Circular,” 2007, Article 4). 
Nepalese medical students reported that their expectations of learning gains were 
not fully met, as reflecting from the following codes: language barrier; less practical 
experience; patient reluctance; diagnosis issue; and unsatisfactory pedagogy. 
Language barrier. The language barrier between Nepalese medical interns and 
patients limited practical experience for Nepalese interns who yearned for great clinical 
exposure. For instance, Bimal, quoted earlier, said, “In China even there are local 
variations in the language of the city, so we have to seek the professor’s help time and 
again [in communicating with the patient].” Som, another intern, said, “Chinese language 
is the most difficult language in the world,” pointing to the biggest challenge he had 
faced in China. As such, several of them advised prospective Nepalese students to study 
in Nepal if they could financially afford education in the home country. Underscoring the 
importance of clinical exposure, he said, “it is said that the best book to study medicine 
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was not published by any author, rather it’s your patient who is the best book for you.” 
Similarly, Raj, a medical student in central China, said, “the biggest barrier is the 
language — even more difficult than the medical study!” 
Patients’ reluctance. Barring some exceptions, medical interns reported patients’ 
preference for Chinese doctors. As a result, they got less practical experience. For 
instance, Rukmini, an MBBS student in East China, attributed patients’ reservations to 
the skin color of Nepalese students. She said, “because our skin color is different, patients 
don’t prefer us to come near them over any other Chinese, so we get less exposed to 
practical scenarios.” 
Difficulties with teaching. While the Nepalese students did not report any 
problem with teachers’ level of knowledge, qualification, and behavior, their negative 
experiences fall into the following categories. 
Dissatisfaction with the teaching style. Though the students reported that in 
China, the teachers’ use of PowerPoint made keeping notes easier, they said that teaching 
in Nepal and India was better because teachers from those countries tend to explain the 
course material rather than simply handing in PPT slides to study. For instance, Karuna, 
in Southwest China, said, “There are a very few teachers who explain the course content. 
A majority of them put the content on slides and assign readings, that’s it.” Dish, another 
medical student from the same university, said, “[The] Indian teacher taught well. His 
style was good. Chinese teachers teach through slides, but Nepalese teachers explain.” It 
appears that the respondents were desiring more teacher-centric classroom inasmuch as 
they wanted to benefit from teacher expertise. A few students said that teaching was not 
different from that in Nepal because they used the same textbook. It may be added that 
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unlike the university in North China which had a presence of international faculty, such 
as from India and Nepal, and the university in central China where many medical 
instructors were reported to be from Pakistan, the university on the east coast had 
instructors almost from China.14 Thus, student participants had a different degree of 
exposure to the international faculty. 
Limited proficiency in English. Barring a few exceptions, Chinese instructors 
were not found proficient in speaking English. It may be added that foreign students, 
including Nepalese students, are taught separately because their medium of instruction is 
English, while local students are taught in Chinese. Interviewees pointed out that Chinese 
teachers were relatively “weak” in explaining in English. A master’s student in 
aeronautical engineering said: 
I expected much more from China. Teachers....most disappointing thing was 
teachers’ English was not so good. Problems I wanted to ask but I couldn’t 
understand and then only thing I was disappointed with was with the teachers. I 
know they had most of knowledge but thing was like they could not speak proper 
English. So, they were like nervous sometimes. 
This situation is corroborated in an online article by Schulmann and Ye (2017): 
While Chinese universities have made great strides in offering more programs in 
English, for many students, the linguistic barrier remains an often-insurmountable 
obstacle to prospective degree-seeking students. English remains the lingua 
franca of academia, rendering language a significant challenge in terms of 
China’s goal of increasing international student enrollment. (“A natural ceiling” 
                                                 
14 This point is not aimed to underscore regional variations in faculty composition. In order to protect 
student participants’ confidentiality, regions act as substitutes for universities’ names. 
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section, para. 5) 
Issues in the University Life 
Nepalese students pointed to the difficulties arising out of extreme rules and 
regulations15 in universities such as the one in North China and the university policy of 
accommodation. First, electricity cuts at 11:30 p.m. makes it harder to study at night. An 
interviewee added it was meant for students’ “welfare” by maintaining silence at night 
(making it easier for roommates who need enough sleep), though those who wish to stay 
up and study found this rule challenging. Second, the use of fingerprinting at the time of 
leaving and entering the university premises was found to be annoying. Third, the 
prohibition on off-campus accommodation (with some universities being an exception on 
account of the small size of hostels) did not let them choose a place of residence.16 
Fourth, the prohibition on work, including on-campus work, deprives them of the 
opportunity to cover their living expenses. 
Thus, at large Nepalese medical students did not make any remark on the merits 
or distinctiveness of China’s education system. At most, China is an outlet when the 
dream of becoming a doctor is at stake because of the high tuition cost in Nepal or the 
failure to get admission or scholarship in Nepal. 
Positive Experiences 
Despite the limitations described above, Nepalese medical students reported 
positive experiences in terms of some learning benefits and the attitude of teachers. In 
addition, Bimal, a medical intern in central China, was impressed by hospital facilities, 
                                                 
15 In presenting this information, I am not pronouncing my judgment on the rightness of these rules. I am 
documenting the impressions of the Nepalese students as they narrated their experiences. 
16 However, the official page of the Chinese Ministry of Education mentions the provision of residence off-
campus upon written permission and registration. 
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saying that medical devices and infrastructure were “mind-blowing” which was not found 
in Nepal. Another converging point was that interviewees believed it was self-study that 
was important and that academic success and the success in career depended on the 
student, even though they expected to receive better instruction from teachers. 
Learning Benefits 
The following factors contributed to the learning gains of the Nepalese medical 
students while studying in China. 
Ease of diagnosis.  Patience on the part of patients and instructors’ emphasis on 
diagnosis were singled out as merits in students’ learning process. Interestingly, speaking 
about the ease of diagnosis, Bimal said, “In my country if someone goes to the patient 
and asks and checks, the patient gets angry — ‘do you want to learn in a single day?’ But 
here three patients have ten interns- each of them checks them. But the patient does not 
react.” 
Patients’ receptivity. Experiences of two students at a university in Southwest 
China were positive in terms of patient receptivity though it was more so when the 
Nepalese students were accompanied by Chinese doctors or professors. Som, one of 
them, said, “Majority of patients are glad that foreign doctors treated them. So, it has 
been a good experience in hospitals too.” 
Acquisition of clinical skills and confidence. Despite the language barrier, the 
interviewees with the help of instructors, Chinese doctors and self-effort, were able to 
perform clinical procedures such as ECG, cleansing, dressing, Lumbar Puncture, and 
Bone Marrow Aspiration by working in several departments such as the cardiology 
department. What they learnt in theory was put to practice in internship. In the words of 
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Karuna, an intern, “Initially, I was so afraid of injections. But now I’m so confident.” 
Caring and Helpful Teachers 
 It is apt to mention that teacher development has been identified as an element of 
higher education improvement in China’s Plan for Study in China (2012). It states: 
As a part of the personnel development of higher education institutions, teachers’ 
capacity trainings including teaching in foreign languages shall be further 
emphasized and a performance-based assessment system shall be improved, thus 
making a number of outstanding teachers with academic excellence, rich 
experiences and caring for students the main force for Study in China. (Teachers 
Development section) 
So far as qualification and caring attitude is concerned, participants’ experience 
was positive. Karuna said that her teachers were caring, helpful and willing to resolve 
“any problem” including the financial one. In addition, several stories featuring Nepalese 
students in China can be found online. According to one source, a Nepalese medical 
student remarked, “My time spent at Sichuan University is an unforgettable experience 
for me: lifelong teachers, friends and lasting memories” (Sah, 2016, para. 1). 
Multicultural Ambiance 
 The participants got an international experience with the presence of students 
from different countries such as Poland, India and other South Asian countries, though 
with Chinese students they had a little interaction because as foreign students, they had 
separate classes that were taught in English. In the words of Tej, an alumnus from a 
university in Northeast China and currently employed in a Nepalese hospital, “Indian 
students were so brilliant. I used to get motivation from Indian students. I used to study 
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with them and share my knowledge with them.” In addition, a couple of participants 
reported interacting and hanging out with Indian students. 
Appreciation for Social Science Programs 
 Compared to the medical students, respondents’ experience with the social 
science programs was more positive. Rachit, a Ph.D. candidate in international relations 
in North China, gave a thorough description of his academic experience, which is 
detailed below. He was on scholarship from the Nepalese government. 
Academic freedom. When asked what he learned about China that he did not 
know before, the interviewee said that he had a “misperception” that there would not be 
“so much academic freedom in China in speaking and writing.” But after living in China 
for more than five years, he found that his perception was wrong. He based this 
impression on his interactions on political development and China’s foreign policy when 
his Chinese friends would “talk frankly” and on the fact that critical opinion had been 
voiced in Chinese academic circles. 
Sensitive issues as an exception. When asked whether there were certain subjects 
like Tibet and Taiwan that could not be discussed in class, Rachit said “every country has 
sort of sensitiveness in their core values. I think it’s natural.... I am enjoying academic 
freedom in China.” This response points to the respondent’s defense/justification of the 
limitations in China. Similarly, Samir, another social sciences student said, “Maybe 
sometimes they don’t want to talk about some really sensitive issues like Tibet or Taiwan 
sometimes but most of the time they are open.” 
When asked about the challenge faced, Rachit said that China has a “one-way of 
thinking” which is different from the thinking process of Nepalese people who tend to 
105 
think “from different angles.” He added a caveat that it did not mean that the Chinese 
way was wrong or right but that their way of conducting academic research was different. 
He explained that most of his Chinese professors and friends “put the national interest 
first” when “looking upon an issue” and that “nationalism is very much powerful in 
Chinese academia.” Thus, on the one hand the respondent talked of academic freedom in 
China, regardless of the limitations based on the core interest as defined by the 
government, on the other hand, his reference to the entrenchment of the one-way of 
thinking in research seems to suggest that the boundaries of research in China are 
determined by the ethos of nationalism. 
University of Repute. Rachit further informed that his was one of the topmost 
universities in China in the social science discipline. He said that such universities as 
Peking University and Xinhua had “good reputation” around the world and had well-
qualified faculty to assist Ph.D. students. It was a reflection of pride on his admission to a 
reputed university when he said that it was difficult even for Chinese students to get 
admission and that one needed to secure more than “90% marks” to be accepted. 
Quality of research and learning. Ph.D. students in China are required to 
publish at least two articles in journals indexed by the Social Science Citation Index 
(SSCI). While one of the articles can be published in a journal indexed by the Chinese 
Social Science Citation index, at least one must be published in a SSCI journal. Summing 
up, Rachit said, “Overall, the academic research in China has been wonderful.” 
Academic Experiences of Other Social Science Students 
Samir and Nisha, students of international relations in Nepal, studied at an 
institute in Southwest China for a semester under the joint post-graduate program (sort of 
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a student exchange program). They shared positive experiences. Samir made the 
following statement about interactive pedagogy as well as examination system in China 
in comparison with the system in Nepal: 
They [instructors in China] didn’t want one-dimensional class where they just 
speak and lead; they wanted students to interact.  So, I like that kind of teaching 
where teachers and students interact.  If you have talent or potential, you can 
show it more in China than in Nepal because teachers want it to come out like 
they give you the platform to express yourself to show your potential. The 
difference I found in the examination system is that in China you have papers in 
12 days, in two weeks, whereas in Nepal we have to wait for a long time. 
Similarly, Nisha shared in her written response: 
My academic experience was very sound because it gave an opportunity to 
explore more on the aspects of China. Since it was a joint program so, classes 
were focused primarily on International Relations topics such as Security, State-
to-State relations (Bilateral Relations), Geopolitics of China, International 
Political Economy, etc. (Nisha, personal communication, November 10, 2017) 
Referring to her future plans, Nisha stated: 
My future plan is to pursue a Ph.D. degree and get into academic sector in relation 
to IR. My experience in China can be pretty helpful for my further studies and it 
has helped me to understand the Asian values in terms of IR since our academics 
primarily focuses on Western values. 
The above quotes underscore that the respondent found her course relevant and 
beneficial as well as enlightening in terms of building her knowledge of Asian values in 
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contrast to, what she perceives as, non-Chinese academicians’ focus on Western values. 
Similarly, the criticism of the Western media reflects in the following written response by 
Shiva, a Ph.D. candidate in North China, when asked to tell about his academic 
experience: 
Chinese educational institutions are now very advanced and modern. What some 
sections of the Western media disseminate inaccurate information about China are 
baseless and far from truth. I learned knowledge, skill, pragmatic vision, use of 
modern technologies etc. from China. (Shiva, personal communication, 
September 15, 2017) 
Conclusion 
Participants had a mix of academic experiences. Broadly, the lingering desire of 
the Nepalese medical students was to have a stronger clinical exposure which could be 
facilitated easily had they interned in Nepal owing to language competence in the native 
tongue and the resulting interaction with patients. Social science students reported 
positive experiences in terms of quality of research and learning, especially when China 
was the focus of their subject matter. Academic freedom with exception in discussion on 
“sensitive issues” was also reported. Also, while the cost factor was a major driving force 
behind medical students’ decision to study in China, social science students studied in 
China as Ph.D. scholarship recipients as well as under student exchange programs and 
because of the importance of China in international relations which was their subject 
area. 
108 
 
CHAPTER VI 
EDUCATION AS A CONDUIT OF CHINA’S CULTURE AND VALUES 
China has set out to transmit and popularize its culture through its educational 
institutions and through the Confucius Institutes that it has opened in various parts of the 
world. Insofar as exposure to Chinese values and culture is concerned, the Confucius 
Institute is the direct and purposeful channel of culture dissemination. Other than that, 
education serves as the medium by hosting international students who get to know about 
a foreign country’s culture and values through social interactions and cultural 
experiences. Also, their personal values are formed in this process, bearing the imprint of 
the host country’s culture and environment. In turn, the host country’s soft power is both 
built and projected, depending on the quality of the experiences and the nature of the 
narratives about international students’ encounters, impressions and perceptions. 
This chapter produces findings on Nepalese students’ social, cultural, and political 
experiences. The findings are based on interviews, followed by literature from online 
sources. Let us first take experiences of the students who studied at the Confucius 
Institute. Subsequently, experiences of Nepalese students in China will be described.
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Students’ Experiences at the Confucius Institute: Findings through Interviews 
Let us first understand as to what motivated the participants to learn Chinese at 
the Confucius Institute at Kathmandu University (CIKU). They shared that it was good to 
learn a new language for free and for the potential benefits in view of studying in China 
or in interacting with people in China, a neighboring country. In the words of an 
interviewee, “It was [a] good feeling to get some non-credit courses and understand basic 
terms of foreign language.” He also said, “I have [a] positive feeling towards this 
program. It is [a] good opportunity for students to get a chance to learn language of their 
interest, all free of cost.” Two of the interviewees — Bikas and Shasha— are engineers at 
China’s Huawei Technologies in Nepal. Aabha, another interviewee, did her B. Tech 
from Kathmandu University (KU) in Nepal and is currently pursuing an advanced degree 
in India. Describing her intent to learn Chinese at the Confucius Institute, she said: 
It was for free and an opportunity to learn a new language and the Institute was 
inside the campus [of KU]. It was quite like a fun time with my friends and it was 
a way to meet different faculty other than my own. It was a good opportunity to 
meet and interact with other people. 
Respondents commonly referred to learning Chinese as “a good opportunity” or 
“a chance” to learn a new or different language. As far as learning is concerned, the 
emphasis at the Institute is on sounds for the beginners who are taught to pronounce 
“pinyins” which takes at least a month to memorize. It is followed by lessons in “simple 
Chinese words (only pinyin) and their meanings,” accompanied by the use of translator 
devices for translating English into Chinese. The students were taught through 
PowerPoint slides and were provided with copies of the basic Chinese language book. 
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The participants’ experiences at the Institute are categorized below. 
Forgetting the Language 
 Regardless of the perceived benefits of learning Chinese at the Institute, the 
interviewees reported that they had forgotten what they learned over time and that 
Chinese was an extremely difficult language, while they also lacked the opportunity to 
practice. For instance, Kamal said that the only word he remembered was nihao (hello). 
Shasa said that she had learned the Chinese language for a few months at the Institute. 
She added, “But studying there wasn’t much of a help because we only had one-hour 
class each day. And this wasn’t enough, and after class hours we had no interaction with 
other Chinese speakers in order to practice.” 
When asked if her expectations had been met, Aabha replied: 
My expectation was maybe I would be able to learn a lot more than what I did. 
But then I guess Chinese language is one of the difficult languages. So, I didn’t 
learn much but I thought after two semesters I would be able to converse in 
Chinese, which I did up to some level but I was expecting more on that like 
converse on other things rather than just talk about my family or my country. I 
wish course content was large enough but maybe it has improved by now — I 
don’t know. Even by the end of the second semester, we were not able to write in 
Chinese. It was difficult for us. The teacher didn’t put pressure on us. After a 
while he realized that we were all engineering students....I think he was trying to 
be a little lenient with the course although he could have included a lot of things 
so that students could have learned a lot. 
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A Difficult Language 
Compared to other languages, the Chinese language was found to be more 
difficult. Explaining the reason, Shasa said, “Nepal[i] or English language does not have 
tones. However, Chinese language has four tones and it’s really challenging to pronounce 
a same thing in four different tones.” 
Kamal suggested that the Institute apply “different techniques so that people can 
easily learn the language.” He also said that the program should be designed in such a 
way that people would be interested in joining the program on their own rather than being 
driven by the urge of the Chinese authorities to learn their language. In his words: 
They should have this program in such a way that people would be so interested 
in their language by themselves. People would come to them and say “okay, I 
want to learn your language. Can you please teach me?” So, people should come 
to them, rather than they telling people to come and learn their language. 
Fascination with the Chinese Language 
Describing her experience, Shasa explained how she eventually became 
fascinated with the language. 
It was really very frustrating in the beginning but later I was fascinated by it. 
Rather than speaking it was like singing a song. Also the words....each Chinese 
word is actually composed of simple words. For example, the word computer is 
called “diannao” in Chinese. Here dian means electricity and nao means brain, so 
basically Chinese have named computer as electric brain. 
The above description reflects the learner’s appreciation and understanding of the 
“composition” of the language and the feeling of singing associated with it. She further 
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said, “We also had to act out the simple conversations written in the book so that we 
could understand how to use the words in a sentence. All in all the classes used to be 
fun.” 
Familiarity with Chinese Culture 
 Realistically speaking, China is an “alien” culture to Nepalese who share cultural 
affinity rather with Indians. As Sujeev Shakya,17 a trade and investment consultant in 
Nepal, told me on the phone, “China is not culturally integrated into Nepal.” He also 
observed that the CI had not made any significant impact in Nepal, and that the very fact 
that Nepalese watch Bollywood or enjoy Indian food points to the lack of cultural 
influence or appeal of China as yet. What he said cannot be disputed, but a concrete gain 
that China has derived is the growing familiarity of Nepalese with Chinese culture. It is 
another issue that China might have invested a lot whereas the gains might not be 
commensurate. For instance, interviewees learned about language diversity in China, 
where people speak different languages in cities. Also, Shasa, quoted earlier, said: 
Well before I studied there, I really didn’t know anything about China except it 
being a neighbor country and Chinese manufactured things [that] were of poor 
quality. By studying there I realized how rich Chinese culture was. We used to 
have programs where teachers introduced us the different festivals of China, the 
cuisines, the music, taiji and so on. 
She further said: 
Especially talking about the festivals, I found out that there were so many 
similarities between my culture and theirs. For example, in Nepal we celebrate a 
                                                 
17 The expert's name appears with his consent. 
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festival called gaijatra. This festival commemorates the death of people during the 
year. And even Chinese people celebrate a similar festival. 
Familiarity with China 
Bikas, a participant who was enrolled at the Confucius Institute for two years as a 
student of engineering at Kathmandu University, said that he was not a regular student of 
language, but took it as an extra credit course with the classes held on two days in a 
week. He said that they were sometimes shown documentaries about advancement and 
growth of China, its culture, and geographical status. The documentary on culture made 
him and other students aware of “cultural variances of China.” Thus, while they had the 
impression that “all Chinese” followed Buddhism or Confucianism, they learned that 
most of the Chinese were Christian and some were Muslims too. Bikas also shared that 
he was not familiar with the revolution launched by Mao Tse Tung until, at the Institute, 
he watched a documentary on Mao’s life and Mao’s revolutionizing of China. Talking 
about its impact on him, he said, “I had read a book by Dalai Lama, and to be honest I 
was quite negative about China, but after taking class, I came to know that it is not that 
bad. We need revolution, if it’s not going through, must follow another way.” When 
asked to elaborate, he said, “In today’s world of science and technologies, revolution on 
these two things is necessary and compulsory. If Dalai Lama is not going to do anything 
and someone has to take over…. after takeover of [sic] China, there are industries and 
hydropower in Tibet.” 
Interviews with the other participants brought out other aspects of their 
knowledge of China after joining the Institute, as mentioned earlier. 
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Students’ Perception of the Motive of CIKU 
When asked what he thought was China’s rationale in setting up a CI in Nepal, 
Kamal said it could be a business purpose.  This participant viewed China as targeting 
“nearby” countries to sell its products, expanding its business, so that “it will be very 
easy” to buy and sell Chinese products. When asked whether he liked Chinese products, 
he pondered over it saying, “what should I say?” He said that some of the goods should 
be introduced so that Nepalese could afford low-priced goods.  When asked whether he 
himself was satisfied with Chinese goods, he said “personally I’m not satisfied with 
Chinese goods. They are not providing good quality in Nepal. I don’t know why. I don’t 
know what type of quality or goods they export to other countries. But in Nepal, the 
quality is not good.” He added that he personally did not “like” Chinese products that did 
not have longevity or durability. His view mirrored the view of Shasa who became aware 
of China’s rich culture; otherwise, she had known China as just a neighboring country 
and one that manufactured “poor quality things.” 
Sharing her opinion, Aabha said that the Chinese teacher intended to show his 
country as “a peaceful country, a warm and tourist welcoming country, trying to show 
what beautiful things they have. His motive was to show that.” 
Other than familiarizing Nepalese students with the language and culture, on the 
cultural front the Confucius Institute has not made deeper inroads into cultural preference 
toward China among Nepalese people. China is perceived as a country that makes goods 
of poor quality, though studying at CIKU introduced the students to positive aspects of 
China. But more than that, its foreign policy objectives of cultivating appreciation among 
Nepalese people toward Chinese culture seems to be the major gain, as explained in the 
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subsequent chapter, which highlights such activities of the Confucius Institute as taking 
Nepalese students to China-assisted facilities in Nepal. 
Online Sources and the Confucius Institute 
The composition of learners at the Institute is varied, including university students 
and general public. Speaking about the economic value of learning Chinese, a tourist 
guide at the Institute, interviewed by the BBC, stated, “Over a billion people live in 
China, and even if just 1% of them visit Nepal every year, we will get a lot of 
employment” (Joshi, 2013, para. 2). Similarly in a You Tube video, August 1, 2012, a 
Nepalese tourist guide talks of the benefit of the ease of interaction with Chinese tourists. 
Further, Leela Mani Paudyal, the Nepalese ambassador to China, writes, “China is the 
largest source of outbound tourists with the highest per capita expenditures. China is the 
second largest source country in terms of tourist arrivals since 2014. China has declared 
2017 as Nepal Tourism Promotion Year in China” (Paudyal, 2017, para. 4). As such, 
Nepalese people find it important to understand the Chinese language in order to reap the 
benefits of tourism from China. Similarly, Chinese investors looking for investment in 
China “may need professional interpreters to overcome language barriers”; the Nepalese 
ambassador to China says that this issue could be resolved as Nepal has sent “many 
students to China to learn Chinese, including 200 in Beijing” (“Nepal offering 
preferential,” 2017, para. 2). 
Growing Popularity 
 Lately, Nepalese officials in different ministries have been learning Chinese 
(“Nepal education ministry,” 2017). Xinhua cites Hari Prasad Bashyal, joint secretary at 
the Ministry of Education, as noting, “Nepal has a lot to learn from China in the sectors 
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like technology, education system, culture, trade and tourism. Learning about these areas 
is possible only through language, so we felt it’s necessary to train our officials first for 
knowledge and technology transfer” (“Nepal education ministry,” 2017, para. 4). Xinhua, 
China’s news agency, cites Devi Prasad Upadhyay, a section officer at the Nepalese 
Ministry of Education, as endorsing this view: “Chinese language has played a significant 
role in my life. Besides my regular job, I work as an interpreter and tour guide in my part 
time. Through the language, I have received a new recognition” (Nepal education 
ministry,” 2017, para. 14). He learned Chinese for two years in China under government 
scholarship. Further, over 3,000 Nepalese students are learning the language in China 
(“Nepal education ministry,” 2017). 
Experiences of Nepalese Students in China 
This section highlights social, cultural and political experiences of Nepalese 
students while studying in China. Here, we move from the experience of the participants 
who studied at CIKU to those who were international students in China.  Let us first take 
up socio-cultural experiences, both positive and negative. The headings represent the 
categories formed out of codes. 
Positive Social Experiences 
Positive experiences encompass safety and security, personal development, 
pleasant social behavior, and admiration for Chinese traits. 
Safety and security. When asked about the social life or what they liked in 
China, Nepalese students predominantly mentioned safety and security, especially road 
safety. Most of them reported the ease of going out at night. In the words of Dish, a male 
medical student in Southwest China, “One can go out at night. In Nepal, people don’t go 
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out at night.” Uday, an aeronautics engineering major at a university on the east coast of 
China, said that what was important to his experience was “transportation and security.” 
In his words: “I can find metros, local buses, local taxis. And then…. security is very 
good; transportation and security I like. That’s different from Nepal....if you are working 
on a road at night, you will not feel fear...if you are a lady working at night [you will feel 
safe].” 
Personal development. When asked about benefits of studying in China, students 
reported that they had personally benefited in terms of becoming independent, self-reliant 
and confident, which is quite a common characteristic of experiences of international 
students globally. In the words of Karuna, a female MBBS student, “The biggest benefit 
is that I learned to be independent. There we have a family on which we are dependent. 
But here it’s not like that. We have to rely on ourselves and we have to think on our own, 
good or bad. Confidence in myself has gone up. ” Rukmini, another female MBBS 
student said, “I learned to be patient. I can adapt to tough situations. I can speak basic 
Chinese and most importantly I learned to live alone and independent.” A male student 
majoring in aeronautics engineering said, “It has given me a lot of confidence. I don’t 
think I will [could] be able to speak that frankly with you four or five years ago.” 
Pleasant social behavior.  In analysis of respondents’ experiences of social 
behavior in China, the first cycle coding gave the descriptive codes of “respect,” 
“friendliness,” “helpful,” and “social greetings,” and emotion codes of feeling welcome 
and respected. They were further coded into the description of behavior as warm, 
friendly, respectful and helpful, which comes under the overall category of “pleasant 
social behavior.” In the words of Karuna: 
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These people give respect. If you reply to their greetings, hello, politely and with 
a smile, they respect you in return. They welcome us. These people.... unlike us 
whose outward behavior is different from our inner thoughts...these people speak 
their heart out...give us blessings. Elderly people do not know us but when we 
smile at them and speak well, they ask us why we have come here. They don’t 
think like “we should not give them advice because they are from a different 
country.” They rather give us advice, “you have come from that far...study well.” 
Just as our elders give us advice. 
Samir, an alumnus from a university in Southwest China, underlined how his 
perception of China through “Western” media underwent a change through positive 
experience of freedom and respect from local people. He explained: 
Whatever we know about China is [a] Western construction because the better 
way to learn about a country is to go there and see for yourself. What I saw and 
what I have read — there was a contradiction. China is different from what you 
read in the textbooks. You get the images through articles, news articles that 
China is more restrained toward foreigners. In fact, I found plenty of freedom 
there. Tourists were treated very well.  I got lots of love and respect from local 
people there. To my surprise, they really love Nepal. They had traveled to Nepal. 
They wanted to know about Nepalese culture. 
Samir also said, “When you go to a country which is the second largest economy, 
it’s one of the super powers of the world. And you have certain image of the people but 
they are very down-to-earth and they are very respectful.” 
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Participants happened to contrast their own society with the Chinese society. In 
the words of a Karuna, “These people.... [are] unlike us whose outward behavior is 
different from our inner thoughts...these people speak their heart out.” The same 
participant also compared how people in her country were suspicious of foreigners and 
rather cautioned their children to stay away, while people in China warm and friendly. 
Som, another medical student, appreciated the civic sense in China unlike in his country, 
people kept public places clean. He said, “[the] government has some policies and people 
over here are also so honest that they won’t spoil anything outside. People in my country 
would throw things outside, on the road.  People here think about their country.” 
It may be noted that students who mostly talked of unpleasant experiences had 
been in China for five to six years whereas those who reported pleasant experiences had 
been there for either a year or less than a year such as a semester-long stay under a 
student exchange program. 
Admiration for Chinese personal traits. Nepalese students were impressed with 
Chinese people’s zest for life, work-ethic (including dignity of labor), diligence, lifestyle, 
and attitude toward work. These codes are based on the following statements: 
Studying in China has taught me lots of things, like back in our country old 
people think they need to rest and wait for their turn to die but here I have seen 
Chinese people even in their old age are active. They go dancing, singing, doing 
exercises, eat healthy food. From China I learned no job is inferior as even the 
rich people are found doing their work themselves and they don’t like keeping 
servants. (Rukmini, a student at a medical university in East China) 
Tej, an alumnus from a medical university, shared, “70-80 percent of Chinese do 
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not believe in God. Some believe in laughing Buddha; in Xinjiang province, people 
believe in God. But most Chinese do not believe in God. They believe in hard work.” 
Similarly, Nisha, an alumna from a university in Southwest China (quoted in Chapter V), 
wrote in her written response, “Chinese life is a very disciplined life. Hard work is given 
an utmost priority and everyone is encouraged to work to their utmost level.” 
Dark Spots in Social Experiences 
This section illuminates the negative or unpleasant experiences of Nepalese 
students in China, which fall under the overarching categories of social ills, underpinned 
by the second cycle codes of racism, color discrimination, and xenophobia. These codes 
were formed out of the first cycle codes of discrimination, prejudices, mistreatment, and 
misbehavior. Another category is that of negative cultural shock, formed by second cycle 
codes of social apathy and money-mindedness which in turn were based on first cycle 
codes of social indifference and lack of considerateness. 
The second cycle codes, underlying categories of social ills and cultural shocks, 
have been explained below to describe participants’ social experiences. 
 Racism and color discrimination. Some students reported “racism” outside of 
the university setting, experiencing discrimination and unfriendly social attitude. First, 
they observed that whites or people from Western countries were treated more favorably 
than others in jobs and social interactions. Uday, an aeronautics major at a university on 
the east coast, gave the following description of the challenge of living in China: 
Somewhat racism.  If you are white, if you have white skin, students from Eurasia 
or Ukraine- white skin people- they would easily get the job of teaching English. I 
won’t get it so easily. Because they are white.... they prefer white people. While 
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applying for some part-time jobs. Most job is like teaching English. It’s 33 dollars 
per hour. And then when I apply for those kinds of jobs.... okay…. I applied. They 
were happy. I was selected. But then they finally they told me to tell the parents 
that I’m from Canada, I’m not from Nepal. And this was not acceptable to me. 
They prefer people from Western countries. 
Importantly, as noted in Chapter V, for those students studying medicine, some 
patients’ reluctance to receive treatment from Nepalese interns was attributed by 
participants to patients’ preference for Chinese doctors who had a fairer skin. This 
attitude limited practical experience for Nepalese students. Similarly, in the words of Tej: 
They [Chinese people] are treating according to color…. generally they are 
treating according to color.... I don’t like that. Sometimes my mood was not good. 
For us with Mongolian, Aryan face, dark-brown eyes, black hair.... “Yeah, yeah, 
South Asian dudes”….they are treating in a different way. I really don’t like [it] 
from Chinese people. 
Xenophobia and probing. Some respondents narrated experiences of 
mistreatment and probing by Chinese people. Karuna, quoted earlier, narrated an incident 
in which a local female shopkeeper abused as well as pushed her and her friends out of 
the shop. They were looked upon with suspicion. It was due to the intervention of her 
faculty that the situation was handled when they warned the lady with police action if she 
did that again. Relating this incident to her other experiences in China, the respondent 
had a mixed observation: 
Some people behave differently.  Ladies of her kind look down upon us. But 
many are also happy to meet us. They mingle with us to the extent that they invite 
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us over at occasions: “spend time us; go out with us.” But there are some who do 
not want to talk to us. They behave as if we will eat them up, as if we are aliens 
from somewhere, this is how they react. Others respect us and speak very nicely 
to us and love to befriend us — both boys and girls. 
Tej, quoted earlier, had stayed in China for five and a half years. He said that 
local Chinese people were “direct” with foreigners, asking such questions as “where are 
you from?”, “are you married or not?”, “do you have a girl friend?”, “where are you 
studying?” He emphasized that most of the time they would ask where he was from and 
on what purpose he was in China, which made him “uncomfortable in the beginning.” 
Such encounters were mostly in public at shopping centers, during travel, and during 
interaction with taxi drivers. Uday observed that the geographical location mattered when 
it came to people’s behavior. He observed, “I think in cities like Beijing they behave like 
normally. They don’t care. I mean.... when I am going to some other places, people 
would stare at me.” 
Negative cultural shock. Participants experienced a negative cultural shock in 
the form of prevailing social apathy and money-mindedness in China. 
Expectation belied. Tej said that he thought that Chinese people’s cultural 
thinking would be modern because it is “a fast-developing country” but he said it was 
same as it would have been 20-40 years ago. Also, he found that unlike Nepalese people, 
Chinese shopkeepers were “so money-minded” in selling products. For example, he said 
that even though he was a regular customer, the vegetable vendor would not spare a 
single penny if he fell short of even one RMB.  His view reflects his being used to the 
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culture that prevails in Nepal (and also in India) where shopkeepers let the regular and 
familiar customers pay later. 
Social apathy. Most participants alluded to extreme busyness on the part of 
Chinese people to the extent that several of the participants point to their lack of 
“empathy for fellow humans in need” owing to busy life and immersion in technology. In 
the words of a medical student, “people’s unwillingness to act as a good Samaritan is 
something that bothered me a lot.” Social indifference was pinpointed by participants 
who said that people in China were too busy to be caring and empathetic toward fellow 
Chinese. The final code of “social apathy” emerges from initial codes of “extreme 
busyness,”, “lack of care and concern,” and “immersion in technology” found in the 
descriptions of social life in China, as narrated by the Nepalese students. 
Uday shared: 
…maybe Chinese people are more into technology. They are in sports, in metros, 
while walking, I think they have reduced social...they don’t care about other 
people. They are enjoying the music, and if someone needs help, they wouldn’t do 
it, they wouldn’t care. They are just busy. Technology has some negative impact 
in China. 
Similarly, Raj, from a university in central China, said, “People here in China are 
so busy on their own. Even someone met with an accident I have seen, no one stepped 
forward to help.  There are some exceptions and maybe this doesn’t apply to all cases.” 
When asked about the social life and behavior of the Chinese society, Dhir, an MBBS 
student in North China, said, “Their behavior is good. The only problem is that people are 
not concerned about each other; if something happens to someone, no one cares. 
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Everyone is busy, [has] nothing to do with others.” When asked what made him say so, 
he said, “They do duty on time. They give much importance to time....sort of disciplined. 
It is good. But no one cares about the other.” When asked how it works in his country, he 
said, “it’s not like that in my country but here no one cares; what if someone dies, needs 
help!” 
Familiarity with Chinese Culture 
Nepalese students who were studying in China or had studied there had cultural 
experiences through universities’ events and functions, organized tours (such as those of 
Sichuan University’s to places of historical significance), personal travel, and through 
social exposure to festivals. Findings reveal universities’ seminal role in providing 
cultural experiences to Nepalese students by organizing events featuring Chinese 
festivals. In her written response, Nisha, quoted earlier, mentioned her Chinese 
university’s role in promoting China’s soft power in the cultural domain: 
in order to understand the social and cultural aspects of China, every weekend we 
were taken for visits with historical significance followed by understanding more 
on the infrastructural development.  The primary focus to show us the social and 
cultural life was to make us understand Chinese lifestyle and to some extent those 
visits posited soft power dimensions as well. (Nisha, personal communication, 
November 10, 2017) 
Nisha also wrote, “Frankly speaking, I did not have much idea about the culture 
of China before due to our cultural affinity towards the southern neighbor [India]. Hence, 
these visits gave me a chance to know about the values and cultures that they adapted 
[adopted].” 
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Chinese festivals and fun. Students’ feelings associated with festivals in China 
can be described as that of enjoyment and fun, and their knowledge extended to the 
names and frequency of Chinese festivals. In the words of Karuna: 
I do enjoy. Friends invite us over for the Moon Festival, the Fire Festival. But we 
don’t get much involved because they celebrate them at homes. Sometimes, we go 
the lake when they celebrate the festivals there. Though we don’t understand 
these things, we enjoy. But Christmas parties are celebrated with much pomp and 
show. Our university also organizes parties for us; cultural programs are 
organized. Our own festivals are not that frequent. [But] the Moon Festival comes 
three times a year. 
Several students shared that they hugely missed their own festivals such as Diwali 
and Dussehra. Som shared that he missed Nepalese festivals but found satisfaction in the 
fact that Chinese festivals provided occasions of merriment: “Festivals which we used to 
celebrate in our country we can’t see here. Luckily I got to celebrate most of Chinese 
festivals here.” 
Lack of taste for Chinese food. Except for two medical students, no other 
respondent spoke favorably of Chinese food because of their native taste for spicy food. 
Raj (central China), quoted earlier, said: “Actually, we don’t get our type of food that we 
get in Nepal or India. Food here is boiled, which Pakistanis also don’t like. We are used 
to eating spicy food.” But Karuna from Southwest China was positive about Chinese food 
when she said, “Food here is good. I enjoyed it. I will miss its food when I go back. 
There’re lots of dishes that I take much delight in even though it is Chinese — I like it a 
lot.” An interesting revelation was by Dish, another student from Southwest China, who 
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said that he and his friends told the staff at local Chinese restaurants to make Indian food 
for them while sharing Indian recipes. It surprised me. When I asked him whether the 
local restaurants really complied with their request, he said yes and laughed. 
Copying the Western culture. In their observation of Chinese culture, 
respondents alluded to the impact of the West in festivals, music, dresses and lifestyle. In 
the words of Uday, an aeronautical engineering major, “the thing is that I have seen 
Chinese people copying Western culture. They say they are non-religious but they 
celebrate Christmas. The Western culture has a huge impact on China.” Similarly, Som 
commented, “Generation over here and the way they live, I think they copy the Western 
style. There’s an upcoming generation, they will prefer to.... they like to listen to music 
which is from the US and they will prefer to wear the clothes the US people wear.” 
It is important to mention that information on students’ experience with Chinese 
cultural values can be analyzed in relation to their experience and understanding of social 
values, as discussed earlier. For instance, Chinese cultural values of benevolence and 
harmony, as publicized by the Chinese government, can be examined in practice in 
connection with students’ narration of social behavior and traits as they observed and 
experienced. 
Opinion on Chinese Political System 
Nepalese students’ views of China’s political system, ideology and values are 
grouped into the following types: favorable views without qualification; favorable views 
with qualification; unfavorable views; appreciation for China’s development model; and 
understanding of China’s political ideology. 
Favorable view without qualification. My interviews with Nepalese students 
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revealed that they appreciated China’s political system because it did not come in the way 
of China’s economic development. It rather accelerated its economic advancement. Their 
experience of democracy as it operated in Nepal, considered a least-developed country 
(LDC), made them aware of its pitfalls such as delays in project implementation and lack 
of economic progress. They pointed to social order, discipline, and rules and regulations, 
and physical security, which they found lacking in their own country. For instance, Dhya, 
a medical student in Southeast China, said, “It [system] should be like this everywhere.” 
Respondents under this category did not have any negative view or 
characterization of China’s political system. They were impressed with the governance, 
which stemmed from the flaws of the system as they witnessed in Nepal, described 
below. 
Political instability and politicization of the Nepalese society. This code emerged 
from the following statement by Dhir, a student in the fourth year of the MBBS program 
in North China, “Everyone is doing politics in Nepal. Teachers are also doing politics 
which affects our studies because they do not concentrate on teaching. Political instability 
is a serious issue in Nepal.18 It [politics the domain of the few] should be like [that] in 
China.” The student seemed to suggest that because in China, politics was the business of 
the few, the rest could focus on their work, rather than creating indiscipline which was 
the bane of Nepalese politics. He found that politics had seeped into Nepalese society at 
large, including the academic world, at the cost of work ethics and national development. 
Interests of the students were at stake as they were faced with teacher absence as well as 
lack of teacher commitment. 
                                                 
18 It may be added that in August 2016, the leadership change in Nepal was the 25th in 26 years (“The 
cost,” 2016, August 11). 
128 
Project delays in Nepal versus quick pace in China. Owing to numerous political 
parties that tended to oppose and obstruct, coupled with the politics of negotiation and 
persuasion marking the democratic system in Nepal, the students felt that the 
development projects were susceptible to delays. On the other hand, the faster 
implementation of projects in China, as manifest from the frequency of construction of 
infrastructure projects such as bridges and buildings, created a favorable impression on 
the interviewees. Bimal, an MBBS student in central China, opined: 
The country should be democratic only after it has reached a level of 
development. If a country is developing, I think it should be ruled by only one 
party because if it is democratic, it has to convince all the political parties of local 
areas, convince the local people, convince everyone, wait for 30 days, and some 
more days. What happens in China is the government decides, makes some 
positive things for development- that’s good for the whole country. 
Karuna, another MBBS student, said, “When we came here, within five months here, our 
place has developed a lot that surprises us.... we realize that development in our country 
is stuck in discussions.” 
Lack of order and discipline in Nepal. Students spoke of rules, regulations, 
safety and security in China. Dhya, quoted earlier, said: 
It should be like this everywhere. Here also people have freedom. But if do 
something wrong or break the law, then there is punishment. In fact, I think every 
country should have such system. They have given their people good living 
standard and economic development, why will they create nuisance? What people 
want is facilities. 
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These interviewees were in favor of emulation of the Chinese system in terms of 
one party rule in a developing country and preference to economic development 
(assuming a trade-off between development and democracy). Clearly, those views were 
informed not by the notion of a supposedly intrinsic limitation of democracy but by how 
the polity operated in their own country, marked by political instability and stifled 
economic development. 
Favorable view with qualification. Rukmini, an MBBS intern in East China, 
said, “China lacks democracy which plays a major role in its unstoppable development as 
it is ruled by good hands.” Karuna, another MBBS intern, said: 
From this perspective [freedom], ours is better. I heard from two instructors in 
China that they.... though they didn’t tell openly.... but they told that they don’t 
like the political condition here.... they have to do what they are told to; they can’t 
do what want to do. They said that they [the government] make us dance to their 
tune. But in our country [Nepal], it’s not like that. We can do something for our 
rights, but these people can’t.  They have to carry out the will of the government. 
But for development, it [China’s system] is good because they are developing it a 
lot. When we came here, within five months here, our place has developed a lot 
that surprises us. We think that development in our country is stuck in 
discussions. But here progress is fast. So for development it is good...[but] they 
don’t like it that much. 
Unfavorable view. Som, quoted earlier, endorsed Nepal’s democratic system by 
first sharing different perspectives on China’s political system and then giving his own 
opinion: 
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Everything has both sides. Sometime[s] it is good but sometime[s] it is bad. I 
found lots of my Chinese mates [who] used to tell me “I don’t like the 
government of China. They will do what they want.” But some people think 
communist [system] is good — it is good for the development of the country. So, 
most of the time they will tell like “I don’t like communist [sic] but some of them 
[said] “I like the government system here”, but for me, I don’t think communist 
[system] is the good way to rule the country. Our country is the best .... people 
have [a] right to do what is good for them (emphasis added). 
Appreciation for China’s development model. Concomitantly with critiquing 
the Western media and the Western model of development, students in the social sciences 
program talked of the virtues or expressed appreciation of the Chinese system. While 
medical students also admired the level of development as they saw in China, social 
science students employed theoretical constructs in their responses, drawing from their 
knowledge of Chinese leadership’s oft-used concepts such as “harmonious society” and 
“mutual cooperation.” In the written words of Shiva, a Ph.D. candidate in North China: 
China’s harmonious civilization attracted me. From my school level, I have been 
[sic] great interest in China issues. Anglo-American model totally failed for 
inclusive development of [the] world and created more conflict than problems. 
But China always focuses on mutual cooperation and win-win situation. (Shiva, 
personal communication, September 15, 2017) 
Similarly, Nisha, quoted earlier in this chapter, remarked: 
The media are controlled to some extent, but the citizens are provided with all the 
facilities that the state has to provide. The poverty level has declined significantly 
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which has eventually increased the standard of living. Second, the organized 
development of cities has been very mesmerizing. I think if China maintains this 
current status in both state as well as system level, within a span of 10 years, it 
will become one of the superpowers in the international system. (Nisha, personal 
communication, November 10, 2017) 
The respondent also exhibited her knowledge of “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics,” saying that this phrase was quoted by her professors in lectures. 
Elaborating on this notion, she stated: 
 In political terms, Chinese Communist ideology has been one of the major 
aspects for its infrastructure development. And this development process began 
right after the cultural revolution and the economic reform that was introduced by 
Deng Xiaoping. Hierarchy has always been given an utmost priority which exists 
from government level to private level. With this note, the overall system is very 
much disciplined which has been experienced in our classrooms as well. Rule and 
order prevails and is strictly followed by the citizens. (Nisha, personal 
communication, November 10, 2017) 
Clearly, the reference to development, rule, order and discipline stand out as the 
features of China’s governance, which were observed by the respondent and which point 
to her favorable impression of China along these lines. Referring to Asian values which 
Nisha said she had learned about at Sichuan University, she added, “those countries that 
have adopted Western values have a very slow progressive rate…but in [on] the other 
hand, those countries that have adopted their [own] values have been very much 
successful”. 
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Understanding of China’s political ideology. Students in the social sciences 
program got exposure to and understanding of China’s political ideology with much 
clarity compared to medical students. Given that social science as a discipline offers the 
possibility of incorporation of Chinese political system or ideology into courses, faculty 
in Chinese universities can play an important role in disseminating China’s ideology as 
well as Chinese worldview. It reflects from the following description by Nisha: 
Earlier my idea for Chinese communism was based on the far left of the political 
spectrum. But later after my four months’ stay, China as a communist country has 
its own characteristics. Since IR [international relations] as discipline emerged 
from the west and is taught on the basis of Western values prioritizing majorly on 
liberal values and therefore, the oriental or Chinese values are never prioritized 
and taught (in Nepal’s case). As I spoke to few of our professors there, they said 
that they believe in the government as the government system is well focused in 
the welfare of state and that has been proven as well with the poverty 
alleviation.  They feel that they are more democratic than other democratic 
countries. They also focused on how these political characteristics will eventually 
make China one of the superpowers in the world. Thus, these perceptions from 
the professors are also reflected on [sic] the ongoing work of Chinese government 
and to add further to it, the surplus economy has already set as an example 
worldwide. (Nisha, personal communication, November 10, 2017) 
As Rachit, a Ph.D. candidate noted, “nationalism is very much powerful in 
Chinese academia.” If this statement serves as any clue to the content of class lectures, it 
is apparent that the faculty espoused a favorable view of China or back up China’s case. 
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For instance, Bibek studied international trade law under the Yes China program for a 
year at a Chinese university. He shared that his professors pointed out that so far the 
global order had been West-centric where China had to accept the rules rather than create 
them and that China was going to be a major force in formulating the rules of 
international system such as trade governance. 
Online Sources: Views of Nepalese Students on Chinese Politics, Culture and Society 
Besides interviews, Website documents shed light on Nepalese students’ 
perspectives on Chinese politics and Nepalese alumni’s involvement in promotion of 
Chinese culture.  
Praise for China’s Economic Development 
A Nepalese Ph.D. candidate in international politics at Shandong University 
writes in The China Daily, a Chinese government-run newspaper: 
My generation has grown up listening to the stories of China’s success. I would 
wonder how a country could uplift 700 million people out of poverty in a span of 
30 years. Thanks to the Communist Party of China and the path of Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics, it has made a remarkable contribution to the humanity’s 
right to development. (Upadhyaya, 2017, para. 2) 
Interestingly, the student has made reference not only to the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) but also to “socialism with Chinese characteristics” — the official ideology 
of the CPC. 
Cultural Mediation 
Online data reveals the Arniko Society’s role in fostering Nepal-China relations in 
cultural and humanitarian projects. For example, the Society took an initiative to air in 
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Nepal China’s popular TV series Xi You Ji (Journey to the West), dubbed in Nepali, in 
2016. Its president Sarbottam Shrestha explained, “To showcase history, culture and 
current affairs of China, we have chosen Xi You Ji to be aired in Nepal. This drama was 
very popular in France, Italy, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and China. It is 
entertaining for children to old” (“Xi You Ji”, 2016, para. 2). In September 2017, Chinese 
Ambassador Yu Hong attended the launching ceremony of Eastward Flows the Mighty 
Yangtze River: Prose Collection of Wuhan Authors (Nepali edition). The Arniko Society 
had a representation at this ceremony where the Nepali edition of the book was launched.  
Conclusion 
In terms of attraction, China’s political system was appreciated for governance 
(safety and security), efficiency, and economic development. Political legitimacy stands 
out. In brief, it was found favorable on account of its capacity to deliver results. Some 
students, however, felt that Nepal’s political system was better because of the freedom of 
resistance vis-à-vis obligation of Chinese citizens to carry out the will of their 
government. 
In terms of social values, Nepalese students appreciated work ethic, discipline, 
and motivation on the part of Chinese people though social apathy as well as racism 
stood out as the negative aspects of social life in China. In terms of cultural impact, at 
most, Nepalese students at the Confucius Institute and in China gained awareness of 
Chinese culture, including festivals. While for those who studied in China, learning the 
Chinese language was essential because of the program requirement as well as in order to 
interact with the Chinese people, those at the Confucius Institute considered learning 
Chinese an opportunity to learn a new language for free. The language issue was found to 
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be a major barrier by almost all current students and alumni, and those who had learned it 
at the Confucius Institute had forgotten how to speak it. These facts point to the limits of 
China’s cultural penetration in Nepal. 
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CHAPTER VII 
EDUCATION AS A TOOL FOR CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS 
As mentioned in Chapter IV, one of the soft power aims of China is to create a 
constituency of supporters for advancing its national interest in Nepal, whether related to 
reining in Tibetan separatists or curtailing India’s influence or promoting business 
interests. From the perspective of the soft power model adopted in this study, China’s 
success in achieving this aim can be gauged through Nepalese students’ concurrence with 
its foreign policy, one of the sources of soft power in the soft power framework provided 
by Joseph Nye. Accordingly, their statements on China-Nepal relations, China’s foreign 
policy initiatives, China’s presence in the region, and other issues have been analyzed in 
this chapter. 
Findings from Interviews with Nepalese Students 
This section presents findings in four categories: positive perception of the Belt 
and Road Initiative; China’s contribution to Nepal and the world; impact of course 
content; and students’ interest in collaboration with China. 
Positive Perception of the Belt and Road Initiative 
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), previously known as One Belt, One Road 
(OBOR), is China’s ambitious infrastructure project in Asia, Africa and Europe. Carney 
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and Martel (2017) describe it as a “super-highway for Chinese economic dominance”; 
they write, “[It] is China’s plan to dominate world trade by building and controlling a 
network of roads, pipelines, railways, ports, and power plants to deliver raw materials to 
China and finished goods to the rest of the world” (para.5). In May 2017, Nepal signed a 
Memorandum of understanding (MoU) with China, agreeing to join the BRI. 
 
Figure 4. China’s BRI Program (Jia, 2015) 
 Nepalese students in social sciences programs not only referred to the BRI when 
asked about their knowledge of China or understanding of its foreign policy, but they 
were also receptive to and appreciative of it, as manifest from the section below. 
Connection between BRI and soft power.  Students of international relations 
were not only familiar with the concept of soft power but also explained how the BRI, 
soft power, and education were inter-connected, which further speaks of their favorable 
impressions of China’s foreign policy. Nisha, a former student at a university in 
Southwest China, shared the following opinion on Nepal- China educational ties:  
From the perspective of soft power, China has been successful by adapting such 
[educational] ties because it provides an opportunity for students to explore more 
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about China mainly on its developmental side followed by cultural, political and 
social life. China has also been able to create awareness on its grand project of 
OBOR [,] which is eventually going to be one of the most influential projects 
worldwide. (Nisha, personal communication, November 10, 2017) 
The above quote is significant in the following ways. First, it reflects a Nepalese 
student’s perception of the success of China on the front of soft power in the domain of 
educational linkages with Nepal. Second, it mirrors a connection between higher 
education and the foreign policy program of the BRI (formerly known as OBOR) insofar 
as foreign students enrolled in such joint programs gain understanding of BRI or other 
programs. Third, the belief in BRI’s future success as “one of the most influential 
projects worldwide” is a clear-cut concurrence with the initiative itself. 
Similarly, Rachit, a Ph.D. candidate in North China, drew a connection between 
the BRI and scholarships to foreign students, while pointing out that China was “giving 
scholarships as a tool of soft power” and that it signified its “responsibility” toward 
developing countries. He said that especially after the BRI came to be implemented, the 
number of scholarships to developing countries like Nepal went up because “OBOR 
[BRI] became one of the prominent elements of foreign policy” and added that countries 
receiving these scholarships were benefiting from the schemes which could result in 
China’s influence in his country also. He further said that “every big power” uses this 
tool, while citing the example of India that provides 3,000 scholarships to Nepal 
annually. His viewpoint clearly suggests that provision of scholarships as a soft-power 
building exercise is tied to the foreign policy initiative of the BRI. Also, the respondent’s 
mention of scholarships provided by India further suggests that China is endeavoring to 
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curtail India’s influence in the educational field — one of the soft power aims underlined 
in Chapter IV. 
Nepalese students’ receptivity to the BRI is underlined in the subsequent section 
on online sources. Interviewees, especially medical students, were either not sure what to 
say about China’s foreign policy or when prompted for Nepal-China relations, they either 
referred to China’s developmental aid to Nepal or simply said that the relations between 
the two countries were good. Thus, there was no negative characterization of China-
Nepal relations or China’s foreign policy. 
China’s Contribution to Nepal and the World 
The above category was formed out of the codes of “contribution to countries’ 
development,” “financial support,” and “global stability, peace and development.” In the 
words of a medical student, “I have heard that China exports products and contributes to 
countries’ development. They support other countries financially. This is what I hear and 
read in news that China has supported that much, has given aid...but not in detail” 
(Karuna). In the words of Shiva, a Ph.D. candidate, “China has a lot of things to deliver 
to the world and contribute for global stability, peace and development.” Shiva’s words 
echo the official stance of the Chinese government. For instance, Xinhua reports that 
Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi said that “China will continue to be an anchor of 
international stability, an engine of global growth, a champion of peace and development 
and a contributor to global governance” (“China to continue contributing,” 2017, para. 1). 
Impact of Course Content  
A former student at the Confucius Institute at Kathmandu University (CIKU) 
informed that his perception of China was changed after watching a documentary on 
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“Maoist revolution” and videos on China’s development and growth. The agenda of 
influencing the foreign youth reflects in the nature of videos shown to students at the 
CIKU: ideologically influencing the youth in a democratic country. Bibek, who studied at 
a university in East China, said that after communists came to power in China, gender 
equality had come to prevail as women constituted most of the workforce in China. He 
further said that his Chinese instructors would speak highly of the rich civilization of 
China, and opined that the political system of China had an imprint on the course material 
and on what was taught in class. The participant seemed to suggest that instructors were 
expected to put forth China’s case to advance national interest. For instance, in the 
international economic law class, the instructor explained how China is preferring to be a 
party to an institution at the time of its formation rather than accepting the existing rules 
of the game such as that of the World Trade Organization. He also shared that since there 
were all foreign students in the class, the instructors felt free to engage in discussions 
without bothering about possible spying by students. 
Interest in Collaboration with China 
Some Nepalese students in social science disciplines mentioned working with 
China (or for China) as part of their possible future plans in terms of providing legal 
assistance in litigation to Chinese companies in Nepal, working with Chinese 
organizations in Nepal, or associating with China’s BRI project by offering consulting 
services to Nepal or interested parties. 
Online Sources 
Apart from interviews, online sources carry articles contributed by Nepalese 
students, including Ph.D. candidates, which reflect their positive views of China’s foreign 
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policy, specifically the BRI. 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
The China Daily is apparently encouraging and is receptive to foreign student-
written articles favorable to China’s image, including its foreign policy. It is especially 
carrying write-ups on the BRI. For instance, it carried a summary of the joint research 
paper of a Ph.D. and a master’s student on “The Politics of Soft Power: Belt and Road 
Initiative as Charm Influence in South Asia.” Both are Nepalese students studying in 
China. The article also alluded to India’s foreign policy, saying, “Experts said that India’s 
hegemonic and British-era foreign policy towards the neighbors is forcing them [the 
South Asian region] to look at China for cooperation” (Sharma & Khatri, 2017, para. 6). 
Interestingly, the Chinese leadership has called upon India to join the BRI Initiative, and 
this piece echoes this stance as the authors write: 
Due to the massive support of the global community to the initiative, it is said by 
many Indian scholars that India will not have any other choice than to support 
B&R [BRI]. They added that India made a mistake by not sending a 
representative to the Beijing B&R Summit (Sharma & Khatri, 2017, para. 5).19 
Though it is debatable as how much the Nepalese government is committed to 
China’s BRI project (Ghimire, 2017), it looks like some Nepalese researchers studying in 
China are pushing hard, creating favorable outcomes for the Chinese government which, 
in turn, through state media is carrying pro-China or Nepal-China write-ups by Nepalese 
students. For example, the following excerpt from an article by a Nepalese Ph.D. 
                                                 
19 The summary did not provide any source to back up the claim, viz., “said by many Indian scholars.” 
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candidate, featured on CCTV, China’s state news broadcaster, calls upon the Nepalese 
government to cooperate with China in implementing the bilateral agreements. 
Nepal should focus on implementing agreements. China, which is the second 
largest economy of the world and the biggest exporter, has capital, technologies, 
knowledge and experiences. Nepal-China relations can move in harmonious 
ways. Nepal stands committed to the One China Policy. China supports Nepal’s 
development. Now Nepal needs to do much more from its side. (Sharma, 2017, 
paras. 15-16) 
Another Ph.D. candidate from Nepal in his article in The China Daily, China’s 
state-run newspaper, writes about the benefits of BRI for Nepal, while also in contrast 
criticizing India for its intervention in Nepalese politics. Also, he calls upon India to “join 
hands with China” in the region by joining the BRI. Interestingly, his thesis focuses on 
China’s multilateral diplomacy, including its BRI initiative in South Asia. Given that the 
article appeared in the Chinese government-run newspaper and subscribes to the Chinese 
perspective, it appears to be a mouthpiece of the Chinese government. The author writes: 
OBOR [BRI] is based on win-win cooperation. It is a Chinese dream of building 
a[sic] interconnected world where the countries along the route are included in a 
global value chain. It is imperative for Nepal to create job opportunity so that the 
human resource do not have to go to the gulf countries to work in the poor 
working conditions and low pay. Seeing the proximity and affinity, a Chinese 
train could have first reached Kathmandu, which is merely 100 kilometers from 
the border of China before plying more than 12,000 kilometers all the way to 
London. These observations take us to a simple conclusion that it is already too 
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late for Nepal to start collaborating with China in building infrastructure projects 
under the One Belt, One Road initiative (Upadhyaya, 2017, paras. 6-7). 
In fact, the author in yet another article in the China Daily minces no words when 
he writes, “As a strong admirer of OBOR, I take this opportunity to wish the ongoing 
‘Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation’ a grand success” (Upadhyaya, 
2017, June 12, last para.)  Going further, he puts forth a critical view of the West: 
At the time when the West is fanning the clash of civilization, protectionism and 
isolationism, the Communist Party of China with Chairman Xi [Chinese 
President] as the core has put forward the Chinese dream of building a community 
of common destiny for mankind. (Upadhyaya, 2017, June 12, last para.) 
The views expressed above appeared in the Chinese state media and clearly align 
with the official stance of the CPC. It is another issue as to how the Nepalese students’ 
pro-China views translate into concrete gains for China in muting any future criticism of 
or skepticism over China’s intentions in Nepal or how influential these students are going 
to be in the Nepalese mainstream. 
Arniko Society 
Online sources illuminate increasing engagement of Nepalese alumni with 
Chinese organizations. Arniko Society, an alumni association, has emerged as an 
important player in building closer ties between Nepal and China through such ways as 
holding China education fairs, organizing or attending Chinese cultural events, tying up 
with Chinese NGOs in development works for Nepal, and positively responding to the 
Chinese government’s initiatives on the Tibet issue. 
In fact, the Arniko Society website lists its following functions: 
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 Developing closer contacts and cooperation among the members to provide 
opportunities for exchange of information on academic, scientific, technical and 
other concerned subjects among the members. 
 Introducing China and the Chinese language to the Nepalese youth and general 
public. 
 Developing cultural, educational, social, economic, trade, scientific and 
technological co-operation and exchanges between the two countries. 
 Promoting exchange of visits between academicians, professionals, students and 
businessmen of both countries to enhance people to people contacts. 
 Arranging seminars, conferences, exhibitions, and talk programs on issues of 
common interest. 
 Organizing public programs like film festival, photo exhibition book fair, to give 
the Nepalese people opportunity to know more about China and the different 
aspects of life of Chinese people and disseminate information about Nepal to the 
Chinese people. 
 Making arrangements for the visit of Chinese Friendship Organizations, Buddhist 
organizations and academicians to Nepal. 
 Playing the role of a contact point between similar organizations of Nepal and 
China (“Who we are,” n.d., para. 2) 
The Society has been involved in organizing free health camps and conducting 
free cataract surgeries for Nepalese people with the help of Chinese NGOs (Jin, 2014) 
such as CNIE and the China Foundation for Peace and Development, giving relief to 
“low-income households” and providing services in “Nepal’s rugged and remote regions, 
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where modern eye care is often unheard of”’ (Pengfei, 2014, para. 10). Similarly, in June 
2016, Arniko Society organized lectures of Chinese medical experts to share their 
knowledge with nearly hundred Nepalese pertaining to diseases and diagnosis of 
obstetrics/gynecology, cancer, among other diseases. In an interview to Xinhua, a 
Nepalese radiologist said, “The lecture session and presentation by the Chinese medical 
experts are very fruitful for us. In fact, such interactions should be held regularly to 
expand our knowledge” (“Visiting Chinese medical experts,” 2016, para. 4). 
Arniko Society and the Tibet issue. While on the one hand, the Arniko Society 
as a non-governmental institution is interacting with Chinese medical professionals and 
Chinese NGOs, which is contributing to Chinese soft power on a nongovernmental level, 
the role of the Chinese Embassy is also not passive when it comes to establishing rapport 
with the Society. In fact, there is a strategic element to the Arniko Society--Chinese 
government relationship.  First, the Society was involved in selecting tour guides for 
visitors to Tibet. As posted on the website of China Tibet Online: 
Nearly 60 Nepalese tour guides received training on knowledge of China’s Tibet 
in a program organized by the China Tibetology Research Center on June 8. The 
tour guides were all selected by the Nepalese Arniko Society (emphasis added). 
Four Chinese scholars made detailed introduction about history and current 
situation of Tibet, Tibet’s social and economic development, reincarnation in 
Tibetan Buddhism, and traditional Tibetan thangka painting, hoping that the 
students would gain a comprehensive and correct understanding of China’s Tibet. 
An Qiyi, deputy secretary-general of the center, said that tour guides would 
always have a great influence on tourists, and Nepalese tour guides could play a 
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major and positive role in sharing their knowledge about China’s Tibet. 
(“Nepalese tour guides,” 2017, paras. 1-3). 
Second, while Nepalese government has reiterated its commitment to “one-China 
policy” (viz., Tibet is a part of China), China is capitalizing on the growing ties with 
Nepal by seeking its enhanced involvement on the Tibet issue and thereby neutralizing or 
diminishing the activism of Tibetan separatists. At the inaugural ceremony of the China 
Tibetan Cultural Forum in Kathmandu, Ambassador Hong said, “I am sure people of 
Nepal will get to know factual information about Tibet through this event and people of 
Tibet will get to know about the historic aspects of cultural linkages between Nepal and 
China” (“OBOR,” 2017, last para.). Importantly, the Arniko Society had a representation 
at the ceremony, alongside the Chinese Embassy and top Nepalese political elites. In fact, 
as back as the year 2007, a Multi-colored Tibet Photo Exhibition was co-organized by 
China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture and the Arniko 
Society. Given that Tibet is a strategically issue for China for its ‘One China Policy’, the 
presence of Nepalese civil society such as the alumni association gives a political 
advantage to Chinese leadership.  
Conclusion 
It was found that students in social sciences were more knowledgeable about 
China’s foreign policy and gave rich descriptions of the BRI and other foreign policy 
issues, while medical students and those who had studied at the Confucius Institute 
mostly alluded to their perception of China-Nepal relations as “good” or spoke of China’s 
developmental aid, including assistance to Nepal in the aftermath of the earthquake in 
2015. Overall, both interviews and online sources reveal a positive perception about 
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China’s foreign policy, informed by what the Nepalese students see as a potential benefit 
to Nepal from BRI, their awareness of China’s development aid to Nepal, their apparent 
belief in China’s policy of non-intervention, and disapproval of India’s monopoly over 
trade supplies. 
Soft power is assessed through positive images, positive descriptions, and positive 
narratives or stories of or “favorable views” of foreign publics about a country. 
Comparing the gains to China on the front of education as a resource or as a purveyor of 
values/culture, education as a foreign policy tool has appeared more effective. It is 
apparent from the following considerations or outcomes. First, China’s positive influence 
over the foreign students (Nepalese students in the given case) reflects from their positive 
comments on Nepal-China relations, and on China’s BRI Initiative. 
Second, China’s governance and political system found a constituency of 
admirers in Nepalese students. Even those who preferred the Nepalese political system 
admired China’s governance and infrastructure development. Students in the social 
sciences discipline were aware of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”— decades-old 
official description of China’s development paradigm. Interestingly, in October 2017, the 
Research Center for Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a 
New Era was inaugurated at the Sichuan Academy of Social Sciences. 
Third, students of social sciences looked forward to working with China or China-
based projects. Fourth, China stands to gain from a pro-China attitude versus attitude 
toward India. Fifth, the Arniko Society is, to an extent, engaged in activities favorable to 
China, including on the Tibet issue. Overall, it appears that a coterie of intellectuals is 
forming to act as an intermediary between Nepal and China, bringing both countries 
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closer. 
It merits a mention that those participants who chose to respond by email were 
almost positive about China in comparison to those who spoke on the phone or other 
devices, and were perhaps more careful in sharing their views.
149 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
DISCUSSION 
This chapter determines and discusses the relationship between China’s soft 
power aims and Nepalese students’ experiences in academic, social, cultural and political 
terms. As found in Chapter IV, those aims are connected with China's cultural, economic, 
and foreign policy interests. The education soft power model employed in this study 
assigns prime significance to the role of higher education in helping China attain those 
aims. As such, students’ descriptions of their experiences and views constitute a lens to 
gauge the extent of success China has gained so far. One may, however, be cautioned that 
national aims are not an output that can be easily, instantly, or precisely attained 
regardless of the strength of inputs, or even measured. It is not an application of science. 
Nevertheless, this research sheds light on the areas of success, failure, challenges, and 
opportunities, as gleaned through analysis of various data sources. It may be added that 
while medical students praised China’s accomplishments on the front of economic 
development and also narrated their social experiences, responses of the non-medical and 
non-engineering students were primarily focused on the academic and political content in 
describing their experiences in China.
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Relationship Between China’s Soft Power Aims and Nepalese Students' Experiences 
At the outset, it may be noted that this study addresses the following research 
question: What is the relationship between the experience of Nepalese students in China's 
higher education programs and the explicit and implicit aims of China's soft power policy 
in South Asia? Accordingly, this section discusses the experience of Nepalese students in 
connection with China's higher education program(s) against the backdrop of China’s 
aims behind building soft power in Nepal. In this regard, it keeps in view the following 
sub-question: how are China’s social and political values as well as its culture reflected in 
the experience of Nepalese students in regard to China’s higher education programs? The 
following table presents this discussion. 
Table 4 
Relationship between China’s Soft Power Aims and Nepalese Students’ Experiences 
 
China’s Soft Power Aims 
 
Nepalese Students’ Experiences 
Increasing the influence of 
Chinese higher education program 
 China has not yet established a “brand 
name” for its education among Nepalese 
students. 
 China ranks sixth in destination, attracting 
Nepalese students on account of 
affordability and scholarships. 
 Studying in China is not considered 
prestigious in Nepal. 
 China has a limited success in 
implementing the Plan for Study in China 
and the Circular on Interim Provisions for 
Quality Control Standards on 
Undergraduate Medical Education in 
English for International Students in 
China in respect of Nepalese students. 
 Social sciences might be accounting for a 
better experience for Nepalese students, 
though research in this domain is likely to 
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China’s Soft Power Aims 
 
Nepalese Students’ Experiences 
be impacted by Chinese academia’s “one-
way of thinking,” i.e., holding China’s 
national interest supreme. 
 
Cultural Dissemination  Nepalese students became aware of and 
enjoyed Chinese festivals 
 Cultural sites were appreciated 
 Barring a couple exceptions, Chinese food 
did not find favor with Nepalese students 
 Chinese movies and music did not figure 
in Nepalese students’ cultural 
consumption 
 Work-ethic, warmth and friendliness of 
Chinese people were reported 
 Negative experiences involving racism, 
and social apathy toward fellow-beings 
were reported. 
 
Language Dissemination  Chinese was found to be an extremely 
difficult language 
 Students at the Confucius Institute (CI) 
forgot how to speak Chinese over time, 
losing the learning gain 
 Students at the CI pointed to limitations 
such as lack of opportunities to practice, 
and learning challenges 
 Those who studied and stayed in China 
had a better ability to speak Chinese. 
 
Fostering Bilateral Ties & 
Cultivating Nepalese youth, 
including alumni, for support as 
future elites 
 Some participants expressed a desire or 
willingness to work with the Chinese 
organizations in the future. 
 Arniko Society is engaged in tasks that are 
important for China's national interest 
such as promotion of Chinese education 
program, Chinese culture, and on pro-
China stance on the Tibet issue. 
 Experience of unpleasant social behavior 
might obstruct goodwill creation 
 
Counter to India's influence  Support to the BRI project 
 Appreciation of China's non-intervention 
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China’s Soft Power Aims 
 
Nepalese Students’ Experiences 
policy and humanitarian assistance 
 
Positive image of Chinaa  Described as a beautiful country, 
disciplined, with good governance in 
terms of order, safety and security. 
Note. aAspects of positive images and negative images can be gleaned from the preceding 
rows in this table. 
Guided by the above table, the following section offers a detailed discussion on 
the findings of this study. China’s soft power aims have been categorized into the themes, 
and the corresponding text discusses the aims’ relationship with the students’ experiences 
and observations. From the perspective of the educational soft power model, increasing 
the influence of higher education comes under education as a resource; dissemination of 
culture and language in education as a purveyor of values and culture; and cultivation of 
youth for protection of its national interest and countering India’s influence in education 
as a tool to achieve foreign policy objectives. The aim of carrying a positive image 
straddles the three constituents of the model. In addition, Joseph Nye’s framework of 
culture, political ideals, and foreign policy is integrated with this model (Nye, 2004). 
Increasing the Influence of China’s Higher Education 
China is seeking to increase the influence of its higher education globally by 
attracting international students to study in China and by creating a “brand name” for 
Chinese education. Extending this aim to Nepal, China has stepped up scholarships for 
Nepalese students, while scores of Chinese universities have participated in education 
fairs in Nepal. But an analysis of the brand reputation of China’s educational institutions 
and the quality of Nepalese students’ academic experiences reveals challenges to China’s 
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soft power drive, as explained below. The subsequent sub-sections highlight the current 
focus of China on enrollments, the potential for enrollment of Nepalese students in social 
sciences, and futuristic scenarios. 
 Lack of brand reputation. China’s Tsinghua University and Peking University 
rank among the world’s top 20 universities in the Times Higher Education (THE) World 
Reputation Rankings 2017. In 2017, they surpassed the University of Pennsylvania and 
Cornell University to occupy 14th and 17th places respectively. From this perspective, 
China has carved a niche in top global university brands. Interestingly, the THE ranking 
is compiled through the opinion-survey of leading academics in identifying universities 
on the basis of excellence in research and teaching. However, based on interviews with 
Nepalese students and scholars, it cannot be said that Chinese education carries a brand 
reputation in Nepal. No student participant, other than one Ph.D. candidate in social 
science, referred to the university’s ranking as a factor of appreciation for Chinese 
education, while a master’s student who was “happy” to have studied at a “big” Chinese 
university for his undergrad program chose China for the scholarship he received. As 
Luxbacher (2013) writes in the Guardian about the influence of world university 
rankings: 
The indicators and criteria used are not all encompassing and often measured via 
proxies. There is a greater overall emphasis on research than teaching, despite the 
context of rising tuition fees, when prospective students are looking for the 
complete package. (para 11) 
Though China attracted the medical interviewees owing to its cost structure, 
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scholarships, and easiness of getting admission to medical colleges,20 the interviewees 
did not mention the elements of attractiveness that are included in China’s official Plan 
for Study in China. The plan’s focus is to make Chinese education programs attractive 
and to make China known for “higher education institutions with distinguishing 
features”; “high-standard disciplines”; “attractive courses” (providing international 
comparative advantage); and “outstanding teachers.” Rather, the perception of Nepalese 
society at large is that it is not prestigious to study in China. In contrast, as the creators of 
the educational soft power model write, Finland achieved nation-branding most 
significantly through its internationally acclaimed education system (Wojciuk, Michalek 
& Stormowska, 2015). In 2017, Xinhua, China’s press agency, carried a news story on a 
Chinese education fair in Nepal in which it cited a couple of prospective students who 
appreciated both scholarships and growing reputation of Chinese universities (“China 
education fair,” 2017, December 10). But as this study has demonstrated, the current 
students do not look upon China as a reputed destination for higher education. In the 
short-term, recruitment because of the low cost is boosting enrollment, but the long-term 
plan to develop a brand on the basis of quality of institutions, courses, and teachers is a 
challenge. 
Gaps in student expectations. As explained in Chapter V, students experienced 
certain learning challenges, especially in concept clarification and in their medical 
internships. Broadly, China’s achievements against the backdrop of China’s Plan for 
                                                 
20 Admission requirements for an MBBS program in China are considered non-stringent. At the time of 
writing this note, candidates do not need to pass any pre-qualifying medical examination in Nepal in order 
to apply to a Chinese university nor submit any test score, such as a Graduate Record Exam (GRE) 
equivalent, other than high school grades. 
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Study for China as well as the Circular on Education for Foreign Medical Students were 
found to be limited except for students’ positive experience with clinical procedures and 
assistance from “qualified” and “caring” teachers. However, acquisition of “solid” 
medical knowledge, an objective of the Circular, was challenging owing to the language 
barrier as well as the limited proficiency of some teachers in English, in addition to other 
learning challenges. 
It may be acknowledged that carving a niche of influence based on attracting 
students to China through cost advantage can be considered a mark of success in the 
education market, just as pricing in the business world is considered a selling proposition 
and a differentiation strategy. But it is important, at the same time, that customer 
satisfaction and product quality are not compromised. Given this analogy, while holding 
attraction for Nepalese students is a sign of soft power or a mark of the success of 
international education strategy, the gaps in student expectations between China’s 
promotion of its programs and the experience of students in obstacles to full gains in 
knowledge, such as lack of adequate clinical exposure as highlighted in Chapter V, 
detract from the attractiveness of Chinese education and pose a challenge to building a 
brand name for it. 
But when it comes to easing the language barrier, Chinese universities seem to 
have limited leeway because while they may appoint more proficient instructors, they 
cannot possibly identify, shortlist and present to Nepalese interns the patients who can 
communicate in English. In China around 10 million people in the population of 1.3 
billion can speak English. In the mainland China, cities such as Shanghai, Beijing, 
Tianjin, Jiangsu have more English speakers than other cities. Even if prospective 
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students decide to target these areas for study, it is not certain that their patients would be 
English speakers. There appears to be a built-in handicap that demands creative solutions 
to provide better clinical experience to Nepalese interns or other foreign students. A 
question arises: how would patient’s prejudices based on skin color be addressed? Even if 
Chinese doctors or instructors could accompany all Nepalese interns, it would be a quick-
fix solution rather than amelioration of social prejudices. 
Focus on enrollment versus other ingredients of attraction.  For the Chinese 
authorities, the reasons why Nepalese students choose to study in China do not apparently 
matter anymore than their current prime concern for increasing international enrollment, 
including that of Nepalese students, to meet the official target of having 500,000 foreign 
students by 2020 to become a hub of international education. As such, offering 
scholarships is an important mechanism to attract students from Nepal (“China awards 
university-level scholarships,” 2017). As Ding (2016), who examined experiences of 
international students in Shanghai, observes, “China...has chosen to focus on strategies 
that can quickly increase international enrollment in the short term, such as increasing the 
supply of government scholarships” (p. 335). Besides, the students who self-funded their 
education certainly contributed to Chinese coffers. As Haugen (2013) notes in the context 
of China’s “neoliberal educational structuring,” “China—like several Western 
countries— aspires to become a primary destination for self-funding foreign students, 
who pay much higher fees than the domestic students” (p. 7). 
Furthermore, another objective of the Plan for Study in China is “to generate a 
large number of graduates who both understand China and contribute to connecting 
China to the rest of the world.” It is pertinent to cite Singh (2010) in Nepal’s context: 
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A large number of Nepalese students, mainly those who have failed to get into 
engineering and medical colleges in Nepal or India, throng to China to study at 
facilities especially created for them. Nepal, with population of 2.8 crores [28 
million] has 14 medical colleges. The Chinese have a very nonchalant attitude 
where teaching these students is concerned, for their primary aim is to brainwash 
the young minds of the Nepalese to the Chinese communist way of thinking, 
primed to turn Maoists on return to their homeland. (p. 107) 
Be that as it may, China is currently aspiring to strengthen the base of Nepalese 
students studying in China by using scholarships and low cost to fuel their recruitment. 
While it requires further investigation as to how brainwashing is taking place, it is apt to 
mention that a former student at Shanghai University said in an interview in this study 
that after communists came to power in China, gender equality came to prevail, reflecting 
in women’s higher representation in the workforce. Also, Chapter VII illuminates 
especially positive views of China, based on both interviews and online sources. In any 
case, the lack of brand reputation might be limiting the number of international 
enrollment in China. 
China’s potential for attraction in the social sciences disciplines. Nepalese 
students go to China mainly for medicine and engineering disciplines. In the telephone 
conversation (September 22, 2017), Lok Raj Baral,21 executive chairman of Nepal 
Contemporary Studies, stated that China’s higher education system does not hold 
attraction for Nepalese students. He added that given the liberal orientation of Nepalese 
students in contrast to those in the communist regime, study of the social sciences in 
                                                 
21 The expert's name appears with his consent. 
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China would not attract students from Nepal while medicine and engineering have been 
the dominant disciplines of Nepalese students’ study in China. Similarly, Madhukar 
S.J.B. Rana22 stated: 
[The] Role of higher education is rising as more and more students opt for China, 
particularly in Medicine and Engineering. When China develops world class 
universities with international faculty, as they have now planned to do, it is likely 
that enrolment will increase in arts, humanities, social sciences and, particularly, 
banking and management. (Madhukar SJB Rana, personal communication, 
September 25, 2017) 
Similarly, when I was looking for participants in this study, a huge pool of 
medical students on social media was available. As a result, the data on medical students’ 
experience is more extensive. Fewer students in the social sciences disciplines were 
interviewed.  Also, three out of the five interviewees in social sciences had studied in 
China under special programs for a semester or a year (such as the Yes China program) 
while they were enrolled in degree programs in Nepal. Hence, only the remaining two, 
the doctoral students, were enrolled in the degree program in China itself. However, a 
couple of points suggest future developments in increasing attraction to China’s higher 
education in the area of social sciences. First, given that China is a major force in 
international politics, interest in China studies may step up in the future. For instance, my 
respondents in social sciences were focused on China (such as the Ph.D. topic on China 
or the course on China’s foreign policy initiative on the BRI). Second, China is 
popularizing its foreign policy programs, such as the much famous BRI which extends to 
                                                 
22 The expert's name appears with his consent. 
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the South Asian region, by introducing “OBOR Scholarships.” These factors produce a 
potential for growth in enrollments in social sciences. 
But how is social science important for China? First, it offers a fertile ground to 
espouse pro-China views or make a case for China in course material and pedagogy, 
which may impact the foreign students, especially from non-developed countries, in 
forming a favorable opinion of China. Second, in its “knowledge war with the West,” 
China stands to gain by slowly but steadily injecting what it terms “China’s theoretical 
innovations” in securing audiences for Chinese theoretical constructs. For instance, 
participants in my study were familiar with such concepts as “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics” — the concept that was incorporated into the constitution of the Chinese 
Communist Party as “the Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics 
for a New Era” in October 2017. Below is an excerpt from an article that further clarifies 
the context behind this line of reasoning: 
The Chinese leadership is seeking global recognition for its indigenous theories, 
social science evaluations, and Chinese philosophy. It has flung a challenge to 
political liberalism, a reigning Western ideology, and has seemingly entered the 
intellectual warfare or the contest over recognition of “theoretical innovations”- 
the phenomenon that goes beyond the ideological clashes of the Cold War era. In 
other words, just as theories or concepts developed by American scholars have 
dominated the methodological landscape in plethora of social sciences literature, 
especially after the end of the Cold War and the accompanying triumph of 
neoliberalism, the Chinese leadership has embarked on the ambitious agenda of 
hoisting the flag of Chinese intellectual might. (Jain, 2017, p.14) 
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Futuristic scenarios. This section sheds light on China’s attractiveness based on 
the reputation of its institutions. 
Reputation as an attraction? Of late, Chinese universities have been marketing 
themselves on the basis of world ranking of higher institutions. In the first China 
Education Fair held in March 2017 in Nepal, Judy Shen, Program Manager at University 
of Science and Technology of China told Xinhua, China’s official press agency, “Our 
university is one of the top universities among Chinese universities and world widely 
[sic] stands at Top 200…We offer various scholarship programs so we thought we can 
attract more Nepali students to study” (“China education fair,” 2017, para. 8). Clearly, 
scholarships and ranking are the selling propositions in universities’ promotional 
activities in Nepal. But China’s ranking has not helped it in substantively impacting 
Nepalese students’ perception of Chinese higher education program. It is true that most of 
my participants have been in China for the past four to five years, while China’s 
universities figured in the top 20 brands in the Times Higher Education ranking in 2017. 
But even as far back as 2011, Chinese universities ranked among the top 45, with 
Tsinghua University occupying the 35th place. But no interviewee referred to China’s 
ranking as a decisive or as a factor at all in their decision to study in China. China was 
actually a low-cost destination for them. 
Given that China’s education fairs started recently, the ranking factor might 
reflect in students’ choice to study in China in the future, though it is difficult to say 
whether China would surpass the Western countries in their first choice to study abroad. 
Students who could afford to study in other countries would probably still skip China. 
Why? First, China is still a developing country. Some Nepalese student participants in 
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this study aspired to undertake further study or work in the United States. Further, as a 
student in my study said, people in Nepal at large are not much aware of China’s 
advances in science, technology and economy. Second, although China’s reputed 
universities such as Tsinghua and Peking University are rivaling top Western universities 
in science, technology, engineering and mathematics research, they are “not as strong” 
(Lane, 2017) in the life sciences, medicine, and the social sciences (Bothwell, 2017). 
Third, if immigration is what prospective students are aiming at, China may not be 
among top choices because of perceptions such as it is a communist regime with a lack of 
freedom, the difficulty of getting Nepalese food, and the language issue. As participants 
in my study said, they had held such images before coming to China. Unless China is 
able to address these perceptions and images, it will continue to lag behind other 
countries in attracting self-funded students from Nepal. 
Another question arises. If Nepal’s education system is reformed along the lines 
of affordability and an increase in the number of medical colleges, would it impact 
prospective students’ choice of China? In other words, how sustainable is China’s charm 
that largely thrives on the ills of Nepal’s domestic education system? What if other 
countries come to offer the same advantage? How competitive would China be then? 
Prevailing competition with other countries. Given that my participants 
expressed a desire to pursue further education in the United States, it suggests that China 
is more of a sojourn, in response to exigencies of the situation, rather than a dream 
destination. In this regard, its soft power is evidently fragile in comparison with the 
overwhelming attraction the US holds. The source of this attraction is not simply the 
worldwide reputation of American universities (or to say, the US is an established brand) 
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but also the implicit goal of settling in the US. For instance, several Nepalese students 
who are pursuing an MBBS from China plan to take the US Medical Licensing 
Examination (MLE) in order to practice in the US, while a Nepalese Ph.D. candidate in 
China plans to pursue a Ph.D. degree from the US after completing his program in China. 
China’s visa policy, though relaxed recently, is not favorable to foreign students even 
though China is of late seeking foreign talent in select areas such as technology that may 
drive innovation in China. But in any case, the reputation of China as a whole is not as 
strong as that of the United States when it comes to the first choice in studying and 
staying. Thus, though China has established world-class universities with global repute, 
competition from the US soft power emerges from the reputation of the country, which 
means that the challenge for China is to take on an established brand. 
Cultural and Language Dissemination 
This is yet another soft power aim. Nepal is part of an overall project of China in 
its drive to become a cultural soft power. As observed in an article in the Economist, 
“China hopes foreigners will take up some of its traditional customs...The Communist 
Party wants China’s cultural presence to reach everywhere...” (“China spending billions,” 
2017, para. 8). This mission demands the spread of Chinese cultural influence in terms of 
attraction for and consumption of Chinese cultural products such as movies. The 
following major themes have emerged based on findings in Chapter VI. 
Cultural awareness versus cultural embracement/consumption. Nepalese 
students in China gained more cultural exposure in comparison to those studying at the 
Confucius Institute. They became familiar with Chinese festivals and traditions and had 
fun during celebrations. Except for a couple of students who liked Chinese food, none 
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had a liking for Chinese food, and no one reported viewing Chinese movies. The area 
where Chinese culture attracted several Nepalese students was the beauty of the country, 
specifically as they saw during travel, reflecting in cultural sites. For instance, a former 
student said, “Their museums are very impressive…the things that were preserved there, 
and all those cultural sites, historical sites were very well-preserved. I went to 
Chengdu…When you walk there, it feels like it’s 5,000 years old” (Samir). His 
observation underscores the cultural value the Chinese place on preserving artifacts.  This 
value is mirrored in the statement of the mayor of Kathmandu Metropolitan City in Nepal 
regarding what Nepal might learn from China: “Nepal is rich in culture, language and 
festivals which should be preserved for future generations. Chinese experience on 
preservation and development of cultural heritages can be very useful for us.” On their 
part, students at the Confucius Institute got to know positive things about China such as 
its civilization and culture, while previously they had largely perceived China as a maker 
of substandard goods. 
Overall, there is more awareness of than attraction for Chinese culture. In fact, 
culture does not figure high in student impressions and experiences. China is a 
‘newcomer’ on the cultural scene, whereas for centuries Nepal has shared cultural affinity 
with India. Nepalese people are used to Indian food, entertainment, music, dresses, and 
are fans of Indian entertainment figures. For instance, Bhandari (2017) notes in Sixth 
Tone, an online publication on China: 
China is taking its chances and investing heavily to make its mark on the 
entertainment landscape in countries such as Nepal...China’s soft power offensive 
is still dwarfed in many countries by competition from India and South Korea. 
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Bollywood [India’s film industry] enjoys enormous popularity in South Asian and 
Middle Eastern countries due to linguistic and cultural similarities, while South 
Korean pop music has been successful in captivating teens across Asia with its 
catchy tunes and flashy style. (para. 7) 
Bhandari (2017) also writes that Tsering Rhitar Sherpa, a Kathmandu-based 
filmmaker, is leading China’s Ode to Joy TV series project in Nepal but finds it 
challenging because “most Nepalis look to India and its often-patriarchal soap operas” 
(para. 4). This was found true in the case of the interviewees also. For instance, Nisha, a 
respondent in my study, wrote, “I did not have much idea about Chinese culture due to 
our cultural affinity [with India]. These visits [organized by the Chinese institution to 
Chinese historical places] gave me a chance to know about [their] values and culture.” As 
evident from students’ experiences, cultural awareness is increasing, though cultural 
embracement is challenging. It may be added that China has achieved phenomenal 
success in the consumer market in Nepal. As Shakya (2015) notes: 
Particularly among the Nepali elite, China has a positive image not because of aid 
but because it has replaced India as the source of sought-after goods. Its consumer 
products are penetrating every level of the market from refrigerators to 
cellphones, and almost 100% of cellphones sold in Nepal are Chinese-made. 
Among social media users, China’s WeChat system23is the most popular means of 
communication among Nepalis. (para. 3) 
China is apparently keen on replicating this success on the cultural front. As far as 
                                                 
23 This thesis does not delve into the specificities of Nepalese people's use of WeChat, such as the impact 
on Nepal's security (because of possible Chinese surveillance) or the user privacy. But the popularity of 
WeChat among Nepalese cannot be denied. Participants in this study were also users of WeChat, though 
interviewed them via other tools. 
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language dissemination is concerned, online sources revealed a growing popularity of the 
Chinese language among Nepalese students and professionals. Those who learned 
Chinese at the Confucius Institute at Kathmandu University (CIKU) reported forgetting 
how to speak it, apparently because they did not get to speak it once they finished the 
course. In comparison, those who had studied and stayed in China had a better ability to 
speak Chinese because of the requirement to learn Chinese in the first year of the 
program and through practice gained out of speaking Chinese with Chinese people in 
public places such as shops. Thus, although CIKU has emerged as an important avenue 
for Chinese language learners, its effectiveness in benefiting the learners is not much in 
evidence. Though online sources feature stories of Nepalese sellers and tourists 
benefiting from learning Chinese, gains for regular students in acquiring Chinese-
speaking skills were not reported in the interviews because of the limitations of the 
program and lack of opportunities to practice. 
Furthermore, the Chinese government’s projection of the CI as one meeting the 
global demand for learning Chinese did not match with the participants’ perception of the 
CI as serving China’s interests such as promotion of its goods, projection of the China’s 
image, and cultural appeal. In other words, the participants did not have any particular 
appreciation for the CI other than having fun at the Institute. As a former student shared, 
his impression was that China was reaching out to Nepalese people to promote its 
language rather than the other way around. Thus, on the cultural front, China’s soft power 
has not made substantial gains in appeal to Nepalese students. However, a soft power 
benefit in terms of projecting a positive image of China or introducing China to Nepalese 
students has been an achievement of the Confucius Institute, as highlighted in Chapter 
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VI. This aspect echoes the viewpoint of Gil (2009) who writes: “...but the actual 
influence and benefits China gains from this project [the Confucius Institute] are 
currently limited to shaping preferences in language learning and attitudes towards 
China” (pp. 59-60). As such, my findings in Nepal’s context contradict the opinion of 
Falk Hartig who has researched Confucius Institutes. He says: 
I think only people who have a rather positive image of China would go to a 
Confucius Institute. So no one who really has issues with China would go to a 
Confucius Institute and afterwards would say: “Oh, the Confucius Institute really 
changed my perception of China.” (Funnell, 2015, para. 34) 
Chinese values in practice. As far as Chinese values are concerned, participants 
reported mixed experiences. While they were impressed with work-ethic and motivation 
on the part of Chinese and found Chinese people warm and friendly, they reported 
unpleasant experiences of racial prejudices and color discrimination and found social 
indifference to others’ concerns amid busyness of life given to work, technology, and 
money-making. The lack of empathy is corroborated by online stories of “deepening 
moral crisis” (Zhang, 2011) in China such as lack of care and response for a TV 
journalist in pain on the flight and even after the landing of the plane (MTJ828, 2015); 
and the public’s neglect of the plight of the two-year old girl who was run-over twice. 
Discrimination by skin color among Chinese patients was noted by some 
Nepalese students in Chinese medical programs. Even though some participants 
apparently internalized discrimination saying, “it happens everywhere,” the fact that such 
practices interfered with their internship experience and part-time jobs points to the social 
characteristic that is at odds with the Chinese leadership’s vision of a harmonious 
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Chinese society. 
Imprint of the West: Western soft power? Evident in participants’ perceptions 
and observations was the impact of the West on China in terms of culture, education, and 
lifestyle. In fact, students’ use of the words “copying the West” suggests that the Chinese 
leadership is faced with the challenge of presenting Chinese culture in a purer form to 
outsiders as it sets its eyes on spreading its cultural appeal outside the home frontiers. Is 
there a wide mismatch between President Xi Jinping’s vision and reality? In its cultural 
scramble with the West, the foreign perception among Nepalese students that Chinese 
society is “copying” the West exposes the limitations of President Xi Jinping’s zealous 
attempts to sustain China’s “cultural lifeline” by restoring Confucianism. On September 
24, 2014, in his address to the International Confucian Association in Beijing in 
commemoration of the 2,565th anniversary of the birth of Confucius, President Jinping 
stated: 
The ideology and culture of today’s China is also the continuation and 
sublimation of traditional Chinese ideology and culture. To understand present-
day China, to know the present-day Chinese, one must delve into the cultural 
bloodline of China, and accurately appreciate the cultural soil that nourishes the 
Chinese people. (Jinping, 2014, para. 24) 
Also, this study revealed several students’ experience of preference to Western 
people in jobs and fairer treatment in Chinese society. While on the one hand, the 
Chinese leadership, fired by hyper-nationalism, is attempting to take on the West in the 
global power hierarchy, on the other hand, the mindset and attitude of the Chinese society 
appears self-defeatist—rather, the captive of the calcified inferiority complex vis-à-vis 
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the West. Furthermore, the observation of a participant in this study that it is the 
Confucius Institute that is urging foreign countries like Nepal to learn Chinese (not the 
other way around) echoes the key message in an article in The Economist, “China spends 
billions to make the world love it.” According to David Shambaugh, it spends around $10 
billion a year on the soft power project to sell its “brand”—a state-sponsored “image 
building program”— “one that has the ability to attract people from other countries in the 
way that America does with its culture, products and values” (“China is spending 
billions,” 2017, para. 2). 
Creating a Constituency of Supporters 
Joseph Nye, the originator of the concept of soft power, considers attractiveness 
or agreement with a country’s foreign policy a source of its soft power, assessed through 
a foreign audience’s endorsement to the country’s foreign policy, their positive images, 
reservoir of goodwill, and their receptivity to its presence or strategic initiatives in one’s 
own country, whether related to trade, business, or geopolitics. In this regard, foreign 
youth are considered a crucial source of support because they are future leaders whether 
in politics, business, or any other field, and also important actors in bilateral relationship.  
This study reveals that China has a growing constituency of admirers in Nepalese 
students, including professionals who studied in China. The participants included those 
currently working in Chinese companies in Nepal as well as those who looked forward to 
working with Chinese companies or organizations. 
In addition, analysis of data from online sources revealed that the Arniko Society 
is involved in boosting Nepal’s cultural linkages with China, co-organizing China 
education exhibitions (and thus promoting Chinese higher education programs), as well 
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as serving China’s strategic interests in Nepal such as on the Tibet issue. Interestingly, 
the involvement of the Arniko Society in the Tibet issue, in whatever degree, exhibits 
China’s soft power influence over the Society, which in turn strengthens China’s hard 
power over Tibetans. Thus, it is a reinforcement of hardness through softness. Already, 
the Nepalese government has taken such measures against Tibetan refugees as 
detainment of those who attempt to cross over to India. In this regard, it is pertinent to 
quote the Nepalese journalist Sradda Thapa who finds a conflict between Nepal’s 
democratic identity and the treatment meted out to Tibetans. She remarks, “We are a 
sovereign state and it puzzles my generation — who were taught to value democracy — to 
witness our government deny the same to Tibetans in Nepal” (Bork, 2011, Nepal’s 
Community section, para. 7). 
The following observation of China expert David Shambaugh also fits in this 
emerging scenario in Nepal, though Shambaugh’s views are in the context of China’s 
education diplomacy in East Asia. 
 Calculating the influence of this academic training on future generations of Asian 
elites will be difficult to measure with any precision, but their experiences while 
in China will certainly sensitize them to Chinese viewpoints and interests. In 
addition, they will possess knowledge of the Chinese language, as well as Chinese 
society, culture, history, and politics. Those who enter officialdom may be more 
accommodating of Chinese interests and demands. They will also share personal 
connections with former classmates and will move up through professional 
hierarchies simultaneously. (Shambaugh, 2004/2005, p. 78) 
However, what is also important for unleashing the potential of goodwill is the 
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role of society in general — how it treats foreign students. While the Chinese government 
wants positive narratives about China to flourish, which is crucial for building soft 
power, the negative impressions about the Chinese society could undermine the goodwill 
that China might be earning among Nepalese students through scholarships or by 
building infrastructure in their country. Hence, soft power turns out to be the fine sand 
that slips through easily; it could be lost with inattention to one aspect of attraction 
regardless of the strength in another. 
There is also a word of caution for the Nepalese youth. If they are not aware of 
the complexity of political and economic issues surrounding China’s investment, with 
implications for Nepal’s interest, it would be naive on their part to support China’s 
initiatives without appraisal on rational grounds. For instance, China is pushing for its 
traditional medicine (TCM) in Nepal through the Arniko Society, consisting of doctors 
and other professionals who studied in China. If TCM finds inroads into Nepalese 
market, it will benefit China monetarily and culturally especially in competition with the 
Western medicine. However, given the controversy surrounding the efficacy of TCM, 
Nepalese doctors and medical authorities would need to be cautious in endorsing it. 
Similarly, the “strict conditions” attached with Chinese investments is not new to South 
Asia. In fact, the stringency was cited as a factor in why South Asian countries such as 
Nepal were compelled to scrap deals such as the one on the hydropower project. A social 
sciences student in this study spoke of the responsibility of Nepal to derive gains from 
ties with China. In his words, “we have to make sure that we are getting benefits out of 
this relationship.” Interestingly, Nepalese students interviewed in this study endorsed 
China’s BRI, believing it to be in Nepal’s interest by providing routes for supply of 
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Nepalese goods and by ending India’s monopoly. But they are not experts who have got 
details on how the BRI actually helps Nepal. 
As noted by Bhaskar Koirala, an expert on Nepal-China relations: 
OBOR [BRI] is important for Nepal but this is not everything for us. We have 
never talked about getting our basics on the trade with China right. We have huge 
trade deficit with China as well. We are primarily an agriculture-based economy. 
But we never talk about exporting our agro-goods to China. At the moment, 
Nepali agricultural products are not allowed into Chinese market. We need to 
negotiate with China to get preferential access for our agricultural goods. 
(Koirala, 2017, last para.) 
Hence, the onus is on the Nepalese youth to protect their country’s interest 
through a deeper understanding of complex issues with competence to negotiate with 
China. 
Building a Positive Image 
Building a positive image underpins an overarching motivation to build soft 
power. Mixed images of China based on academic, cultural and social experiences have 
been presented in the preceding section. It further emerges from this study that China’s 
political system (governance more specifically) and its foreign policy initiative – the BRI 
– have found favor with Nepalese students. It may be recalled that political system and 
foreign policy are sources of soft power in Joseph Nye’s framework. 
Interestingly, as experts say, China has focused more on the cultural part of soft 
power, knowing that its political system is not found favorable to the West. However, of 
late Chinese President Xi Jinping has been more vocal in advancing the Chinese model of 
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development. In fact, China’s governance drew accolades from Nepalese students with 
several of them favoring such system in their own country (for example, in terms of less 
politicization of the Nepalese society), and the rest of them – while not wanting to 
emulate the Chinese system – did praise the Chinese system for delivering the goods. It 
turns out that if the political elites in their country could deliver, Nepalese students would 
not have spoken favorably of China’s system. But it is not certain that the replication of 
China’s political model would guarantee good governance elsewhere. Instead, political 
reform in terms of institutional capacity and political will could be less risky and more 
desirable. In any case, what is worth-noting is that China has found a constituency for its 
political system among some Nepalese youth who seem to have lost faith in their own 
political leaders. As such, Nepalese students’ perception of Chinese political system is 
that it injects political and social discipline and fosters economic progress. 
Major gains to China in the realm of foreign policy are three-fold, which are 
explained as below. 
China versus the West. Nepalese students’ unfavorable views of the West 
reflected in their criticism of the Western media, the Western (Anglo-American) model 
of development, the curriculum focus on Western values such as courses in Nepal that 
incorporate exclusively Western theories, and the dominant Western theoretical construct 
in international relations. These views were expressed by the students in the social 
sciences program. Concomitantly, they exhibited familiarity and appreciation for 
concepts employed by the Chinese leaders such as “harmonious civilization,” and 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Such an attitude is perhaps a vindication of the 
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Chinese government’s efforts to curb the influence of the West in China — for instance, 
Western values and Western curriculum. 
Negative effect on India’s influence. Mostly online sources revealed Nepalese 
students’ admiration for China’s “policy of non-intervention,” which had a concealed 
reference to comparison with India. Interestingly, these views were published in The 
China Daily, which is China’s official newspaper. But in any case, China’s soft power in 
Nepal is being built around the context of India. It is being welcomed as a counterweight 
to India’s monopoly of the routes to supply goods, making Nepalese youth look to China 
for friendship and Nepal’s development. Ironically, a participant in this study specifically 
mentioned the blockade of 2015 and admired China for its humanitarian help.  
Importantly, he did not mention the Indian government’s aid and the Indian people’s 
support. Comparing the attitude of Indian public and Chinese people in solidarity with 
Nepal, Tsering Shakya notes: 
The earthquake in Nepal did not arouse a wave of public sympathy in China, 
unlike the mass support and concern conveyed in India...The earthquake was 
hardly discussed on the vibrant social media in China, and there was no rush 
among the public to collect donations to send to Nepal. (“Is China building up,” 
2015, para. 4) 
Finally, the respondents (social science students)24 in this study were supportive 
of the BRI, which runs counter to India’s non-acceptance of the project. Interestingly, 
their perceptions of China’s foreign policy were framed by the context of Nepal, rather 
than being informed or influenced by China’s aggressive postures elsewhere such as 
                                                 
24 It does not mean that medical students were not supportive. But social science students specifically 
referred to BRI in telling about their knowledge of China. 
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muscle-flexing in the South China Sea and rejection of the international tribunal’s ruling 
in the South China Sea case (Phillips, Holmes and Bowcott, 2016, July 12). Nevertheless, 
Nepalese students alluded favorably to Indian teachers, Indian peers and Indian cuisine in 
their responses in this study. 
Conclusion 
To sum up, this study addressed the following research question: what is the 
relationship between Nepalese students’ experiences and China’s soft power aims? The 
sub-questions centered on the students’ academic experiences and experiences with 
social, cultural and political values of China as well as China’s soft power aims in Nepal. 
Gains to China in soft power consist in (a) wielding a positive image among Nepalese 
students largely because of, what the students found, China’s good governance (or the 
deliverance capacity of its political system) beauty of the country, infrastructural 
development, and certain traits of the Chinese people such as diligence; (b) familiarizing 
Nepalese students with Chinese culture such as festivals; and (c) finding a base of 
supporters in Nepalese youth for China’s strategic interests in Nepal. However, China’s 
soft power or attraction is lacking in three areas: the image of its education system; its 
cultural penetration; and the image of its society. Apart from getting a couple of positive 
remarks, China’s education system did not win admiration of the Nepalese students nor 
does it have a brand reputation in Nepal. Also, China’s cultural appeal to Nepalese 
students was not found to be strong, while the experiences of racism and xenophobia 
formed negative images of the Chinese society among Nepalese students. As such, China 
faces some serious deficiencies as it strives to build soft power in Nepal.
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the foregoing chapters, this chapter outlines the major implications of 
this study for international education, the soft power concept, and the existing literature. 
Afterwards, it offers recommendations, discusses the limitations of the study, and 
presents the conclusion. 
Major Implications 
The key implications of this study are grouped into the following: travesty of 
international education; exclusivity of soft power; international education as a platform of 
foreign policy; difference in experiences of other foreign students; and convergence with 
and divergence from Nye’s framework. 
Travesty of International Education 
Realistically speaking, China’s soft power gains in attracting Nepalese students 
and exposing them to China are partly pedestalled on the ills of and loopholes in Nepal’s 
education system. Thus, in the scenario of international education, while one country is 
internationalizing its institutions to become a global hub, the other has caused 
disillusionment among its own youth because of unaffordable medical education, lack of 
provision of installments, and corruption in admission process. While some online 
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sources (Kharel, 2013), as mentioned before, highlight cases of “incompetence” and lack 
of seriousness on the part of students who could not get admission in Nepal, it does not 
absolve the domestic system of its flaws. 
Interestingly, Nepalese policy makers are relying on foreign countries to build the 
country’s human capital base and are keen to foster friendly ties with them but do not 
seem interested in stemming the domestic rot. For instance, at the opening ceremony of 
the China Education Exhibition in Kathmandu in May 2013, Nepalese Minister of 
Education Madhav Paudel, the chief guest, stated, “China is developing very fast and we 
have very good friendly relations with China. By these educational opportunities and 
exchanges, Nepali and Chinese people will have good friendly relations in people to 
people level” (“Nepali students throng,” n.d., para. 4). In this process, they seem to be 
ignoring the “compulsions” driving Nepalese students to study abroad.  For example, an 
MBBS student said in a sunken voice that he could not get admission in Nepal despite 
good percentage because he came from a middle-class family without adequate financial 
power to get into the system. He intended to complete his degree in China so that he 
could go back and take care of his mother and sister. Karuna said that if there were more 
colleges or medical seats in Nepal, she would have preferred studying in her own 
country. She also said that people in Nepal do not appreciate what difficulties Nepalese 
students go through in studying in a foreign country and rather downplay the academic 
achievements in studying in China. In her words: 
We have friends here but how much will they help? In Nepal, we have family 
support.  Who can help us here? They can’t. So we have to do everything on our 
own. We have to bear responsibility. It’s difficult. We wish we studied in Nepal- 
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we would have got better experience. Here we are getting but we are not that 
satisfied. 
Though the above respondent pointed to help from friends and also from teachers 
(Chapter V), she pointed to challenges of living in a foreign country without family, such 
as sickness. Another student’s response reflected determination when she urged fellow 
Nepalese students to prove that they were not inferior to doctors trained elsewhere, that 
is, outside China, and called upon them to take studies seriously rather than frittering 
away time on fun. As such, it is high time Nepalese policy makers and education 
authorities address the limitations of higher education institutions in Nepal. This is 
especially important because the medical students shared that they do not get enough 
clinical exposure in China owing to such barriers as the language and that they rather 
preferred the Nepalese teachers’ active role in clarifying the concepts that they had 
experienced in Nepal before coming to China. Reforms may also include permitting 
Nepalese graduates to do internships in Nepal because the interns highly value the local 
experience. In other words, while China may be celebrating its soft power gains and 
while Nepalese leaders may be cheering over finding human capital formation avenues, 
the Nepalese higher education sector has been relegated to the persisting practices that 
could benefit from reform. 
Exclusivity of Soft Power: Zero-Sum Gains 
 China’s soft power benefits can be juxtaposed against disadvantages to both 
Nepal and India. Let us take Nepal first. Nepalese students were found comparing 
governance in their own country to that in China, with disdain for the political system in 
Nepal. It causes a sentiment of deficit toward admiration for one’s own country and a 
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gain in approbation for another. The ideological benefit to China on the front of one party 
rule is issuing from the lack of sound governance in Nepal. The first-hand evidence of 
development impressed on the study participants the necessity of political reform in 
Nepal, though not necessarily in terms of adopting the Chinese system. Similarly, this 
study underscores significance for Indian policy makers and practitioners who need to be 
circumspect in relaying messages to the Nepalese youth. Unlike Chinese authorities, the 
Indian bureaucracy or the Indian Embassy in Nepal is not assiduous or even attentive in 
cultivating the current generation or the Nepalese students who studied in India, which 
testifies to loopholes in Indian public diplomacy. 
Difference in Experiences of Other Foreign Students 
This study addresses a serious deficiency by reflecting the nearly unique voice 
and perspective of Nepalese students in the existing literature on China’s international 
education, which is heavily focused on other regions, notably Africa. Some instances 
may be noted here. The findings in terms of student satisfaction and China’s soft power 
benefits underscore some variation. For example, Haugen (2013) writes in the context of 
experience of African students in China, “teaching methods based on rote learning and 
discouragement of critical engagement with the teacher during class caused frustration” 
(p. 13). On the contrary, in this research the respondents from social science backgrounds 
pointed out that classes were interactive, while medical students had a problem with the 
lack of English proficiency. Also, Haugen concludes, “the main effect of the current 
influx of African students to China is not to enhance the illustrious Chinese soft power. 
Rather, it is yet another manifestation of China’s growing old-fashioned economic power 
based on the export of manufactured goods” (p. 17). In contrast, this study brings out the 
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soft power factor as an effect of Nepalese students’ exposure to China. 
Second, participants in this study had a mix of negative and positive experiences 
with Chinese society, rather than mostly negative experiences that are documented in the 
case of student respondents in Gillespie’s (2001) study. Importantly, Nepalese students 
did not report encountering institutional discrimination or prejudices while Gillespie 
revealed African students’ bitter experiences on campus as well. Similarly, though both 
in Gillespie’s (2001) research and in this study, financial considerations prominently 
weighed in students' decision to study in China, the Gillespie’s participants spoke about 
receiving scholarships as “an enabling factor,” while participants in this study — most of 
whom were self-funded — mentioned affordability and alternative destination (for 
example, because of non-admission in the home country) as primary reasons. 
Furthermore, unlike participants in Gillespie (2001) who wished to study abroad 
in any case (though China was mostly not the first choice), medical interviewees in this 
study had compulsion to study abroad or in China for the reasons outlined in Chapter V. 
While the above areas of comparison are some examples, readers will get to 
discern more points of comparison with the existing literature, including students’ 
impressions of and experiences with the Confucius Institute. 
Connection with the Institutional Integration Scales Model 
Though this study, which is qualitative, did not use Institutional Integration Scales 
(IIS) to examine students’ university experience, the responses of the participants in some 
measure fall into the components of this model. The IIS was used by Dong and Chapman 
(2010) in their investigation of perceptions of Chinese government scholarship recipients 
in Shanghai and Beijing in relation to the experience in China. Dong and Chapman 
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(2010) modified the IIS which was originally developed by Pascarella and Terenzini 
(1980) to examine college experience of students in the United States. Its subscales are 
the following: peer group interactions; interactions with faculty; faculty concern for 
student development and teaching; academic and intellectual development; and 
institutional and goal commitment. The first three components measure social integration 
and the last two measure academic integration of the students. While social integration 
relates to “the informal education of students” (Lyons, 2007, p. 10), academic integration 
pertains to “both grade performance and his [/her] intellectual development during the 
college years” (Tinto, 1975, p. 104). 
Let us see how the model reflects in my research findings. In terms of peer 
interaction, respondents reported less interaction with Chinese peers because of separate 
classes and separate accommodation, though sharing the class with students from other 
countries provided a multicultural ambiance. However, help from Chinese peers in 
translating technical terms was reported by an aeronautical engineering major. Though 
interaction with the Chinese faculty did not figure starkly in students’ responses, other 
than classroom discussions, faculty’s intervention in dealing with an unpleasant social 
situation was mentioned by a medical student. Faculty concern for students’ development 
reflected in student participants’ narration of the Chinese faculty’s attention to students’ 
diagnosis skills. In terms of goal commitment, medical students appeared to own personal 
responsibility for success as they talked of the importance of “self-study,” while also 
expressing dissatisfaction with the teaching style and the level of English proficiency of 
Chinese instructors. 
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International Education as a Platform for Foreign Policy 
The findings on soft power aims, discussed in Chapter IV and subsequent 
chapters, underscore the elements of public diplomacy and state control in international 
education. First, public diplomacy manifests in its course offerings such BRI courses that 
familiarize foreign students with China’s flagship foreign policy project and in the 
activities of the Confucius Institute in Nepal in earning goodwill for China and spreading 
bright stories of China, including positive aspects of the Maoist revolution (in cases 
where the documentaries on Chinese history are shown to Nepalese students) and 
Chinese economy. Second, instructors in Chinese universities function under specific 
constraint when it comes to discussing “sensitive” issues; also, the instructors reportedly 
put forth China’s case in such courses as international trade law and international 
relations. In fact, in the current regime led by President Xi Jinping, Chinese intellectuals 
have been instructed not to discuss the following seven issues: “universal values, freedom 
of the press, civil society, civil rights, past mistakes by the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP), crony capitalism, and judicial independence” (Li & McElveen, 2013, para. 2). 
Thus, the instructor’s identity appears to be fused with the national identity in protecting 
China’s national interest.25 As Rachit, a Ph.D. participant in this study opined, Chinese 
academics have one way of thinking, which impinges on their research. This propensity 
was identified as a particular challenge to conducting research in social sciences in China. 
Convergence with and Divergence from Nye’s Framework 
This study incorporated Nye’s soft power framework— culture, political ideals 
                                                 
25 However, one can find through media outlets the instances of Chinese academics such as Zhang 
Xuezhong and Xia Yeliang who have been defiant and have championed free speech and the rule of law. 
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and foreign policy— into the educational soft power model. Furthermore, Nye says that 
soft power consists in the “ability to shape the preferences of others” (Nye, 2004, p. 5). 
Using both interviews and archival literature, this study has revealed the crucial role of 
education in this regard. In brief, whether through the Confucius Institute or through 
exposure of Nepalese students to China, preferences of Nepalese students have been 
shaped in terms of their desire to learn Chinese, appreciation of the political system of 
China with a strengthening belief in the political reform in Nepal for development and 
political stability, and endorsement to China’s BRI project. However, some points of 
divergence from Nye’s views emerge in this study. 
First, as mentioned in Chapter II, China’s notion of soft power encompasses 
economic inducement as a soft power tool (Kurlantzick, 2006), while Nye keeps 
inducement within the purview of hard power. From the Chinese perspective, foreign 
attraction toward the Chinese education program based on low cost and scholarships and 
the resulting increase in enrollments would constitute a gain in China’s soft power. In 
fact, the Chinese government raised the stipend of government scholarships for foreign 
students in 2015. Undergraduates, master’s students, and Ph.D. students will be entitled 
to 66,200 yuan ($10,660), 79,200 yuan and 99,800 respectively on an annual basis (Rao, 
2015). 
Second, Nye includes political ideals as a source of soft power. Writing about 
attractiveness of American ideals, he notes, “Seduction is always more effective than 
coercion, and many values like democracy and human rights, and individual 
opportunities are deeply seductive” (Nye, 2004, p. x). However, in this study, the 
outcome of governance, rather than China’s political ideals per se, held attraction for 
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Nepalese students. It is true that some participants in my study upheld belief in their own 
political system on the ground of civic freedom, but they converged on the understanding 
that China’s single-party rule had quickened the development process. They were 
appreciative of the prevailing law and order in China, while lamenting the lack of 
political stability in Nepal with repercussions for development. As such, pragmatism 
rather than the nature of the political ideal per se permeated Nepalese students’ 
perception of Chinese polity. 
Third, comparing the US and China, Nye points out that much of America’s soft 
power comes through its civil society such as universities and Hollywood, while Chinese 
soft power comes through state efforts or the government investment in soft power 
projects. As such, Nye considers it China’s “soft power deficit.” This study reveals that 
Chinese universities (which signifies the role of the civil society) contribute to China’s 
soft power by offering low-cost options to foreign students. It must, however, be 
conceded that the academic freedom is limited by the Chinese government’s guidelines 
such as restrictions on discussing certain topics. This partly lends credence to Nye’s 
argument about the fragile role of civil society in China’s soft power build-up.  But 
interestingly, the soft power effect of the foreign civil society seems to be in the offing as 
China piggybacks on such sections of the Nepalese society such as the alumni association 
and the Nepal China Cultural and Educational Council to buttress its soft power outreach. 
Recommendations 
On the basis of the findings and implications of this study, key recommendations 
for a varied audience can be put forth. First, reforms in medical education in Nepal may 
include: lower costs; a provision to pay the tuition fee in installments; approval to 
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complete and internship in Nepal for Nepalese medical graduates from foreign countries; 
curbs on corruption in admission process; and increase in the number of medical seats in 
colleges. Second, Chinese universities can provide an enriching learning experience to 
international students through improvement in the English proficiency of the teachers. 
Third, it is critical for continuous improvement that they seek international students’ 
feedback on their learning experiences and academic satisfaction. Fourth, reform in 
governance in Nepal would help address discontent among Nepalese youth who yearn for 
economic development and political stability.  It is understandable there will need to be a 
collective effort of the Nepalese society as a whole to achieve this change as political 
leaders are just part and parcel of the society. Fifth, the Chinese leadership should realize 
that in attracting and winning the international students, as part of building build soft 
power, the mechanism of higher education is not enough. The mindset of the larger 
society, reflecting in openness to foreigners and non-discriminatory treatment, is essential 
for enhancing the nation’s appeal. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Limitations to this research include participant recruitment and representation. I 
attempted to triangulate the findings from the interviews with the Nepalese students who 
studied in China through interviews with participants who might bring additional 
perspectives, such as Confucius Institute teachers, the Nepalese Ministry of Education, 
and the Arniko Society. Also, I aimed to recruit students who are currently learning 
Chinese at the Confucius Institute in Kathmandu. But for the reasons mentioned in 
Chapter III, this could not be possible. Second, the interviews took place from off-site 
locations through communication devices. The positive aspect was that the use of 
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technology such as social media facilitated my identification of and access to participants 
from as many as six different regions of China. However, the current students at the 
Confucius Institute in Kathmandu could not be reached via social media (for example, the 
Facebook membership of the Institute’s members is relatively low). As such, only the 
alumni were interviewed. Third, there were more males than females interviewed for this 
study. I had to rely largely on social media to contact prospective participants, and the 
social media outlets had a predominant membership of males (which could be possible 
because more Nepalese males than Nepalese females are studying in China). 
Future research may include more non-medical students and more female 
participants. Also, by taking a field-trip to Nepal, a researcher may get to recruit current 
learners of the Chinese language at the Confucius Institute and thereby assess their 
learning outcomes and experiences in the current scenario at the Institute. If the 
researcher is also able to interview the Chinese language instructors at the Institute, it will 
triangulate the findings from interviews with the learners. However, it is not certain that 
the interviewees will open up to the researcher in a face-to-face interview, unlike the 
interviewees who shared certain eye-opening experiences with me over the phone or 
WhatsApp. The reverse could also be true – in which case, it will certainly be enriching 
for this research topic should a future researcher get the time to establish trust with the 
prospective interviewees and fathom their academic experiences at the Institute as well as 
their knowledge of China’s socio-cultural and political values. Further, when conducting 
soft power research in countries whose political systems discourage candid appraisals of 
their programs, future researchers may need to establish rapport with prospective 
participants through personal meetings to assuage the participants’ possible concerns in 
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sharing their experiences or information. 
Furthermore, the role of online course offerings from China could be an 
additional area of investigation in exploring students’ experiences. Also, it may focus on 
the institutional integration dimension in examining South Asian students’ experiences 
through a quantitative perspective, as discussed in the section on implications. 
Conclusion 
In the context of China’s internationalization of higher education (IHE), this study 
has at least three areas of significance. First, the findings provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the soft power underpinnings of internationalization of China’s higher 
education vis-à-vis Nepal as well as an assessment of success in building soft power in 
relation to students’ experiences. The domains of international relations (through the soft 
power concept) and higher education have intersected in this study to inform the 
literature on IHE. Second, by providing a picture of international students’ experiences in 
the host country, this study should be a useful reference for reform in China and 
elsewhere. Third, the focus on South Asia bridges a critical gap in the IHE literature that 
has been confined to other regions, especially in relation to China.  
Overall, China’s soft power gains reflect in positive narratives in Nepalese 
students’ description of China as a country marked by good governance — reflected in 
order, safety and security — and sound economic development, and also in appreciation 
for its BRI project as well as in the emergence of a constituency of supporters for 
advancing China’s strategic interests in Nepal. As Chinese President Xi Jinping said in 
2014, “We should increase China’s soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better 
communicate China’s message to the world” (Xi, 2014, para. 10). Also, an increased 
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number of Nepalese students are being exposed to China, which satisfies another 
objective of China’s Plan for Study in China. 
At the same time, there are serious challenges on other fronts.  China has a long 
way to go in creating a brand name in Nepal, in spite of holding an impressive place in 
the global ranking of higher education institutions. The current focus of China is to boost 
enrollments as a mark of influence of its higher education program. But in the absence of 
reputation based on quality, it will continue to be surpassed by other countries in 
attracting self-funded students. Also, it will be a hard nut to crack if prospective students 
are swayed by their perception of the country as a whole rather than the ranking of 
institutions. 
The fact that there is a greater awareness of Chinese culture and an increasing 
popularity of the Chinese language indicates a good beginning for China in Nepal, even 
though cultural penetration would be challenging. In terms of social experiences in 
China, the Nepalese students’ observation of social apathy and experience of racism can 
be categorized as social disharmony and a social mindset unwelcoming of human 
diversity. It flings a challenge to the Chinese leadership’s desire to see a spurt in positive 
accounts of China; its efforts to build the country’s soft power is obstructed by prejudices 
entrenched in the Chinese society. Hence, it appears that China’s soft power success 
hinges on the support of its civil society as well. By this reasoning, the soft power of 
countries — notably the United States (or the US society) — which are acclaimed for 
openness to foreigners, poses a challenge to China’s soft power. Furthermore, the image 
of the US as a more advanced, affluent and open country holds attraction for Nepalese 
students who are interested in working in the US, if given an opportunity. However, the 
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silver lining for China is that with its generous offering of scholarships to foreign 
students, it is steadily getting an opportunity to project China’s positive image in political 
governance and economic progress, especially among students from developing 
countries. 
Despite the emerging base of China’s supporters in Nepal, China’s desired 
outcomes through friendship with Nepal are not guaranteed if Nepalese policy makers do 
not find cooperation with China a win-win outcome and also because of the complexities 
in decision-making and implementation in a democratic country like Nepal. It is not 
enough to win over individuals. In the words of Zhao Gancheng, head of South Asian 
studies at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, “China needs to protect itself 
more to guarantee that it is signing the deal with the whole country, not the person 
governing it at that moment” (Lo, 2017, para. 25). This observation was in the context of 
Nepal’s withdrawal from the $2.5 billion deal with China on building a dam on the Budhi 
Gandaki river (The Economic Times, 2017). It is argued that China’s stringent financial 
terms as well as the “political divide” within Nepal (pro-India faction versus pro-China 
faction) led to Nepal’s withdrawal. 
As such, it is a moot question whether the Nepalese youth as future political elites 
are swayed by positive images of China or are cautious in protecting their country’s 
national interest through better negotiation with China. As Nye (2006) admits, “Whether 
power resources [including the soft power ones] produce a favorable outcome depends 
upon the context” (para. 1). As such, several further questions arise. Would China 
cultivate a coterie of Nepalese alumni and professionals by providing financial incentives 
— the use of “hard soft power” — to circumvent possible domestic opposition to its 
189 
strategic initiatives in Nepal such as infrastructure projects? Currently, Nepalese alumni 
are mostly in the non-political field such as medicine and engineering. Would the 
Nepalese political elite in the future share an academic background of having studied in 
China? And does it matter? How concretely will China benefit from its attempt at a 
strategic utilization of higher education in the context of Nepal?
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Appendix A 
Demographic Questionnaire for Students 
Please answer the following questions. Those studying at the Confucius Institute can skip 
questions 8 through 12. 
1. What is your age? 
2. Please indicate your gender. 
3. Which of the following applies to you? 
a.  Alumni    b. Currently studying in China   c. Studying at the Confucius 
Institute 
4. What is the level of your proficiency in the Chinese language? 
5. What was your academic qualification before joining this program? 
6. In which country did you get your previous academic credentials? 
7. What’s your profession? 
8. What’s the name of your current university? 
9. Are you pursuing/did you pursue a degree program or non-degree program in 
China? 
10. What degree program are you pursuing/did you pursue and at what level in 
China? 
11. How long have you been in China? 
12. In which language are you receiving/did you receive instruction in China? 
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Appendix B 
Interview Questions 
For Current Students/Alumni 
1. Could you talk about your experience as an international student in China? 
a. In social, cultural and political terms 
b. In terms of academic experience 
c. In terms of comparison of academic experience in China to that in Nepal 
2. What have you liked/did like being in China? What is it that you have not liked/ 
didn’t like or found challenging? 
3. What did you learn about China and Chinese life from your experience? 
a. What do you know about Chinese social values? 
b. Is your feeling toward the experience a positive/negative/mixed one? 
4. If you were to describe what it means to study in China, what would you say? 
5. What tools and resources did you gain from your experience? 
6. Was there anything that happened that you did not expect to happen? 
a. What are/were your main reasons for studying in China? 
b. What benefits are you expecting/did you expect from studying here? 
7. Were there things you expected to happen that did not? 
a. What are/were your main reasons for studying in China? 
b. What benefits are you expecting/did you expect from studying here? 
c. What are the challenges to realizing your expectations? (For current  
students)/To what extent have your expectations been met? (For alumni) 
8. What are your plans for the future?  
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9. What advice would you give to a student from Nepal considering studying in 
China? 
10. Is there anything else you would like to tell me? 
For Students at the Confucius Institute 
1. Could you talk about your experience as an international student in China? 
a. In social, cultural and political terms 
b. In terms of academic experience 
c. In terms of comparison of academic experience in China to that in Nepal 
2. What have you liked/did like being in China? What is it that you have not liked/ 
didn’t like or found challenging? 
3. What did you learn about China and Chinese life from your experience? 
a. What do you know about Chinese social values? 
b. Is your feeling toward the experience a positive/negative/mixed one? 
4. If you were to describe what it means to study at the Confucius Institute, what 
would you say? 
5. What tools and resources did you gain from your experience? 
6. Was there anything that happened that you did not expect to happen? 
a. What are/were your main reasons for studying at the Confucius Institute? 
b. What benefits are you expecting/did you expect from studying here? 
7. Were there things you expected to happen that did not? 
a. What are/were your main reasons for studying at the Confucius Institute? 
b. What benefits are you expecting/did you expect from studying here? 
c. What are the challenges to realizing your expectations? (For current  
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students)/To what extent have your expectations been met? (For alumni) 
8. What are your plans for the future?  
9. What advice would you give to a student from Nepal considering studying at the 
Confucius Institute? 
10. Is there anything else you would like to tell me? 
For Experts 
1. How did you come to be interested in Nepal-China foreign relations? 
2. What do you know about Nepal-China higher education relationships? 
3. What do you know about China’s Confucius institutes, particularly the institute in 
Nepal? 
4. What do you think are the driving factors behind China’s involvement in the 
Nepalese higher education sector? 
5. What are the mutual benefits and drawbacks of China’s involvement in educating 
Nepalese students? 
6. What do you think about the future of China-Nepal relationship in higher 
education? 
7. What do you think are the objectives of China’s soft power strategy in South 
Asia? 
8. What is the role of higher education in serving China’s soft power goals in South 
Asia? 
9. Is there anything else you would like to tell me? 
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Appendix C 
No Objection Certificate 
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Appendix D 
Consent Forms 
Consent Form for Students Currently Studying in China/Alumni 
My name is Romi Jain. I am a Ph.D. student with specialization in policy studies 
in the Urban Education Program at Cleveland State University. 
I am conducting a research study on experiences of Nepalese students with regard 
to China’s higher education programs. Dr. Anne Galletta is the principal investigator and 
Dr. Joanne Goodell is a co-investigator. Both are members of the College of Education 
and Human Services faculty at Cleveland State University. 
If you agree to participate, I will ask you questions about your academic, social, 
cultural and political experiences during study in China. It will be one interview session 
with a possible follow-up session. Each will last about 45 minutes. 
With your consent, I will record the interview by audio-tape/software. Your 
privacy will be maintained through one-one-one session(s), and you may end the 
interview at any time or choose not to answer a question. 
Your answers will be kept confidential. The interview audio-tapes will be 
transcribed and given a code. Your name will not appear on transcription. Only members 
of the research team will have access to transcripts and tapes.  
The information received in this interview, including interview excerpts, will be 
included in a publication(s) such as a book or an article or a report. 
Your name will not be attached with the excerpts or transcripts or report(s). 
Possible risks include discomfort from a 45-minute interview or emotional 
discomfort during experience sharing. In that case, you may stop the interview at any 
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time without penalty. Another possible risk is an unintended breach of confidentiality. To 
lessen this risk, audiotapes and the consent form will be kept in a locked cabinet in Dr. 
Galletta’s office. The interview transcript will be maintained in Dr. Galletta’s office and 
in password-protected computers of the research team for a minimum of three years. 
Participation in this study is voluntary. Hence, you do not have to participate if 
you do not want to. 
 If you have any questions about this study, you may contact me at +1 (216) 370-
3129 or by email at < r.jain17@vikes.csuohio.edu> or Dr. Anne Galletta at +1 (216) 802-
3044 or Dr. Joanne Goodell at +1 (216) 687-5426. 
This form has two copies. After signing them, please keep one copy for your 
records and return the other one. 
Thank you in advance for your support and cooperation! 
Please indicate your agreement to participate by signing below. 
I am 18 years or older. I have read and understood this consent form. I agree to 
participate in the interview. 
____ Yes                                  ____ No 
I agree to have the interview audio-taped. 
____ Yes                                  ____ No 
I understand if I have any questions about my rights as a research subject, I can 
contact the Cleveland State University Institutional Review Board at +1 (216) 687-3630. 
Name of Participant (please print) ________________________________ 
Signature_____________________________ Date: _____________ 
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Consent Form for Alumni/Students Currently Studying at the Confucius Institute at 
Kathmandu University, Nepal 
 
My name is Romi Jain. I am a Ph.D. student with specialization in policy studies 
in the Urban Education Program at Cleveland State University. 
I am conducting a research study on experiences of Nepalese students with regard 
to China’s higher education programs. Dr. Anne Galletta is the principal investigator and 
Dr. Joanne Goodell is a co-investigator. Both are members of the College of Education 
and Human Services faculty at Cleveland State University. 
If you agree to participate, I will ask you questions about your academic, social, 
cultural and political experiences at the Confucius Institute at Kathmandu University. It 
will be one interview session with a possible follow-up session. Each will last about 45 
minutes. 
With your consent, I will record the interview by audio-tape/software. Your 
privacy will be maintained through one-one-one session(s). You may end the interview at 
any time or choose not to answer a question. 
Your answers will be kept confidential. The interview audio-tapes will be 
transcribed and given a code. Your name will not appear on transcription. Only members 
of the research team will have access to transcripts and tapes.  
The information received in this interview, including interview excerpts, will be 
included in a publication(s) such as a book or an article or a report. 
Your name will not be attached with the excerpts or transcripts or report(s). 
Possible risks include discomfort from a 45-minute interview or emotional 
discomfort during experience sharing. In that case, you may stop the interview at any 
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time without penalty. Another possible risk is an unintended breach of confidentiality. To 
lessen this risk, audiotapes and the consent form will be kept in a locked cabinet in Dr. 
Galletta’s office. The interview transcript will be maintained in Dr. Galletta’s office and 
in password-protected computers of the research team for a minimum of three years. 
Participation in this study is voluntary. Hence, you do not have to participate if 
you do not want to. 
 If you have any questions about this study, you may contact me at +1 (216) 370-
3129 or by email at < r.jain17@vikes.csuohio.edu> or Dr. Anne Galletta at +1 (216) 802-
3044 or Dr. Joanne Goodell at +1 (216) 687-5426. 
This form has two copies. After signing them, please keep one copy for your 
records and return the other one. 
Thank you in advance for your support and cooperation! 
Please indicate your agreement to participate by signing below. 
I am 18 years or older. I have read and understood this consent form. I agree to 
participate in the interview. 
____ Yes                                  ____ No 
I agree to have the interview audio-taped. 
____ Yes                                  ____ No 
I understand if I have any questions about my rights as a research subject, I can 
contact the Cleveland State University Institutional Review Board at +1 (216) 687-3630. 
 Name of Participant (please print) ________________________________ 
Signature_____________________________ Date: _____________ 
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Consent Form for Experts 
 
My name is Romi Jain. I am a Ph.D. student with specialization in policy studies 
in the Urban Education Program at Cleveland State University. 
I am conducting a research study on experiences of Nepalese students with regard 
to China’s higher education programs. Dr. Anne Galletta is the principal investigator and 
Dr. Joanne Goodell is a co-investigator. Both are members of the College of Education 
and Human Services faculty at Cleveland State University. 
If you agree to participate, I will ask you questions about experiences of Nepalese 
students in China and at the Confucius Institute at Kathmandu University. I will also ask 
you about the role of China’s soft power strategy vis-a-vis Nepal. It will be one interview 
session with a possible follow-up session. Each will last about 45 minutes. 
With your consent, I will record the interview by audio-tape/software. Your 
privacy will be maintained through one-one-one session(s), and you may end the 
interview at any time or choose not to answer a question. 
Your answers will be kept confidential. The interview audio-tapes will be 
transcribed and given a code. Your name will not appear on transcription. Only members 
of the research team will have access to transcripts and tapes.  
The information received in this interview, including interview excerpts, will be 
included in a publication(s) such as a book or an article or a report. 
Your name will not be attached with the excerpts or transcripts or report(s). 
Possible risks include discomfort from a 45-minute interview or emotional 
discomfort during experience sharing. In that case, you may stop the interview at any 
time without penalty. Another possible risk is an unintended breach of confidentiality. To 
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lessen this risk, audiotapes and the consent form will be kept in a locked cabinet in Dr. 
Galletta’s office. The interview transcript will be maintained in Dr. Galletta’s office and 
in password-protected computers of the research team for a minimum of three years. 
Participation in this study is voluntary. Hence, you do not have to participate if 
you do not want to. 
If you have any questions about this study, you may contact me at +1 (216) 370-
3129 or by email at < r.jain17@vikes.csuohio.edu> or Dr. Anne Galletta at +1 (216) 802-
3044 or Dr. Joanne Goodell at +1 (216) 687-5426. 
This form has two copies. After signing them, please keep one copy for your 
records and return the other one. 
Thank you in advance for your support and cooperation! 
Please indicate your agreement to participate by signing below. 
I am 18 years or older. I have read and understood this consent form. I agree to 
participate in the interview. 
____ Yes                                  ____ No 
I agree to have the interview audio-taped. 
____ Yes                                  ____ No 
I understand if I have any questions about my rights as a research subject, I can 
contact the Cleveland State University Institutional Review Board at +1 (216) 687-3630. 
Name of Participant (please print) ________________________________ 
Signature_____________________________ Date: _____________ 
